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Black v. United States
08-876
Ruling Below: United States v. Black, 530 F.3d 596 (7th Cir. 2008).
Because the defendants deprived their employer of honest services by paying themselves phony
management fees disguised as compensation for covenants not to compete, the alleged
inducement in the form of money from a third party (anticipation that Canadian government
would not treat compensation as taxable income) is no defense to the charge of honest services
fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1346. The defendants forfeited objection to jury instruction, which
required only finding that they deliberately failed to render honest services and did so to obtain
private gain, by opposing the government's request at trial that jury be required to make separate
findings on money or property fraud and honest services fraud.
Questions Presented: (1) Does 18 U.S.C. § 1346 apply to the conduct of a private individual
whose alleged "scheme to defraud" did not contemplate economic or other property harm to a
private party to whom honest services were owed? (2) May court of appeals avoid review of
prejudicial instructional error by retroactively imposing onerous preservation requirement not
found in federal rules?
UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
V.
Conrad M. BLACK, John A. Boultbee, and Mark S. Kipnis, Defendants-Appellants.
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Decided June 25, 2008
[Excerpt: some footnotes and citations omitted]
POSNER, Circuit Judge
[A jury convicted Black and three co-
defendants of mail and wire fraud in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 and Black of
obstruction of justice in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1512(c). The defendants were
senior executives at Hollinger International,
which was essentially controlled by Black
through Ravelson, a Canadian company
controlled by Black.
The defendants set up a $5.5 million
payment from another company disguised as
a covenant not to compete, but the payment
was never approved by Hollinger's audit
board, nor was it ever disclosed to the
shareholders. In fact, the payments were
made directly to the defendants, who were
not entitled to any payment.
The Court then declines to discuss a second,
equally compelling fraud count, stating that
it is not necessary to the outcome of the
case.]
The evidence established a conventional
fraud, that is, a theft of money or other
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property from Hollinger by
misrepresentations and misleading
omissions amounting to fraud, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1341. But the jury was also
instructed that it could convict the
defendants upon proof that they had
schemed to deprive Hollinger and its
shareholders "of their intangible right to the
honest services of the corporate officers,
directors or controlling share-holders of
Hollinger," provided the objective of the
scheme was "private gain." That instruction
is the focus of the appeals.
Section 1346 of the federal criminal code,
added in 1988 in order to overrule McNally
v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987),
defines "scheme or artifice to defraud" in
section 1341 to include a scheme or artifice
to "deprive another of the intangible right of
honest services." The defendants do not
deny that Hollinger was entitled to their
honest services. They were senior executives
of Hollinger and owed the corporation
fiduciary obligations, implying duties of
loyalty and candor. It is not as if Black had
merely been using his power as controlling
shareholder to elect a rubber-stamp board of
directors or to approve a merger favorable to
him at the expense of the minority
shareholders. He was acting in his capacity
as the CEO of Hollinger when he ordered
Kipnis to draft the covenants not to compete
and when he duped the audit committee and
submitted a false 10-K. On his own theory,
the fees that he collected, which the jury was
entitled to find were never owed to him,
were management fees rather than
dividends. The defendants' unauthorized
appropriation of $5.5 million belonging to a
subsidiary of Hollinger was a misuse of
their positions in Hollinger for private gain,
which is just the kind of conduct that we
said in United States v. Bloom, 149 F.3d at
655-57 (7th Cir. 1998), was the essence of
honest services fraud.
So if the jury found such a misappropriation.
this would mean that the defendants, having
both deprived their employer of its right to
their honest services and obtained noney
from it as a result, were guilty of both types
of fraud. Nothing is more common than for
the same conduct to violate more than one
criminal statute. But the section 1346
instruction, which we quoted, did not require
that the jury find that the defendants had
taken any money or property from
Hollinger; all it had to find to support a
conviction for honest services fraud was that
the defendants had deliberately failed to
render honest services to Hollinger and had
done so to obtain a private gain. The
defendants do not deny that they sought a
private gain. But they presented evidence
that it was intended to be a gain purely at the
expense of the Canadian government. They
argue that for the statute to be violated, the
private gain must be at the expense of the
persons (or other entities) to whom the
defendants owed their honest services-a
group not argued to include the Canadian
government.
They are making a no harm-no foul
argument, and such arguments usually fare
badly in criminal cases. Suppose your
employer owes you $100 but balks at
paying, so you help yourself to the money
from the cash register. That is theft, even
though if the employer really owes you the
money you have not harmed him. You are
punishable because you are not entitled to
take the law into your own hands.
Harmlessness is rarely a defense to a
criminal charge; if you embezzle money
from your employer and replace it (with
interest!) before the embezzlement is
detected, you still are guilty of
embezzlement.
The application of this principle to honest
services mail and wire fraud is straight-
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forward. As explained in United States v.
Orshurn, section 1346 was added "to deal
with people who took cash from third parties
(via bribes or kickbacks). United States v.
Holzer, 816 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1987),
supplies a good example. Judge Holzer
accepted bribes from litigants. What he took
from his employer, the state's judicial
system, was the honest adjudication service
that the public thought it was purchasing in
exchange for his salary." Similarly, if the
defendants in this case deprived their
employer, Hollinger, of the honest services
they owed it, the fact that the inducement
was the anticipation of money from a third
party (the anticipated tax benefit) is no
defense.
This case is different from those we have
cited because Canada was not bribing the
defendants with the offer of a tax benefit.
But the distinction is unrelated to anything
in the text or purpose of section 1346. The
grant of a tax benefit is a purposive act,
which confers a benefit on the grantor just as
a voluntary transfer of money or property to
him does; in fact it is a voluntary transfer of
money. The defendants do not argue that
they were trying to defraud Canada; they
argue that their recharacterization of
management fees as compensation for
granting covenants not to compete was
proper under Canadian tax law, even if the
receipt of the payments violated American
law. Canada, they contend in effect, was
willing to "pay" the defendants in the form
of a tax benefit in order to advance Canadian
policy.
And if the defendants were trying to defraud
Canada, that augmentation of their
wrongdoing would not help their case.
Suppose a third party gives a bribe to a
buyer for a department store, and the buyer
pockets the bribe but does not carry out his
side of the bargain, which was that he would
purchase supplies from the principal of the
person who bribed him. The buyer has
deprived his employer (the department
store) of his honest services, and has done so
for private gain, but he has conferred no
benefit on a third party. Judges who accept
bribes invariably argue that they didn't
allow the bribes to influence their decisions.
But a judge who accepts bribes deprives the
judiciary of his honest services even if, as
contended by Francis Bacon, the most
famous of corrupt judges, he does nothing
for the person who bribed him. Such a case
does not differ materially from that of the
"honest" recipient of a bribe-the recipient
who, committed to honor among thieves,
performs his side of the illegal bargain.
Notice, too, how honest services fraud
bleeds into money or property fraud. In the
procurement case, the eagerness of the
seller's agent to make a sale might enable
the purchasing agent to negotiate a better
price, to the financial benefit of his
employer; instead he takes the "better price"
in the form of a bribe. In this case, had the
defendants disclosed to Hollinger's audit
committee and board of directors that the
recharacterization of management fees
would net the defendants a higher after-tax
income, the committee or the board might
have decided that this increase in the value
of the fees to them warranted a reduction in
the size of the fees. If $10 in tax-free income
is worth $15 to the recipient in taxed
income, the employer who learns about the
tax break may require the employee to
accept in tax-free income less than $15 in
taxed income.
This is not to say that every corporate
employee must advise his employer of his
tax status. But the defendants had a duty of
candor in the conflict-of-interest situation in
which they found themselves. Instead of
coming clean they caused their corporation
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to make false filings with the SEC, and they
did so for their private gain. Such conduct is
bound to get a corporation into trouble with
the third party and the SEC.
Even if our analysis of honest services fraud
is wrong, the defendants cannot prevail.
There is no doubt that the defendants
received money from APC and very little
doubt that they deprived Hollinger of their
honest services; whether they also got (or
hoped to get) a tax break from the Canadian
government was not an issue at trial, as the
defendants acknowledged, albeit back-
handedly, when they said in their reply brief
in this court that the theory "that defendants
,misused' their positions at [Hollinger] for
personal gain in the form of Canadian tax
benefits" was "the very theory the
government propounded up to the eve of
trial" (emphasis added). It was not the
government's theory at trial.
The defendants point out that Yates v.
United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957), held
that if the instructions permit the jury to
convict of a nonexistent crime, the fact that
they also permit it to convict of a genuine
crime will not save a conviction declared in
a general verdict. That is different from a
case in which two correct theories of
illegality are presented in the instructions
and there is sufficient evidence to convict
only on one; the jury is assumed to have
followed the instruction on the
government's burden of proof and therefore
to have rejected the insufficiently supported
theory. But a jury that is given an illegal
instruction cannot be assumed not to have
followed it, since juries are neither
authorized nor competent to make
judgments of law.
An error in jury instructions is subject to the
harmless error doctrine. Submitting an
illegal theory to the jury may or may not be
subject to it; it is an issue on which the
courts of appeals are divided. But giving an
instruction that omits a qualification
required to make it unambiguously correct is
different from submitting a case to a jury on
an erroneous theory of criminal liability.
The prosecution did not ask the jury to
convict the defendants because their private
gain was at Canada's expense. The
government's honest services theory was
straightforward. It was that the defendants
had abused their positions with Hollinger to
line their pockets with phony management
fees disguised as compensation for
covenants not to compete. Had the jury
believed that the payments for the covenants
not to compete were actually management
fees owed the defendants, as the defendants
argued, it would have acquitted them.
If the jury had been given a special verdict
that separated the two types of fraud, and
had indicated on the verdict that the
defendants were not guilty of an honest
services fraud, the challenge to the
instruction would be moot. The defendants
were not required to request a special
verdict. But there is a wrinkle in this case
that shows they forfeited their objection to
the instruction: the government requested a
verdict that would require the jury to make
separate findings on money or property
fraud and on honest services fraud. The
defendants objected-they wanted a general
verdict. In effect, they wanted to reserve the
right to make the kind of challenge they are
mounting in this court.
They are reduced to arguing that the judge
after receiving the verdict should have told
the jury to determine whether it had found
both a money or property fraud and an
honest services fraud. That procedure was
tentatively approved by the Third Circuit in
United States v. Riccobene, 709 F.2d 214,
228 n. 19 (3d Cir. 1983), although that court
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has since made clear that it is better to give
the jurors the interrogatories on the same
form as the verdict. Questioning the jurors
after they have handed down their verdict is
not a good procedure and certainly not one
that a district judge is required to employ;,
nor has the Third Circuit so suggested. The
defendants' proposal could if adopted create
a nightmare in which the jury renders a
general verdict; the jurors are polled and
think they're about to be released from their
term of indentured servitude-here four
months-and be free to get on with their
lives; and then they are told they must take
an exam so that the judges and lawyers can
know exactly how they evaluated the
various theories presented to them in the
instructions. Must they resume
deliberations? And if they disagree, what
then-an Allen charge?
Three more issues need to be discussed. The
first is whether an "ostrich" instruction
should have been given....
An ostrich instruction tells the jury that to
suspect that you are committing a crime and
then take steps to avoid confirming the
suspicion is the equivalent of intending to
commit the crime. Suppose you think
you've rented your house to a drug gang, but
to avoid confirming your supposition you
make sure not to drive near the house, where
you might observe signs of drug activity.
That would be the equivalent of knowledge
that you had rented the house to the gang. It
would be a case of physical avoidance of
confirmation of one's suspicions but there is
also psychological avoidance, which is the
type alleged here and which requires the
jury's "distinguishing between a defendant's
mental effort of cutting off curiosity, which
would support an ostrich instruction, and a
defendant's simple lack of mental effort, or
lack of curiosity, which would not support
an ostrich instruction." United States v.
Carrillo, 435 F.3d 767, 780 (7th Cir. 2006).
It is the distinction between willful
ignorance and ordinary ignorance.
The defendants argue that either they knew
they were taking money that they were not
entitled to, or they were entitled to it; there
is no middle ground. But there is.
Remember that the defendants received the
payments in question not from Hollinger but
from APC, which the evidence showed did
not owe them any management fees. If you
receive a check in the mail for $1 million
that you have no reason to think you're
entitled to, you cannot just deposit it and
when prosecuted for theft say you didn't
know you weren't entitled to the money-
that it might have been a random gift from
an eccentric billionaire. You would have
strongly suspected that you weren't entitled
to the money and you would therefore have
a duty to investigate. By shutting your eyes
you tacitly confessed your all-but-certain
knowledge that you were stealing the
money.
The defendants argue that the judge gave an
inadequate limiting instruction with respect
to the jury's use of the false filings with the
SEC. The instruction, although correct, was
abrupt: "You have heard evidence in this
case regarding the disclosures of non-
competition payments in Hollinger
International's quarterly and annual reports
and proxy statements in 2001 and 2002. The
defendants in this case are not charged with
securities fraud." It was important for the
jury to understand that it could use the false
filings to infer that the defendants had been
trying to conceal their receipt of the
payments but that the filings themselves
were not charged as crimes.
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The defendants proposed a misleading
instruction as an alternative. It substituted
for the second sentence ("The defendants in
this case are not charged with securities
fraud") the following: -The defendants are
not charged with making false or misleading
statements in these filings, and you may not
conclude that a defendant is guilty of mail or
wire fraud based on any alleged false
statements or omissions in any of these
filings." The defendants were "charged," in
the sense of accused, of making false
statements in these filings. And the jury was
entitled to base a judgment of guilt "on any
alleged false statements or omissions in any
of these filings," provided that the false
statement or omission was material to the
alleged mail or wire fraud. At argument, the
lawyer who had proposed the instruction
told us at first that he had made other, oral
submissions as well. But when reminded
that he had said in his brief that he had
"proposed a series of limiting instructions,
culminating with this request for the final
charge"-the proposed instruction that we
quoted-he backed off.
If one party submits an instruction that is
accurate but could be made clearer, and the
other party submits a misleading instruction,
the judge can go with the first instruction.
Not that the cases require "that a submitted
charge be technically perfect to alert the
court to the need for a particular charge."
Bueno v. City of Donna, 714 F.2d 484, 490
(5th Cir. 1983). But given the number and
skill of the defendants' lawyers, the
misleading character of their proposed
instruction cannot be regarded as a merely
"technical" failing, as opposed to an effort to
mislead. Nor was the judge's instruction
erroneous; it was merely terse.
The defendants raise some other points in
their 161 pages of briefs, but none that has
sufficient merit to require discussion. The
judgments are
AFFIRMED.
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"Conrad Black's Anti-Fraud Case Will Go to Supreme Court"
Los Angeles Times
May 18, 2009
David G. Savage
Reporting from Washington-The Supreme
Court announced Monday that it would hear
an appeal from jailed newspaper executive
Conrad Black, who contends he was
wrongly convicted under a broadly worded
anti-fraud law that makes it a crime to
deprive someone of "honest services."
Black, a Canadian-born historian and media
magnate, was prosecuted in Chicago for
allegedly skimming more than $5.5 million
from Hollinger International and the
Chicago Sun-Times to finance a lavish
lifestyle. Black said the money was a
"management fee," but prosecutors said it
had not been approved by Hollinger's board.
A jury convicted him in 2007 on three
counts of mail fraud and one count of
obstruction of justice, and he was sentenced
to 6 1/2 years in prison in central Florida.
In his appeal on Black's behalf, Washington
lawyer Miguel Estrada pointed out that his
client had been acquitted of charges that he
treated his company as his "personal piggy
bank," but was convicted of fraud on the
grounds that he deprived the company and
its shareholders of his "honest services."
Estrada said this "vaguely worded criminal
prohibition" allows prosecutors to charge
corporate executives and public officials
with crimes, even without proving they
wrongly took money for themselves.
"This was not fraud in the old-fashioned
sense of the ten. If the court agrees, he
would be at least entitled to a new trial,"
Estrada said.
Congress expanded the anti-fraud law in
1988 to combat public corruption. Usually, a
fraud involves a scheme to deprive someone
of their money or property, but the expanded
law said it was a fraud to "deprive another
of the intangible right of honest services."
The law is aimed at officials who engage in
kickback schemes to benefit themselves or
their friends. In recent years, this law has
been a favorite tool of prosecutors because it
permits prosecutions for questionable
schemes that do not necessarily result in a
loss to the government or a business.
Last year, Robert Sorich, an aide to Chicago
Mayor Richard Daley, and two other former
city officials who were convicted in a
patronage hiring scheme raised the same
issue in an appeal to the high court. Their
appeals were turned away earlier this year,
but Justice Antonin Scalia dissented and said
the court should act to clarify the law.
Estrada cited Scalia's dissent in his appeal.
Last month, U.S. Solicitor General Elena
Kagan urged the court to reject the appeal.
Black and his codefendants "had abused
their positions with Hollinger to line their
pockets with phony management fees," she
said. But on Monday, the court issued a one-
line order saying it had agreed to hear the
case of Conrad Black vs. the United States
during the fall.
If the court were to rule for Black and
broadly reject the notion of "honest
services" fraud, it could allow persons who
have already been convicted under this law
to file a writ of habeas corpus to reopen their
cases.
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"Convictions of Black, 3 Other Execs Upheld"
Chicago Sun-Times
June 26, 2008
Mary Wisniewski
Former media baron Conrad Black engaged
in a "conventional fraud," a federal appeals
court said Wednesday in upholding the
convictions of Black and three other former
Hollinger International executives.
All had been found guilty last summer of
cheating the newspaper company, whose
holdings include the Chicago Sun-Times,
out of $6.1 million.
A three-judge panel of the 7th U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals unanimously rejected
defense claims that the prosecution unfairly
criminalized sophisticated business
transactions that gave the defendants money
they'd earned.
Besides Black, now serving his 6 1/2-year
prison term in Florida, the judges upheld the
convictions of Peter Y. Atkinson and John
A. Boultbee of Canada and Mark S. Kipnis
of Northbrook.
"The court found clear evidence that all four
defendants engaged in a brazen, multi-
million-dollar corporate fraud scheme," U.S.
Attorney Patrick Fitzgerald said.
Black's attorney, Andrew Frey, called the
decision "very disappointing" and said, "We
are carefully studying our options."
Cyrus Freidheim Jr., Sun-Times Media
Group Click for Enhanced Coverage
Linking Searches's chief executive officer,
said, "We're pleased that it happened as
quickly as it did and as decisively."
The company plans to proceed with $500
million in civil claims against the convicted
defendants and others.
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"Judges Appear Cool to Black Appeal"
Chicago Tribune
June 6, 2008
Susan Chandler
Conrad Black s hopes of getting his criminal
convictions overturned were dimmed
Thursday as his attorney received a highly
skeptical reception from a panel of three
judges at the 7th U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals.
Andrew Frey, the attorney handling Black's
appeal, made little headway as he tried to
argue that Black and other former Hollinger
International Inc. executives didn't steal
from the Chicago-based media company
when they carved out individual non-
competition payments for themselves from
the proceeds of newspaper sales around the
country.
In the case of a $5.5 million payment, Frey
said the money was owed to the Canadian
executives anyway as "management fees"
and therefore Hollinger International
shareholders were not hurt.
U.S. Appeals Judge Richard Posner, one of
the court's most forceful jurists, didn't
appear to be buying it. There was no point in
debating arcane legal points, he said, when
"the bulk of the evidence [in the Hollinger
case] has to do with pretty naked fraud."
Posner also was resistant to Frey's
contention that Black never intended to
obstruct justice when he removed boxes
from his Toronto office 10 days before he
was to be evicted. A Canadian court order
prohibited the removal of documents
without the permission of a special monitor.
Frey told the judges that Black believed his
files had already been copied and turned
over to federal authorities by his attorneys.
"Did the Justice Department go through the
documents?" Posner asked Frey. The answer
was no.
Black was found guilty in July of defrauding
Hollinger International and obstructing
justice after a four-month trial. The jury
acquitted him on nine other counts. Black, a
conservative press baron who bought the
Chicago Sun-Times in 1994, was sentenced
to 6 1/2 years in prison. He began serving
his sentence in early March and was not
allowed to attend the appeal's oral
arguments.
In a Thursday morning e-mail to the
Tribune, Black expressed optimism about
the outcome. "If it has been essentially
decided on the written arguments, I can't
imagine us not doing well, as we waxed the
floor with them in the briefs and replies. But
I have been astonished at the miscarriages of
justice that have occurred already, so it
should be approached with caution."
As the hearing ended Frey asked the judges
to allow Black to go free on bond until their
final decision is reached, which could be
months away.
Outside the courtroom Frey didn't want to
offer an opinion of how the hearing went.
"It's in the lap of the gods," he said. "We'll
see what happens."
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"Media Tycoon Begins Term in Federal Prison"
Orlando Sentinel
March 4, 2008
Stephen Hudak
COLEMAN-Disgraced media mogul
Conrad Black surrendered Monday to
authorities at the federal prison complex
here to begin serving a 6 1/2-year sentence
on charges he illegally siphoned money
from his international newspaper empire.
Black, 63, a member of Britain's House of
Lords and an acclaimed biographer of
Franklin Roosevelt and Richard Nixon,
officially became inmate number 18330-424
at 12:49 p.m., said Felicia Ponce, a U.S.
Bureau of Prisons spokeswoman in
Washington, D.C.
His incarceration has attracted international
attention, particularly from news agencies in
Canada and Great Britain where he is known
as Lord Black.
Convicted of fraud and obstructing justice,
the high-profile Black was placed in the
low-security prison in Coleman, located 50
miles northwest of Orlando and a three-hour
drive from his home in Palm Beach.
Ponce said federal inmates are generally
housed in facilities within 500 miles of
home, a courtesy to the prisoner's family.
The media baron, who has maintained his
innocence, remains convinced he will be
vindicated, said his appellate lawyer,
Andrew L. Frey of New York.
"He is a strong person, and I am confident
that he will soldier through this," Frey said
in an e-mail to the Orlando Sentinel.
-But he firmly believes he has done nothing
unlawful, which makes it difficult to have to
suffer even one day of imprisonment."
A Canadian-born business tycoon, Black
once headed a sprawling newspaper empire
that included The Daily Telegraph of
London, the Jerusalem Post and the Chicago
Sun-Times.
He often dined with heads of state, business
executives and rock stars.
But at the Coleman correctional complex, he
will be among 7,447 inmates required to
dish grub, scrub toilets or perform other
menial tasks for 12 to 40 cents an hour. He
could eventually win a job in the prison's
law and leisure libraries, where he could
tutor other inmates, Ponce said.
She said Black will be treated no differently
than other inmates at the complex's low-
security unit, which houses 1,995 prisoners.
He will wear the standard-issue uniform: a
khaki, button-down shirt with collar and
khaki pants.
Ponce said Black's day will begin at 6 a.m.
and end no later than 11:30 p.m., when
cellblock lights are turned out. He will have
a cellmate in one of the prison's 7-by-8-foot,
double-bunk cubicles.
Federal prisoners at Coleman can exercise
on a jogging track and in a recreation yard,
but there are "no spas, no tennis courts, no
golf courses," Ponce said.
A federal jury in Illinois convicted Black of
defrauding shareholders of Hollinger
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International Inc., once among the world's
largest newspaper-holding companies. The
largest papers-with the exception of the
Sun-Times-have since been sold.
Black, who led Hollinger for eight years as
both chairman and chief executive officer.
was found guilty of pirating $6.1 million
from the Chicago-based newspaper group
now known as the Sun-Times Media Group
Inc.
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"Unbowed Black Gets 6 1/2 Years"
Chicago Tribune
December 11, 2007
Ameet Sachdev
Two dramatic questions loomed over the
Chicago federal courtroom Monday when
former press tycoon Conrad Black arrived
for sentencing.
How much time would Black, the jet-setting
executive and author, face in federal prison
for his role in the looting of the Chicago
Sun-Times' parent company? And, given his
record as an outspoken and at times strident
defender of his innocence, what would he
say to the judge?
The day provided surprises on both counts.
U.S. District Judge Amy St. Eve sentenced
Black to 6 1/2 years in prison, rejecting a
government bid for a stiffer sentence of
about 20 years, which would have had the
practical effect of sending the 63-year-old to
prison for the remainder of his life. Black
also was fined $125,000 and has to forfeit
$6.1 million in ill-gotten gains, but not his
home in Palm Beach, Fla., and other assets
prosecutors had requested.
When it came time to make his comments,
Black was uncharacteristically brief and at
times even contrite-in his own way. Black
expressed "profound regret" for the huge
financial losses that shareholders of
Chicago-based Hollinger International Inc.
suffered after he left the company in 2004.
He also apologized for the medical problems
that have beset him, his family and his co-
defendants since the corporate saga began
four years ago.
While he refrained from asserting his
innocence, he concluded, to no one's
surprise, without apologizing for his actions
that led to the conviction or admitting
criminal wrongdoing.
It was up to the judge to have the last word,
making a personal observation that both
Black's supporters and detractors have
asked themselves as well.
-I frankly cannot understand how somebody
of your stature, on top of the media empire
you were on top of, can engage in the
conduct you did and put everything at risk,
including your reputation and integrity," St.
Eve said.
Indeed, the former chairman and chief
executive of Hollinger, once one of the
largest newspaper companies in the world, is
going to prison for stealing $6.1 million
from shareholders and obstructing justice by
removing 13 boxes of documents from his
Toronto office after he was warned not to do
so.
The amount of the theft is a fraction of
Black's wealth at his peak about a decade
ago when he was a globe-trotting media
baron leading a life of luxury among the
upper echelons of society, spending time in
the company of such people as Henry
Kissinger and Elton John and taking on the
British title Lord Black of Crossharbour.
But now all that's left of that empire, which
once included holdings in the U.S., Canada,
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Great Britain and Israel, is the Sun-Times
and a group of suburban papers. The stock
of the company, now known as the Sun-
Times Media Group Inc., trades at about $1,
down from a high of $20.35 in 2004.
weighed down by a circulation scandal
under Black's watch and nearly $200
million in legal fees it spent defending Black
and other former Hollinger executives.
One shareholder, in addressing the court
Monday as a victim, urged the judge to
make an example out of Black, for looking
out for himself instead of investors and
employees.
"This didn't have to happen," said Eugene
Fox, managing director of Cardinal Capital
Management LLC in Greenwich, Conn.
"[Black] had many opportunities along the
way to make different choices."
Black's stunning downfall began about four
years ago when other shareholders started
asking questions about payments Black and
other executives had received following
sales of Hollinger newspapers. At the time,
Black dismissed the complaints as "an
epidemic of shareholder idiocy."
Ultimately, the grumbling led to an
independent board inquiry and criminal
allegations that Black and his cohorts had
looted the company of about $32 million
through a scheme in which they disguised
bonuses to themselves as payments not to
compete with the new owners of its
newspapers. Some of these "non-compete"
payments were not disclosed to shareholders
or even Hollinger's audit committee.
Black, a native of Canada who gave up his
citizenship when he became a British lord,
was forced to resign from the company he
built and controlled. Since his indictment in
2005, Black has heaped scorn on the
government, calling the evidence "flimsy"
and even referring to the team of federal
prosecutors as "Nazis." He has maintained
his innocence since his conviction in July,
saying he was acquitted of nine of the 13
charges against him. He recently told one
British interviewer that he has done
"absolutely nothing wrong."
"Mr. Black. even today, has refused to
acknowledge the point behind his being here
today was his own greed and his own
disdain for rule of law," Assistant U.S. Atty.
Eric Sussman, the lead prosecutor, told the
judge at the sentencing hearing.
In his comments to the court, Black was
quick to point out that he "never once
uttered one disrespectful word about this
court, your honor, the jurors or the process."
He plans to appeal.
When asked whether he was satisfied with
the length of the sentence, U.S. Atty. Patrick
J. Fitzgerald told The Associated Press: "Mr.
Black is going to prison a convicted felon,
convicted of fraud. So we proved the case.
The bottom line is Mr. Black will do 6 1/2
years in jail. That's a serious amount of
time."
St. Eve apparently was unfazed by Black's
lack of remorse. She made several favorable
rulings on his behalf before deciding on a
78-month term. She took a conservative
estimate of the damage from Black's fraud,
deciding he was responsible for $6.1 million
in losses and not $32 million as the
prosecutors had suggested.
St. Eve also based her decision on more
lenient sentencing guidelines in effect when
the fraud occurred, instead of the rules in
place now. Finally, the judge said there
should not be a big discrepancy between
Black's sentence and the 29 months his
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deputy, F. David Radler, is expected to
receive when he is sentenced on Dec. 17.
She described Black and Radler equally
culpable. Radler pleaded guilty to one count
of fraud before the trial and testified against
Black in court.
The judge gave Black three months to get
his affairs in order before he must report to
prison on March 3. She suggested he serve
his time at the prison camp at Eglin Air
Force Base in Florida.
A jury also had found Black's co-
defendants, Peter Atkinson, John Boultbee
and Mark Kipnis, guilty of three counts of
fraud. Atkinson, 60. a former executive vice
president, was sentenced to two years in
prison. Boultbee, 64, the former chief
financial officer, received 27 months.
Kipnis, 60, the corporate counsel based in
Chicago, will not serve time. The judge
sentenced him to five years of probation in
part because Kipnis did not receive any non-
compete payments.
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"Dark Day for Lord Black"
Chicago Tribune
July 14, 2007
Ameet Sachdev, David Greising and Susan Chandler
Unmoved by testimony about a jet-setting
lifestyle at company expense but certain that
Hollinger International Inc. had been
pilfered, a federal jury on Friday found press
baron Conrad Black guilty of the lesser but
still serious charges of obstruction of justice
and three counts of mail fraud.
With Black's former business partner F.
David Radler serving as a star witness
against him, prosecutors had accused Black,
62, of masterminding a racketeering
conspiracy that allegedly plundered more
than $60 million from Hollinger, owner of
the Chicago Sun-Times, the London Daily
Telegraph and other newspapers.
The jury in its verdict found that Black
illegally had taken a relatively modest $2.9
million. On the strength of a videotape that
showed Black personally removing 13 boxes
from his Toronto office in the middle of the
government's fraud investigation, the jury
also ruled that Black had impeded the
investigation.
Black's conviction marks the stunning
downfall of one of Canada's most prominent
businessmen, who used the power of the
press to become an international celebrity
known as much for his right-wing views as
his high-wattage living.
Born to wealth in Canada, Black parlayed a
tidy investment in a group of community
newspapers into a media empire with
holdings in the U.S., Great Britain, Israel
and Canada. Black recruited such luminaries
as Henry Kissinger and former Illinois Gov.
James R. Thompson to his board, and he
entertained global movers and shakers at
parties, some funded with Chicago-based
Hollinger's money.
The verdict also culminates a saga that first
unfolded four years ago, at the height of the
scandals over lax corporate governance in
the wake of wrongdoing at Enron Corp.,
Tyco Inc. and other companies.
Black's hold over Hollinger began to
unravel when a little-known shareholder, the
investment firm Tweedy, Browne Co.,
complained publicly about millions of
dollars that Black and other top Hollinger
executives personally received as part of the
company's sale of dozens of newspapers in
the U.S. and Canada.
Black was ousted as Hollinger's chief
executive in 2003, along with Radler, then
president of the company now known as
Sun-Times Media Group Inc. Black was
fired as chairman in January 2004. Soon
after, a task force headed by former
Securities and Exchange Commission
Chairman Richard Breeden issued a scathing
report, calling the conduct of Black and
Radler at Hollinger a "corporate
kleptocracy."
Black, who gave up his Canadian citizenship
in order to become a British lord, showed no
visible reaction to the verdict Friday and
will appear in court Thursday to learn from
U.S. District Judge Amy St. Eve if he may
leave the country.
He faces a maximum of 35 years in prison, a
maximum penalty of $1 million and possible
192
forfeiture of property. Prosecutors estimate
Black's sentence may range from 15 to 20
years.
The jury in Chicago also found Black's
three co-defendants guilty of three counts
each of mail fraud. They are attorney Mark
Kipnis, 59, of Northbrook; former Hollinger
Chief Financial Officer John Boultbee, 64,
of Victoria, British Columbia; and former
Executive Vice President Peter Atkinson,
60, of Oakville, Ontario. Each faces up to 15
years in prison and fines of up to $750,000.
All three were released on bond.
All defendants are expected to appeal the
verdicts. Prosecutors estimate sentencing
ranges of 7 to 10 years for Boultbee,
Atkinson and Kipnis. The mixed verdict set
off a debate among prosecution and defense
lawyers about the meaning of the jury's
verdict.
"If you're going to take liberties and break
the law with other peoples' money, there are
going to be consequences," U.S. Attorney
Patrick Fitzgerald said.
Yet after a four-month trial and 12 days of
deliberation, the jury found insufficient
evidence to convict Black of the most
sweeping charges of the indictment,
including racketeering.
The government had sought convictions on
42 separate charges in the 16-count
indictment, claiming Black, Radler and the
others engaged in a scheme to pocket
millions of dollars from the sale of dozens of
Hollinger newspapers.
In the deals, Black and Radler personally
reaped millions in payments from the buyers
of the newspapers. In exchange, the
Hollinger executives promised not to
compete against the new owners. Some of
those payments were not disclosed to
shareholders or even to Iollinger's audit
committee.
But defense lawyers argued that such non-
compete payments are legitimate and
customary in newspaper deals, a claim the
jury appeared to find credible in some
instances.
Juror Tina Kadisak, a beautician, in an
interview at her Woodridge home, said the
jury carefully followed the evidence and was
unswayed by testimony about Black's
opulent lifestyle.
"The things we felt we could convict on
were things we could link up and see
obvious proof of," Kadisak said. "On some
counts [prosecutors] just couldn't do that."
The guilty verdicts for all four defendants
stemmed from charges they received $5.5
million in bogus non-compete agreements
with a Hollinger subsidiary-essentially
agreeing not to compete with themselves.
The third guilty count arose from $600,000
in payments fraudulently attached to the sale
of community newspapers.
After the verdict, government lawyers
sought to have Black immediately placed in
custody as a flight risk.
But Black's defense lawyers vowed their
Canadian client would remain in the U.S. to
avoid being jailed prior to his sentencing
hearing Nov. 30. They also argued that St.
Eve should allow a reduction in the bond
Black has pledged: the $20 million of equity
he has in his home in Palm Beach and
proceeds from the $8.5 million sale of a
New York apartment.
Well-known Chicago defense lawyer
Edward Genson ticked off the names of the
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transactions on which the jury found no
wrongdoing: CanWest, Horizon and
Community Newspaper Holdings.
Genson also noted that the jurors found
nothing wrong with Hollinger's allegedly
below-market sale of the New York
apartment to Black. The jury also did not
buy the prosecution's allegation that Black
illegally charged Hollinger for a lavish
birthday party for his wife, Barbara Amiel
Black.
"He was convicted of the two monetarily
lowest amounts in the case," Genson said.
Edward Greenspan, the Canadian lawyer
who led Black's defense at trial, told
reporters the government's effort to put
Black in jail for as long as 20 years is off
base given the conviction on relatively
narrow charges. "When we were indicted
the allegation was $90 million in loss. Now
the lost amount for Conrad Black alone is
$2.9 million. We intend to appeal and there
are viable legal issues," Greenspan said.
U.S. Atty. Fitzgerald insisted that because
Black and his co-defendants were convicted
of the first, most sweeping count in the
indictment, the judge at sentencing could
find them culpable of taking as much as $30
million from Hollinger.
Still, the evidence connected to that count
suggests no more than $3 million was at
stake.
Black, dressed in a tan suit and powder blue
shirt, sat stoically in the courtroom after the
verdict as lawyers argued about his
immediate fate.
St. Eve declined to rule immediately on
Black's motion to have his bond reduced
and be allowed to travel outside the U.S.
John Hueston, a prosecutor in the Enron
case now in private practice in Los Angeles,
said prosecutors gambled unsuccessfully
that jurors would be outraged by testimony
about Black's wealthy, globe-trotting
lifestyle, including lengthy testimony about
a trip to Bora Bora on the corporate jet.
Peter Henning, a law professor at Wayne
State University, thinks Black will be
sentenced far more harshly than his co-
defendants because of his obstruction
conviction and his outspoken contempt for
the prosecution: "Calling the prosecutors
Nazis doesn't put him in a good position."
Even so, Greenspan argued in an interview
that he was pleased with the mixed verdict.
"This was vindication for Conrad Black," he
said.
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"Lord Black Is Indicted by U.S."
New York Ti7mes
November 18, 2005
Geraldine Fabrikant
Conrad M. Black, once a major force in
business, political and social circles in
Manhattan and London, was indicted in
Chicago yesterday on charges that he and
three former colleagues stole $51.8 million
from Hollinger International, the giant
international newspaper publisher he helped
create.
The 11-count indictment charged that Lord
Black, 61, and his co-defendants worked out
a plan to divert funds to themselves and
misused corporate money, citing such
instances as he and his wife taking a private
jet to Bora Bora and $40,000 he spent to
cover much of the cost of a lavish birthday
party for his wife.
Patrick J. Fitzgerald, the U.S. attorney who
announced the indictment by a federal grand
jury, said yesterday: "If you worked at a
bank and you wanted to spend $40,000 on
yourself, you should ask someone other than
you. Failing to do so when there was a legal
obligation to do so is a fraud."
Lord Black was accused of wire fraud and
mail fraud, charges that carry penalties of up
to 40 years in prison and fines up to $2
million. A British citizen, Lord Black has
been spending time in Canada. An arrest
warrant has been issued for Lord Black, and
there were reports last night that he was
believed to be in Canada. But Mr. Fitzgerald
said he could not comment on his
whereabouts, adding: "He will end up
needing to appear in front of a judge in
Chicago. We think he should be extradited."
The indictment detailed a plan to defraud
Hollinger International by diverting $51.8
million in 2000 from its multibillion-dollar
sale of assets to CanWest Global
Communications. It contended that the
defendants engaged in a series of secret and
misleading transactions that funneled
payments to themselves disguised as
noncompetition fees or as a "management
breakup fee" to Ravelston, a company
controlled by Lord Black.
It also charged that Lord Black and one of
the others indicted misused corporate funds
in the South Pacific vacation and when the
company paid for two apartments on Park
Avenue in Manhattan.
"This is the sort of thing," said Mr.
Fitzgerald, a national figure from his role in
the C.I.A. leak case, "that in the words of
Mr. Black is simply unacceptable." The
defendants, he continued, "lined their
pockets" by taking money from shareholders
for themselves.
"Part of the fraud,"
"was basically to
shareholders."
Mr. Fitzgerald said,
defraud innocent
Yesterday's indictments were the latest in a
succession of charges in the last few years
against once-highflying chief executives
accused of betraying investors. These have
included L. Dennis Kozlowski of Tyco
International, John J. Rigas of Adelphia
Communications and Bernard J. Ebbers of
WorldCom.
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But perhaps none of those executives sought
as much political and social recognition as
did Lord Black, whose publishing empire
included The Chicago Sun-Times, The
Jerusalem Post and The Daily Telegraph of
London.
Lord Black and his wife, the conservative
newspaper columnist Barbara Amiel, held
annual gatherings at the Bilderberg Group,
where a variety of leading political figures
assembled, including Margaret Thatcher;
Richard N. Perle, a high Defense
Department official in the Reagan
administration and early adviser to the Bush
administration; and a former French
president. Valery Giscard dEstaing.
But Lord Black has been under siege for two
years, since the Hollinger International
board dismissed him as chief executive in
2003, asserting that he and others took $32
million in unauthorized "noncompete
payments" associated with the sale of
smaller newspapers.
Lord Black has continued to fight back,
aggressively challenging the accusations and
seeking to retain power through Hollinger
Inc., the holding company for Hollinger
International. In the last year, he tried
without success to take Hollinger Inc.
private.
Indeed, the indictment came as he was
trying to regain his social standing in the
United States, in Toronto where he now
lives, and in London. In January he
reportedly told guests at Donald J. Trump's
Palm Beach wedding: "Don't write me off. I
am about to become a corporate-governance
counterterrorist."
And last summer, there were newspaper
reports that he was looking for a new
apartment and having lunch with prominent
friends.
Those charged along with him yesterday
were John A. Boultbee, a former chief
financial officer of Hollinger International;
Peter Atkinson, an executive vice president
of Hollinger International; and Mark Kipnis,
a former vice president of Hollinger
International. Ravelston was also charged;
its principal asset was its controlling interest
in Hollinger Inc.
Yesterday, Lord Black's Toronto lawyer,
Edward Greenspan, issued a statement
saying, "Conrad Black asserts his innocence
without qualification."
A lawyer for Mr. Boultbee, Donald Jack,
said his client would "vigorously defend the
charges against him and is confident of the
outcome.-
Lawyers for the two others accused did not
return calls seeking comment.
In August, indictments charged the former
Hollinger International president and
publisher, F. David Radler, and Mr. Kipnis
with a scheme to divert more than $32
million from the American-based newspaper
holding company through a complex series
of unauthorized payments. Mr. Kipnis
pleaded not guilty, but Mr. Radler, a
longtime close associate of Lord Black,
agreed to cooperate with the authorities.
The charges related to the noncompetition
payments were laid out in 2004 by a special
committee established by the board and led
by Richard C. Breeden, a former chairman
of the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Those payments were the subjects of a
subsequent suit by the S.E.C.; that suit is
pending.
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Yesterday, Mr. Breeden said that "this
indictment is focused on a limited number of
transactions, and will enable prosecutors to
focus a trial on a manageable set of issues."
Despite Lord Black's determination to fight
the charges, Mr. Breeden was optimistic
about the government's case.
"He can fight it," he said of Lord Black,
"but the facts are there. His is a situation,
unlike others, where there is a mass of
evidence concerning what took place."
Mr. Boultbee faces a maximum penalty of
40 years in prison and fines of $2 million.
Mr. Kipnis is risking up to 45 years and
$2.25 million in fines. Mr. Atkinson faces
up to 30 years and fines up to $1.5 million.
And Ravelston could face fines of $3.5
million.
The indictment contends that all four
cheated public shareholders in the United
States and Canada, as well as Canadian tax
authorities.
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"DOJ May Rein in Use of 'Honest Services' Statute"
National Law Journal
June 15, 2009
Lynne Marek
A key weapon in the arsenal of U.S.
Attorney Patrick Fitzgerald and his
prosecutors in Chicago has been a section of
the federal anti-fraud statute that makes it a
crime to deprive citizens or corporate
shareholders of "honest services."
It's been used to convict dozens of state and
local government officials, as well as
newspaper magnate Conrad Black and
former Gov. George Ryan of Illinois.
Fitzgerald cited the honest services in the
April indictment of another ex-Illinois
governor, Rod Blagojevich.
But the U.S. Supreme Court's May decision
to review Black's 2007 conviction may put
the brakes on the honest services provision.
The U.S. Department of Justice is likely to
rein in use of the provision, 18 U.S.C. 1346,
until the high court rules on Black's appeal
next term, former federal prosecutors say.
"Anytime that there's a high-profile review
of a conviction, the department tends to just
stop in its tracks, and this is a very high-
profile review," said Matt Orwig, a partner
and criminal defense attorney in the Dallas
office of Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal
and former U.S. attorney for the Eastern
District of Texas. "There's going to have to
be some very careful analysis of how
they've approached these cases in the past."
Using the honest services section of the
fraud statute allows prosecutors to charge
defendants with robbing a general group of
people, such as shareholders of a public
company or residents of a state or city, of
the honest fiduciary duties or government
services they are due. It's typically used to
shore up other fraud counts, but increasingly
has been used as a primary count as well.
Orwig, who didn't recall using the charge
when he was a U.S. attorney, said he thinks
the section has been "over-used." It was the
lead charge lodged by U.S. attorney offices
against 79 suspects in fiscal year 2007, up
from 63 in 2005 and 28 in 2000. (The
Justice Department doesn't consistently
track it as a secondary charge.)
AGGRESSIVE USE
Fitzgerald, the special counsel who won a
conviction against vice presidential aide I.
Lewis Libby Jr., so far is bucking the usual
turnover for U.S. attorneys and is extending
his eight-year stint in Chicago from the
Republican Bush administration into the
Democratic Obama administration.
Former federal prosecutors-turned-criminal
defense lawyers in the Northern District of
Illinois said they believe Fitzgerald's office
has been among the most aggressive in
using the honest services charge. Although
statistics show that his office used the law
only twice in fiscal year 2007 as a lead
charge, the office has often used the statute
as a secondary allegation in cases targeting
Illinois and Chicago officials for political
corruption.
"The Northern District has argued for an
aggressive interpretation of this statute on
many occasions," said Robert Kent, a
partner in the Chicago office of Baker &
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McKenzie who was formerly chief of the
complex fraud section in the U.S. attorney's
office there.
The office has met with success, posting an
overall conviction rate for fiscal year 2008
of 96%, compared to the national rate of
92%. Randall Sambom, a spokesman for the
office, declined to comment on use of the
charge or the Black case.
The criminal defense lawyers said the
Supreme Court is likely to focus on the
second question presented by the Black
petitioners: whether the law "applies to the
conduct of a private individual whose
alleged 'scheme to defraud' did not
contemplate economic or other property
harm to the private party to whom honest
services were owed."
Black's Supreme Court counsel, Miguel
Estrada of the Washington office of Gibson,
Dunn & Crutcher. didn't return calls seeking
comment, but argued in the petition that the
"vagueness" of Section 1346 and differing
appellate courts' interpretation of the law
call out for Supreme Court clarification.
Solicitor General Elena Kagan contends in
response that the law is clear: The
government need not show that a defendant
intended to deprive a victim of property or
money, and the appellate courts differ only
slightly in determining whether a given
honest services fraud is "material."
The court's decision to grant certiorari in the
Black case led to a release from prison of
one of Black's three co-defendants, John
Boultbee, and Black may resubmit a request
for release in the Northern District of Illinois
after Justice John Paul Stevens denied his
request for release on bail on June 11.
The defendants argue that the Supreme
Court may very well overturn their three
mail fraud convictions. Black's counsel
contends that he would then have to be
retried on the only other outstanding charge
against him, an obstruction of justice charge,
because of the "highly inflammatory
evidence" presented in support of the fraud
counts.
In the case, prosecutors charged Black and
his fellow executives from Hollinger
International Inc., publisher of the Chicago
Sun-Times and other newspapers, with fraud
for pocketing money from bogus
noncompete agreements drawn up when the
company was selling off its smaller
newspapers in the 1990s.
Prosecutors argued that millions of dollars
should have gone to shareholders of the
company. Black was convicted by a jury on
four of the 13 counts against him.
U.S. attorney's offices will pursue "honest
services" infractions much more carefully
while Black's case is pending before the
high court to avoid having cases overturned
in the future, the criminal defense lawyers
said. Prosecutors are more likely to use it to
shore up other charges or avoid it altogether,
they said. "It's likely to mean that
prosecutors will only use it in the
circumstances that every court agrees it
would work-that way they'll have some
level of confidence no matter what
happens," Kent said. "At this point, it would
be risky to do anything else."
In cases such as the one against Blagojevich,
which includes a host of other criminal
charges, anticipation of the Supreme Court's
decision on Black is unlikely to make a
difference, the lawyers said.
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A SCALIA DISSENT
Justice Antonin Scalia in February dissented
when the Supreme Court declined to grant
certiorari in another honest services
conviction case against a top aide to
Chicago Mayor Richard Daley, also
prosecuted by Fitzgerald's office. In his
dissent, he said that not taking the case
allowed "the current chaos" in application of
the statute to prevail. Now it seems Scalia
has managed to win over three additional
justices on the honest services issue with
respect to the Black case.
"They need some sharper definition," said
Mark Rotert, a Chicago criminal defense
attorney at Stetler & Duffy and a former
federal prosecutor who was once chief of the
major crimes division in Chicago's U.S.
attorney's office. "There are some real
questions about . . . the appropriate reach of
the criminal statute."
Scalia in his dissent regarding the case of
Daley aide Robert Sorich said that the
circuits are clearly divided on how to
interpret the honest services section. The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit has
held that the statute criminalizes only the
unlawful deprivation of services, though
other courts have disagreed with that, he
stated. The 7th Circuit has read the statute to
prohibit the abuse of a post for private gain,
while some circuits don't see such a gain as
part of the crime, he said.
"Without some coherent limiting principle
to define what the 'intangible right of honest
services' is, whence it derives, and how it is
violated, this expansive phrase invites abuse
by headline-grabbing prosecutors in pursuit
of local officials, state legislators, and
corporate CEOs who engage in any manner
of unappealing or ethically questionable
conduct," Scalia wrote.
At the core of the issue is the notion that
would-be defendants have a right of due
process that provides clarity in the laws that
they are expected to obey, said criminal
defense attorneys.
This isn't the first time that the Court has
wrestled with the statute. In its 1987 ruling
in McNally v US., the Supreme Court
dismissed prosecutors' and courts' widely
held view that the mail fraud statute could
be used to fight public corruption and
misconduct on the basis that citizens had an
'intangible right' to good government.
Congress the following year enacted the
honest services section to revive the practice
of prosecuting under that right.
"The confusion arises in part from the fact
that the law appears to apply differently to
public officials and private individuals," said
John Cline, a partner in Jones Day's San
Francisco office who represented Sorich in
his appeal. "It will be interesting to see if the
Supreme Court tries to develop a unified
standard for the two types of cases."
Some attorneys expect the high court to rule
narrowly on the application of the law to
private individuals, such as corporate
chieftains like Black and avoid weighing in
on circumstances related to public officials,
at least for now.
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Weyhrauch v. United States
08-1196
Ruling Below: United States v I'eyhrauch, 548 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 2008).
The federal statute defining honest services fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1346, establishes a uniform
federal standard for honest services that governs every public official, and thus the government
need not prove independent violation of state law to sustain honest services fraud conviction.
The defendant's alleged conduct falls comfortably within the two categories long recognized as
the core of honest services fraud: (a) taking bribe or otherwise being paid for decision while
purporting to be exercising independent discretion, and (b) nondisclosure of material
information.
Question Presented: To convict a state official for depriving the public of its right to the
defendant's honest services through nondisclosure of material information, in violation of mail-
fraud statute (18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1346), must the government prove that the defendant
violated disclosure duty imposed by state law?
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant,
V.
Bruce WEYHRAUCH, Defendant-Appellee.
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Decided November 26, 2008
[Excerpt: some footnotes and citations omitted]
FISHER, Circuit Judge:
This is an interlocutory appeal by the
government of the district court's pretrial
order excluding evidence from a mail fraud
prosecution. It presents a matter of first
impression in this circuit-whether a federal
honest services mail fraud prosecution under
18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1346 requires proof
that the conduct at issue also violated an
applicable state law. . . . On the merits, we
disagree with the district court that a state
law violation is required, and thus reverse
the court's order excluding certain evidence
from trial.
I. BACKGROUND
Defendant Bruce Weyhrauch, a lawyer, was
a member of the Alaska House of
Representatives in 2006 while Alaska's
legislature was considering legislation that
would alter how the state taxed oil
production. According to the criminal
indictment against him, VECO Corp., an oil
field services company, took an active
interest in the legislature's reconsideration
of the oil tax, and two of its executives had a
series of contacts with Weyhrauch regarding
the pending legislation. The indictment
alleges that Weyhrauch solicited, by mail,
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telephone and personal contact, future legal
work from VECO in exchange for voting on
the oil tax legislation as VECO instructed
and taking other actions favorable to VECO
in Weyhrauch's capacity as state legislator,
such as maneuvering the legislation and
reporting information about proposed
changes to the legislation to the VECO
executives. The indictment does not allege
that Weyhrauch received any compensation
or benefits from VECO or its executives
during this period, but alleges facts
suggesting that Weyhrauch took the actions
favorable to VECO on the understanding
that VECO would hire him in the future to
provide legal services to the company.
Count VII of the indictment charges
Weyhrauch with devising "a scheme and
artifice to defraud and deprive the State of
Alaska of its intangible right to [his] honest
services . . . performed free from deceit,
self-dealing, bias, and concealment" and
attempting to execute the scheme by mailing
his resume to VECO ("the honest services
charge"). Before trial, the parties filed cross-
motions regarding the admission or
exclusion of evidence related to the honest
services charge. Specifically, the
government proposed to introduce: (1)
legislative ethics publications containing
excerpts of various Alaska state statutes
addressing conflicts of interest and
disclosure requirements; (2) evidence that
members of the Alaska State Legislature
customarily acknowledge the existence of
conflicts of interests on the floor of the
Legislature, and that Weyhrauch never
disclosed he was negotiating for
employment with VECO; (3) a description
of the ethics training Weyhrauch had
received; and (4) evidence that Weyhrauch
served on the Legislature's Select
Committee on Ethics.
The district court found that the proffered
evidence related only to duties to disclose a
conflict of interest that might be imposed by
state law, and that state law did not require
Weyhrauch to disclose the conflict of
interest he faced in discharging his duties
while negotiating for future employment
with a company affected by pending
legislation. The government argued that the
evidence should nonetheless be admitted
because proof that a legislator knowingly
concealed a conflict of interest may be used
to support an honest services fraud
conviction even if state law does not require
disclosure of the conflict of interest.
Recognizing an absence of Ninth Circuit
precedent and a split among the other
circuits on this issue, the district court
adopted the approach outlined by the Fifth
Circuit in United States v. Brumley, and
concluded that "any duty to disclose
sufficient to support the mail and wire fraud
charges here must be a duty imposed by
state law." Accordingly, on September 4,
2007, the district court granted Weyhrauch's
motion, denied the government's motion and
excluded the proffered evidence. The next
day, September 5, the government initiated
this interlocutory appeal of the district
court's ruling.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a district court's ruling excluding
evidence for abuse of discretion. "The
district court abuses its discretion when its
evidentiary rulings are based on an
erroneous view of the law or a clearly
erroneous assessment of the facts." United
States v. Nguyen.
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IV. HONEST SERVICES MAIL FRAUD
Accepting our jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C.
§ 373 1, we address whether the district court
properly excluded the government's
proffered evidence. Weyhrauch was indicted
under 18 U.S.C. § 1341, which criminalizes
the use of the postal services in carrying out
a "scheme or artifice to defraud, or for
obtaining money or property by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises." Before 1987,
we and other courts interpreted § 1341 as
covering schemes to defraud another not just
of money and property, but also of
"intangible rights," including the right of
citizens to have public officials perform
their duties honestly. In 1987, the Supreme
Court rejected the intangible rights theory of
mail fraud, holding:
Rather than construe [§ 1341] in a
manner that leaves its outer
boundaries ambiguous and involves
the Federal Government in setting
standards of disclosure and good
government for local and state
officials, we read § 1341 as limited
in scope to the protection of property
rights. If Congress desires to go
further it must speak more clearly
than it has.
McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. at 360
(1987).
Shortly thereafter, Congress in 1988 chose
to "speak more clearly" by enacting 18
U.S.C. § 1346, specifying that for the
purposes of the mail, wire and bank fraud
statutes, "the term 'scheme or artifice to
defraud' includes a scheme or artifice to
deprive another of the intangible right of
honest services." Unfortunately, Congress
did not define the concept of "honest
services" in § 1346, thereby creating some
confusion over the reach of the mail fraud
statute. Because the statute's plain language
is inconclusive, we turn for guidance in
construing the statute to our pre-McNally
case law and any relevant post-M1IcNally
decisions, and then consider pre- and post-
McNally decisions from our sister circuits.
The district court accurately observed that
we have not considered what § 1346
requires of public officials and that our sister
circuits have expressed divergent views on
the proper meaning of "honest services" for
public officials. The Fifth Circuit has
adopted the so-called "state law limiting
principle," which requires the government to
prove that a public official violated an
independent state law to support an honest
services mail fraud conviction. The Third
Circuit has adopted a similar rule requiring
the government to prove the public official
violated a fiduciary duty specifically
established by state or federal law.
The majority of circuits, however, have held
that the meaning of "honest services" is
governed by a uniform federal standard
inherent in § 1346, although they have not
uniformly defined the contours of that
standard. The Seventh Circuit has read
§ 1346 to require public officials to breach a
fiduciary duty with an intent to reap private
gain to support an honest services mail fraud
conviction, and the First Circuit has
suggested that the official's misconduct
must involve more than a mere conflict of
interest to support a conviction. Finally,
several circuits have read into § 1346 the
requirement that a public official's breach of
duty must be material and accompanied by
fraudulent intent. In essence, our sister
circuits have construed the meaning of
"honest services" in ways that limit, to
differing degrees, the reach of § 1346 into
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state and local public affairs.
One concern is that a literal reading of
§ 1346 might give federal prosecutors
unwarranted influence over state and local
public ethics standards. This is particularly
relevant in light of the Supreme Court's
admonition that "unless Congress conveys
its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to
have significantly changed the federal-state
balance in the prosecution of crimes." Other
valid considerations are (1) the need to give
public officials fair notice of the conduct
that would subject them to the federal fraud
statutes' serious criminal penalties; (2) a
desire to establishfirm boundaries lest every
dishonest act by public officials lead to
federal criminal liability; and (3) the
potential for selective enforcement against
public officials, many of whom engage in
partisan political activity.
The Fifth Circuit's state law limiting
principle, which the district court adopted,
addresses all of these concerns. It limits how
much control federal prosecutors have over
state public affairs by restricting federal
criminal liability to conduct prohibited by
the states themselves and sets a clear outer
limit to the reach of the federal statute by
tying liability to violations of specific state
statutes, thereby allaying concerns over fair
notice. Moreover, to the extent the honest
services doctrine is intended to ensure public
officials act ethically, elected state officials
are accountable to their constituencies, who
can punish dishonest or unethical conduct
directly at the ballot box, and nonelected
state officials may be subject to state ethics
laws, which can be strengthened through the
democratic process. Thus, because the
federal criminal statutes are not the only
remedy for dishonest conduct not proscribed
by state law, there is some degree of logic in
reserving to the states exclusive control over
the ethical standards for their own public
officials.
Nonetheless, we decline to adopt the state
law limiting principle. As an initial matter,
our pre-McNally decisions do not support
the conclusion that the federal fraud statutes
derive their content solely from state law. In
United States v. Bohonus, we explained that
the basis for prosecuting public officials for
honest services fraud rests on "the
deprivation of the public's right to honest
and faithful government." This broad
characterization of the duty, without
reference to any underlying state law duty,
suggests that public officials' duty of
honesty is uniform rather than variable by
state. We were less equivocal in United
States v. Louderman, holding that "state law
is irrelevant in determining whether a certain
course of conduct is violative of the wire
fraud statute." Although Louderman is not
directly on point because it involved a
traditional wire fraud prosecution rather than
an honest services mail fraud prosecution,
our refusal to define the federal fraud
statutes based on the contours of state law
informs our decision here. In short, we have
never limited the reach of the federal fraud
statutes only to conduct that violates state
law.
We also cannot find any basis in the text or
legislative history of § 1346 revealing that
Congress intended to condition the meaning
of "honest services" on state law. Because
laws governing official conduct differ from
state to state, conditioning mail fraud
convictions on state law means that conduct
in one state might violate the mail fraud
statute, whereas identical conduct in a
neighboring state would not. Congress has
given no indication it intended the
criminality of official conduct under federal
law to depend on geography. Moreover,
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although the Supreme Court has warned
against interpreting the mail fraud statute to
allow federal prosecutors to intrude into
areas traditionally governed by state law
absent a clear showing that Congress
intended to do so, Congress demonstrated a
clear intent to reinstate the line of pre-
McNally honest services cases when it
enacted § 1346. Because pre-McNally
honest services fraud cases generally did not
require state law to create the duty of
honesty that public officials owe the public
and the plain language of the statute does
not refer to state law, we cannot infer that
Congress intended to import a state law
limitation into § 1346.
Finally, federal action based on a valid
constitutional grant of authority is not
improper simply because it intrudes on state
interests. Congress has a legitimate
constitutional basis for preventing public
officials from using the mails to perpetrate
fraud, so the federal interest in establishing a
uniform standard of conduct for public
officials merits equal consideration. That
interest is not limited to preventing
individuals from using the mails as a tool in
a fraudulent scheme. States often regulate
industries that are national and international
in scope and that the federal government
also regulates under concurrent
constitutional authority, including the
financial services, transportation,
communications, oil, gas and timber
industries. State regulations of these
industries can have national or international
implications, so the federal government may
wish to prevent state action in these areas
from being improperly influenced.
Similarly, state laws that affect economic
development within a state can influence the
federal budget, reduce federal tax receipts
and broadly affect the national economy. In
short, Congress has a legitimate interest in
ensuring that state action affecting federal
priorities is not improperly influenced by
personal motivations of state policymakers
and regulators, and the happenstance of
whether state laxw prohibits particular
conduct should not control Congress' ability
to protect federal interests through the
federal fraud statutes, which are predicated
on valid federal constitutional authority to
regulate the mails.
Having rejected the state law limiting
principle, we next consider the appropriate
contours of honest services fraud. Our pre-
McNally cases recognized two core
categories of conduct by public officials that
other courts have found sufficient to support
an honest services conviction: (1) taking a
bribe or otherwise being paid for a decision
while purporting to be exercising
independent discretion and (2) nondisclosure
of material information. Post-McNally
public honest services fraud cases from
other circuits have generally fallen into one
of those two categories. The post-McNally
decisions from our sister circuits confirm
our view in Bohonus that conduct on par
with bribery and nondisclosure of material
information lies at the heart of public honest
services fraud. Notably, both categories of
misconduct undermine transparency in the
legislative process and other governmental
functions. Because public officials may
legitimately disagree over which of the
many competing interests in society deserve
support from the state, without transparency
the public cannot evaluate the motivations of
public officials who are purporting to act for
the common good to determine whether they
are in fact acting for their own benefit. Thus,
the two core categories of misconduct
supporting public honest services fraud
ensure transparency, without which the
public cannot determine whether public
officials are living up to their duty of
honesty. We are persuaded that Congress'
intent in reinstating the honest services
doctrine after McNally was to bring at least
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the two core categories of official
misconduct within the reach of § 1346.
Here, Weyhrauch allegedly voted and took
other official actions on legislation at the
direction of VICO -while engaged in
undisclosed negotiations for future legal
work from VECO. These allegations
describe an undisclosed conflict of interest
and could also support an inference of a quid
pro quo arrangement to vote for the oil tax
legislation in exchange for future
remuneration in the form of legal work.
Because Weyhrauch's alleged conduct falls
comfortably within the two categories long
recognized as the core of honest services
fraud, we need not define the outer limits of
public honest services fraud in this case.
Accordingly, the government may proceed
on its theory that Weyhrauch committed
honest services fraud by failing to disclose a
conflict of interest or by taking official
actions with the expectation that he would
receive future legal work for doing so.
V. CONCLUSION
We hold that 18 U.S.C. § 1346 establishes a
uniform standard for "honest services" that
governs every public official and that the
government does not need to prove an
independent violation of state law to sustain
an honest services fraud conviction. Because
the district court excluded the evidence
based, in part, on its conclusion that the
government had to prove that state law
imposed an affirmative duty on Weyhrauch
to disclose a conflict of interest, we reverse.
The government did not appeal the district
court's ruling that the proffered evidence
relates only to state law, and we express no
opinion whether the proffered evidence is
relevant to proving the government's case
under the standard v e have announced and
leave that determination to the district
court's sound judgment.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
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"Supreme Court Takes Weyhrauch Mail-Fraud Question"
Anchorage Daily News
June 29, 2009
Erika Bolstad
WASHINGTON-The U.S. Supreme Court
on Monday agreed to hear an appeal by
former Alaska Rep. Bruce Weyhrauch that
prosecutors shouldn't be allowed to say he
cheated Alaska's citizens when he secretly
sought work from the oil-field service
company Veco during the 2006 legislative
session.
In accepting Weyhrauch's pretrial review,
the court said it will look at one specific
area: whether prosecutors must prove
Weyhrauch violated a state disclosure law to
convict him on federal mail fraud statutes.
The federal law makes it illegal for public
officials to use the mails to defraud the
public out of their honest services.
Weyhrauch, awaiting trial on federal
corruption charges, asked the Supreme
Court to overturn an appeals court decision
that directly applied the federal mail fraud
statute to his case. At issue is one count in
Weyhrauch's 2007 indictment where he is
accused of mail fraud for seeking post-
session work from Veco at the same time
Veco was pushing back on an oil-tax bill in
2006. Weyhrauch argued that because his
conduct was legal under state law, it
shouldn't be illegal under the federal mail
fraud statute. His argument prevailed in U.S.
District Court. Prosecutors appealed to the
9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals and won.
His lawyer, Doug Pope, said that he thought
the Supreme Court's decision to hear the
matter at issue dealt a "serious blow to the
government's case."
"We have felt that all the way along that it
was a very weak case that was depending on
a theory that, if it was taken away, was a
case that many prosecutors would look at it
and say, 'This isn't worth pursuing,"' Pope
said.
Prosecutors said Weyhrauch should have
disclosed his conflict of interest. Weyhrauch
said he didn't have to.
The 9th Circuit judges reasoned that even if
a state has weak ethics laws, that is no
reason for its citizens to be deprived of the
honest services of their public officials.
Weyhrauch acknowledged that two other
U.S. circuit courts had made similar rulings,
but said that another two had a different
standard: They required a state law violation
before the mail fraud statute could be used
in a criminal case.
Weyhrauch asked the Supreme Court to
clear up the "confusion" between the
different circuits-which the court agreed to
on Monday. The court did not set a date for
arguments.
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"Court OKs Weyhrauch Evidence"
Anchorage Dail), News
November 27, 2008
Lisa Demer and Richard Mauer
Federal prosecutors can go forward with the
corruption case against former state Rep.
Bruce Weyhrauch using evidence that he
failed to disclose his efforts to get a job with
Veco Corp., under an appeal court ruling
issued Wednesday.
The 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals sided
with prosecutors, who had appealed a ruling
excluding such evidence. The case likely is
headed back to Anchorage for trial.
Efforts to reach Weyhrauch's attorney,
Doug Pope, and federal prosecutors
Wednesday afternoon were unsuccessful.
Weyhrauch, a Juneau Republican, was
indicted in May 2007 along with former
House Speaker Pete Kott over efforts by
Veco and its chief executive, Bill Allen, to
pass tax legislation favored by the oil
industry. Weyhrauch, a lawyer in private
life, was trying to get legal work from Veco,
and his job-seeking effort got tangled up in
Veco's lobbying for the oil-tax deal.
Just before the trial, U.S. District Court
Judge John Sedwick ruled that federal
prosecutors couldn't use his failure to
disclose his job-seeking as evidence to prove
he defrauded Alaskans of honest services
because state law didn't clearly require such
a disclosure. The government appealed and
Kott went on alone to trial in September
2007. He was convicted on three of four
corruption counts against him. He is in
prison and is appealing the convictions.
In its Weyhrauch decision, a three-judge
panel of the 9th Circuit said that all citizens
have a right to the honest services of their
public officials, free from secret conflicts of
interest, regardless of the limits of the law in
any particular state.
"Accordingly, the government may proceed
on its theory that Weyhrauch committed
honest services fraud by failing to disclose a
conflict of interest or by taking official
actions with the expectation that he would
receive future legal work for doing so," the
judges said.
The panel noted that Sedwick's ruling didn't
come out of the blue. Without guidance
from the San-Francisco-based 9th Circuit,
the Anchorage judge turned to a decision out
of the 5th Circuit, in New Orleans, that
"limits how much control federal
prosecutors have over state public affairs by
restricting federal criminal liability to
conduct prohibited by the states
themselves," the decision said.
But other appeals courts have ruled
differently. The federal government has
reason to be interested in what state
lawmakers do, the 9th Circuit panel said.
For instance, some industries regulated by
states, including oil, are national in scope.
"Congress has a legitimate interest in
ensuring that state action affecting federal
priorities is not improperly influenced by
personal motivations of state policymakers
and regulators," the panel wrote.
Public officials have a broad duty to be
honest, even when there's not a specific
state law telling them how to proceed, the
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judges found. There's no hint in the federal
law that Congress wanted geography to
define what behavior is criminal, the panel
wrote.
Other appeals courts generally have found
two kinds of misconduct that amounts to the
crime called "honest services fraud"-taking
a bribe while pretending to be independent
and failing to disclose material information,
according to the opinion.
"Because public officials may legitimately
disagree over which of the many competing
interests in society deserve support from the
state, without transparency the public cannot
evaluate the motivations of public officials
who are purporting to act for the common
good to determine whether they are in fact
acting for their own benefit," the 9th Circuit
panel said.
The evidence at issue relates to one of four
charges against Weyhrauch. He also is
charged with bribery, conspiracy and
attempted extortion.
For the honest services fraud charge,
prosecutors want to present evidence that
includes: legislative ethics publications
addressing conflicts of interest and
disclosure; testimony that lawmakers
typically disclose conflicts on the floor and
that Weyhrauch never revealed he was
negotiating for a Veco job; a description of
ethics training that Weyhrauch received; and
information that Wevhrauch served on the
Select Committee on Legislative Ethics.
On another issue, the judges had harsh
words for the prosecution over a procedural
matter.
It took the government three tries before it
complied with a law that requires a U.S.
attorney to certify that a pretrial appeal is
being made for legitimate reasons and not
just to delay the trial. Because the federal
prosecution of Alaska political corruption
cases is being managed by the U.S. Justice
Department's Public Integrity Section, there
wasn't a U.S. attorney in charge and the
appeal was not certified properly.
Ultimately, U.S. Attorney General Michael
Mukasey authorized it, a year after the fact.
"We will excuse the government's
confusion and allow it to supplement the
record with the Attorney General's
certification," the panel said.
However, the judges threatened to reject
government appeals if prosecutors fail to
comply with that law: "We will not be so
forgiving in the future."
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"Corruption Trials Divided; Kott's Hearing Continues, but Weyhrauch's
Stalls on Federal Appeal"
inchorage Daily Ne's
September 6, 2007
Richard Mauer and Lisa Demer
A federal judge Wednesday ordered separate
trials for two former Republican legislators
to allow jury selection for one to move
forward while the government appeals an
earlier ruling favoring the other.
The decision on the one-time co-defendants
means the bribery, extortion, fraud and
conspiracy case against Pete Kott, the
former House speaker, will go ahead with
opening arguments scheduled for Monday.
Jury selection started at midmorning
Wednesday and will continue today.
But the trial of Bruce Weyhrauch, a former
representative from Juneau, will await the
outcome of the government's bid to the 9th
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in San
Francisco, and perhaps longer. Weyhrauch's
attorney, Doug Pope, said he'd try to take
the case to the U.S. Supreme Court if the 9th
Circuit reverses the decision in Anchorage.
U.S. District Judge John Sedwick made his
ruling on separating the trials in a hastily
called hearing that began at 8 a.m.
Wednesday, just before jury selection was to
begin. With more than 80 potential jurors
from around Southcentral Alaska cloistered
in a meeting room across the lobby and
down a hall, Nicholas Marsh, a trial attorney
from the Justice Department's Public
Integrity Section, told Sedwick that his
superiors in Washington agreed that an
appeal of an earlier ruling was justified.
They are challenging a ruling by Sedwick on
Tuesday that said the government couldn't
present evidence that Weyhrauch and Kott
were duty-bound to report they were seeking
employment with Veco, the politically
active oil-field service company, in 2006,
when they were voting on oil-tax legislation
heavily lobbied by Veco's chair, Bill Allen.
Sedwick held that state law had no such
requirement.
In the Wednesday morning hearing, Marsh
told Sedwick the government still had ample
evidence against Kott and was prepared to
go to trial. But for Weyhrauch, a lawyer who
never landed the Veco job, the evidence is
crucial, Marsh said.
At issue is whether Weyhrauch used mail
fraud to cheat Alaskans of honest services as
a state legislator. Pope said Weyhrauch did
nothing wrong in sending a personal
advertisement for legal services to Veco.
With the trial set to begin, expenses for
lawyers and the court adding up, and
potential jurors cooling their heels, Marsh
proposed that Sedwick revisit a request
made in August by Weyhrauch's attorneys
to split the trial. At the time, Pope argued
that the stronger evidence against Kott could
prejudice the jury against his client. The
government opposed the motion then, and
the judge kept the defendants together.
But now, Pope told Sedwick, the situation
has changed. He was fully prepared to go to
trial. It would be an undue financial and
emotional burden on Weyhrauch and his
family to delay any longer. He argued the
government's points of appeal were thin and
unlikely to succeed.
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But Sedwick said federal appeals courts
around the country were split on the
disclosure issue, while the all-important 9th
Circuit, governing courts in Alaska, "hasn't
spoken." Sedwick said he followed a line of
reasoning adopted by the 5th Circuit in New
Orleans.
Jim Wendt, Kott's attorney, opposed the
split, mainly because he had prepared a case
theory and line of questioning for witnesses
based on having a co-defendant. The
government agreed to delay opening
arguments until Monday, and promised to
tell him by Friday whether Allen and former
Veco vice president Rick Smith would be
called to testify and to reveal the
approximate place in the trial they would
take the stand.
Following a 90-minute recess to review the
law and rulings in related cases, Sedwick
called the parties back to his courtroom and
announced he would split up the co-
defendants so the government could pursue
the appeal. He said the government clearly
had that right.
After packing up boxes of documents on a
cart and clearing the courthouse, Pope
stopped to talk with reporters and expressed
outrage at the government. He said
prosecutors realized late in the pretrial phase
that their case was weak and responded by
inventing a new case theory that relied on an
improper application of federal law.
He said Weyhrauch's day in court may be
delayed for more than a year by the appeal.
Marsh said it would be inappropriate to
comment on Pope's out-of-court criticism.
Back in the courtroom, potential jurors
began filing in to be questioned about their
knowledge of the now-smaller case. The
lawyers on both sides introduced
themselves, and so did Kott, who
represented Eagle River in the House.
"I'm Pete Kott, and I'm the defendant in the
case," he said, smiling at the packed room of
jurors.
Most of those with strong opinions already
had been weeded out through written
questionnaires.
Sedwick, and sometimes the lawyers, asked
detailed questions of about half those
remaining on Wednesday to determine
whether any were too biased to be fair jurors
or had other reasons not to serve.
One had just landed her first full-time job in
a year, so she was allowed to go home. A
couple of people had medical issues. One is
leaving Alaska this month. Another is
married to a former contract manager at BP
and socialized with Allen. All left the
courtroom.
Some were close calls. One man told the
judge he thought he could be fair "for the
most part." When Sedwick pressed him, he
said part of him struggled with the politics
of oil in Alaska. The judge sent him home.
While a number of the prospective jurors
had a general idea that the matter before
them was a bribery case, some said they
didn't pay attention to politics. Others
followed the political corruption cases
closely. Some told the judge they were most
interested in trouble faced by U.S. Sen. Ted
Stevens and his son, former state Senate
President Ben Stevens. Neither has been
charged with a crime, but Ben Stevens is
accused of being part of a conspiracy that
included Kott, Weyhrauch, Allen and Smith.
211
"Indictment: Weyhrauch Sought Work with VECO"
Juneau Empire
May 6, 2007
Pat Forgey
While the Alaska Legislature was discussing
an oil tax bill worth billions to the state,
federal prosecutors allege former Rep. Bruce
Weyhrauch, R-Juneau, called Bill Allen,
CEO of VECO Corp., an oil field services
company and influential player in state
politics.
Weyhrauch told Allen that he wanted to
discuss a "mutually beneficial relationship,"
according to the seven-count indictment
filed against Weyhrauch and former Rep.
Pete Kott, R-Anchorage.
VECO was not named in the indictment, but
it issued a press release late Friday
acknowledging it was the company alluded
to by prosecutors.
That relationship allegedly involved
Weyhrauch soliciting lucrative legal work
after he was no longer a representative in
exchange for his support for a lower tax rate
that the oil companies wanted.
He and Kott also backed a natural gas
pipeline deal supported by Gov. Frank
Murkowski and the state's big oil producers.
Later, Weyhrauch and Kott also worked
together to get a special session of the
Legislature to adjourn early and avoid a vote
on legislation the oil companies opposed.
Weyhrauch and Kott pleaded not guilty
Friday, but were unavailable for comment.
Weyhrauch did not collect any money, the
indictment said. It alleges Kott took
numerous cash payments, sometimes hidden
as payments to Kott's hardwood flooring
business.
The indictment quotes two VECO
executives discussing the gas pipeline
legislation, and why Kott would support the
company's position.
"We got more money in Pete Kott than he
can even think about," executives said,
according to the indictment.
How prosecutors know of the comments is
not explained, but the indictment makes
numerous references to private
conversations that took place in a VECO
suite at the Baranof Hotel in Juneau, as well
as phone conversations, suggesting
electronic surveillance.
At one point, the indictment says Kott told
the company's CEO that "I had to cheat,
steal, beg, borrow and lie," to support the
company's positions.
The CEO responded, "I own your ass,"
according to the indictment.
The indictment also recounts a conversation
in which VECO executives discussed
Weyhrauch's financial struggles and how to
"stall a bit" and string him out with the
prospect of future legal work.
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United States v. Comstock
08-1224
Ruling Below: United States v. Comstock, 551 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 2009).
Graydon Comstock and several other convicted sex offenders in North Carolina were less than a
month away from finishing their prison sentences for federal sex offenses when they were found
to be "sexually dangerous" under 18 U.S.C. §4248. They were then committed to a medium
security facility after the completion of their sentences. The sex offenders challenged the statute,
authorizing their commitment as an unconstitutional assertion of power by Congress. The
Government claimed that the statute was within Congress's power under both the Commerce
Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause. The district court agreed with the sex offenders and
struck down the statute. The Fourth Circuit affirmed.
Question Presented: Did Congress act within its constitutional powers, under the Commerce
Clause or Necessary and Proper Clause, in enacting 18 U.S.C. §4248, which allows the federal
government to commit persons believed to be "sexually dangerous" after they have already
served their terms for prior sexual offenses?
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Petitioner-Appellant,
Graydon Earl COMSTOCK, Jr., Respondent-Appellee.
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Decided January 8, 2009
[Excerpt: some footnotes and citations omitted]
DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ, Circuit Judge:
This case presents the question of whether a
newly-enacted federal statute-18 U.S.C.
§ 4248 (2006)-lies within Congress's
power. Section 4248 purports to allow the
federal government to place in indefinite
civil commitment "sexually dangerous"
persons, granting the federal government
unprecedented authority over civil
commitment-an area long controlled by the
states. The district court held that § 4248
exceeds the limits of congressional power
and intrudes on the powers reserved to the
states. The Government now appeals.
We are the first appellate court to address
this question, but the issue has divided trial
courts across the nation.
Two fundamental principles guide our
inquiry. On one hand, respect for the
legislative branch demands that we afford
congressional enactments a "presumption of
constitutionality." United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607. But on the
other, we must invalidate an act of Congress
on a "plain showing" that Congress has
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exceeded its constitutional authority.
After carefully considering the
Government's arguments, we conclude, for
the reasons set forth below. that § 4248 does
indeed lie beyond the scope of Congress's
authority. The Constitution does not
empower the federal government to confine
a person solely because of asserted "sexual
dangerousness" when the Government need
not allege (let alone prove) that this
"dangerousness" violates any federal law.
We therefore affirm the judgment of the
district court.
I.
A.
Congress enacted § 4248 as part of the
Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety
Act of 2006 ("the Act"). With the aim of
"protect[ing] children from sexual
exploitation and violent crime," a Senate
sponsor described the Act as "the most
comprehensive child crimes and protection
bill in our Nation's history." 152 Cong. Rec.
S8012 (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (statement
of Sen. Hatch). Among other measures, the
Act creates a National Sex Offender
Registry, increases punishments for a variety
of federal crimes against children, and
strengthens existing child pornography
prohibitions. None of these provisions of the
Act is challenged here.
The only portion of the Act at issue here,
§ 4248, authorizes the federal government to
civilly commit, in a federal facility, any
"sexually dangerous" person "in the
custody" of the Bureau of Prisons-even
after that person has completed his entire
prison sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 4248(a), (d)
(2006). To initiate commitment under
§ 4248, the Attorney General need only
certify that a person within federal custody
is "sexually dangerous." Such a
certification, when filed with the district
court in the jurisdiction in wxhich the federal
government holds a person, automatically
stays that person's release from prison. In
the cases at issue here, this stay has
extended federal confinement well past the
end of any prison term. Thus, pursuant to
§ 4248, the federal government has civilly
confined former federal prisoners without
proof that they have committed any new
offense. Moreover, § 4248 empowers the
Attorney General to prolong federal
detention in this manner without presenting
evidence or making any preliminary
showing; the statute only requires that the
certification contain an allegation of
dangerousness.
The statute defines a "sexually dangerous
person" to be one who "has engaged or
attempted to engage in sexually violent
conduct or child molestation and who is
sexually dangerous to others," and who
suffers from a severe mental illness such
that he would "have serious difficulty in
refraining from sexually violent conduct or
child molestation if released." 18 U.S.C.
§ 4247(a)(5)-(6) (2006). However, neither
''sexually violent conduct" nor "child
molestation" are terms defined by the
statute.
After the Attorney General files the
certification, § 4248 directs the district court
to adjudicate a person's alleged sexual
dangerousness. If the district court finds the
person to be sexually dangerous by clear and
convincing evidence, the court must commit
the person to federal custody. Only then
does § 4248 direct the Attorney General to
make "all reasonable efforts" to transfer
responsibility for the person to an
appropriate state authority. Unless and until
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a state assumes this responsibility, § 4248
authorizes federal confinement for as long as
the person remains "sexually dangerous."
B.
Graydon Comstock, who filed the first of
these consolidated challenges to § 4248,
pled guilty to receipt of child pornography
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2)
(2006). Six days prior to the end of his 37-
month prison sentence, the Attorney General
certified Comstock as a sexually dangerous
person, staying his release from prison.
More than two years later, Comstock
remains confined in the medium security
Federal Correctional Institution at Butner,
North Carolina ("FCI-Butner").
The cases of Markis Revland, Thomas
Matherly, and Marvin Vigil followed a
similar course, with the Government
certifying each man for federal commitment
less than one month before he completed his
full prison term. In fact, the Government
certified Vigil for civil commitment on the
very same day that he had completed his 96-
month term of imprisonment. Like
Comstock, each of these men remains in
federal custody at FCI-Butner more than two
years after the expiration of his prison term.
As part of each certification, the
Government petitioned for a hearing to
determine whether the named person
qualified as "sexually dangerous" under
§ 4248. In each case, the named person then
moved to dismiss, contending that § 4248
violates the Constitution. The district court
agreed and held that § 4248's civil
commitment scheme could not withstand
constitutional scrutiny.
With this background in mind, we turn to
the question presented in this case: whether
the Constitution grants Congress the
authority to enact § 4248.
II.
In the exercise of their general police and
parens patriae powers, the states have long
controlled the civil commitment of the
mentally ill. Unlike the states, the federal
government has no general police or parens
patriae power.
Nonetheless, in the statute at issue here,
Congress purports to grant the federal
government broad civil commitment
authority. This raises a substantial
constitutional question because the
Constitution requires that a specific
enumerated power support every statute
enacted by Congress. The Government does
not argue to the contrary.
Yet the Government attempts to defend the
validity of § 4248 largely by direct reliance
on the Necessary and Proper Clause. But
that provision, by itself, creates no
constitutional power; rather, it merely
permits Congress "[t]o make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into Execution . .. all . .. Powers vested by
this Constitution in the Government of the
United States . . ." Thus, to sustain § 4248
under the Necessary and Proper Clause, the
Government must show that the statute is
necessary to achieve ends within Congress's
enumerated powers.
Perhaps implicitly recognizing this
deficiency in its Necessary and Proper
Clause arguments, the Government also
relies (albeit briefly) on the Commerce
Clause. Unlike the Necessary and Proper
Clause, the Commerce Clause does vest
Congress with enumerated constitutional
power. Clearly, if we can uphold § 4248 as a
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valid exercise of Congress' Commerce
Clause powers, the statute lies within
congressional authority. Accordingly,
consistent with the "presumption of
constitutionality," Morrison, 529 U.S. at
607, that we afford every federal statute, we
begin our analysis by addressing this
question.
A.
The Commerce Clause empowers Congress
"[tlo regulate Commerce . . . among the
several States." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
Recent Supreme Court precedent provides
substantial assistance in resolving the
question of whether the Commerce Clause
authorizes § 4248. First, in United States v.
Lopez, the Court held that the Gun-Free
School Zones Act (GFSZA) of 1990, which
made possession of a firearm in a school
zone a federal crime, exceeded Congress's
Commerce Clause power because it
regulated neither commercial nor interstate
activity. Then, in Morrison, the Court
imposed further limits on Congress's
Commerce Clause power, holding
unconstitutional a provision of the Violence
Against Women Act (VAWA) that created a
federal civil remedy for noneconomic sexual
violence, because such crimes do not
substantially affect interstate commerce.
In these cases, the Court identified three
specific areas that Congress could regulate
pursuant to its Commerce Clause power: (1)
the channels of interstate commerce, (2)
instrumentalities of or persons and things in
interstate commerce, and (3) activities that
"substantially affect" interstate commerce.
Like the statutes at issue in Lopez and
Morrison, the statute challenged here,
§ 4248, contains no jurisdictional
requirement limiting its application to
commercial or interstate activities. Nor does
the Government suggest that § 4248 targets
the channels of interstate commerce or
persons and things in interstate commerce.
Therefore, we can uphold § 4248 under the
Commerce Clause only if it regulates
activities that -substantially affect" interstate
commerce.
Morrison forecloses any such argument.
Indeed, § 4248 bears striking similarities to
the VAWA provision struck down in
Morrison. First, like VAWA, § 4248
provides a civil remedy aimed at the
prevention of noneconomic sexual violence.
The Morrison Court's rationale for rejecting
Commerce Clause authority for such a
statute applies with equal force here:
The regulation and punishment of
intrastate violence . . has always
been the province of the States.
Indeed, we can think of no better
example of the police power, which
the Founders denied the National
Government and reposed in the
States, than the suppression of
violent crime and vindication of its
victims.
Second, the target of the statute challenged
here (sexual dangerousness)-no less than
the target of the statute invalidated in
Morrison (gender-motivated violence)-is
"not, in any sense of the phrase, economic
activity." Like the gender-motivated
violence banned in Morrison, sexual
dangerousness does not substantially affect
interstate commerce. Indeed, unlike
Morrison, the record here does not even
contain any legislative findings to the
contrary.
Supreme Court precedent thus compels the
conclusion that § 4248 does not constitute a
valid exercise by Congress of its Commerce
Clause power. To construe § 4248 as within
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such power would encroach on the police
and parens patriae powers reserved to the
sovereign states, conflating "what is truly
national and what is truly local."
Federal commitment of 'sexually dangerous
persons" may well be-like the suppression
of guns in schools or the redress of gender-
motivated violence-a sound proposal as a
matter of social policy. But policy
justifications do not create congressional
authority. Hence § 4248 lies beyond
Congress's Commerce Clause authority. The
Government's apparent reluctance to rely on
the Commerce Clause is thus
understandable.
B.
What is less understandable is the
Government's heavy reliance on the
Necessary and Proper Clause, standing
alone, as a source of congressional power.
Of course, as the Government contends at
length, the Necessary and Proper Clause
reaches broadly, but it does so only to
effectuate powers specifically enumerated in
the Constitution. The Necessary and Proper
Clause simply does not-in and of itself-
create any Congressional power. Ordinarily,
this would end our discussion of the
Necessary and Proper Clause. But because
the Government's defense of § 4248 relies
almost exclusively on that Clause, we
briefly address each of its specific
arguments on this point.
1.
The Government's principal argument is
that its ability to establish and maintain a
"federal criminal justice and penal system"
somehow renders § 4248 necessary and
proper and thus constitutional. The
Government cites no precedent in support of
this novel theory. Instead, the Government
relies on a restatement provision setting
forth common law principles on the
responsibilities of custodians. In essence, the
Government argues that because it may
constitutionally imprison persons who
violate federal criminal law. it can continue
to confine such persons-even after they
have served their sentences-if it believes
them to be "sexually dangerous."
This argument must fail. Of course,
Congress may establish and run a federal
penal system, as necessary and proper to the
Article I power (usually the Commerce
Clause) relied on to enact federal criminal
statutes. And, consistent with its role in
maintaining a penal system, the federal
government possesses broad powers over
persons during their prison sentences. But
these powers are far removed from the
indefinite civil commitment of persons after
the expiration of their prison terms, based
solely on possible future actions that the
federal government lacks power to regulate
directly.
The fact of previously lawful federal
custody simply does not, in itself, provide
Congress with any authority to regulate
future conduct that occurs outside of the
prison walls. For example, although the
Government may regulate assaults occurring
in federal prisons, the Government cannot
criminalize all assaults committed by former
federal prisoners. As the district court
explained:
The fact of legitimate custody . . .
does not establish Congressional
authority to provide for the
commitment of a person after a
person has completed a sentence for
a federal crime, i.e., when the power
to prosecute federal offenses is
exhausted, when that person has not
committed any misconduct while in
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custody, and where there has been no
showing that the person is likely to
engage in conduct that Congress, as
opposed to the states, actually has
the authority to criminalize.
Comstock, 507 F Supp. 2d at 551.
2.
The Government next contends that § 4248
constitutes a necessary and proper exercise
of its power to prevent "sex-related crimes."
Brief of Appellant at 36. But the federal
government simply has no power to broadly
regulate all sex-related crimes, as § 4248
purports to do.
Consistent with Congress's limited powers,
federal statutes regulating sex crimes are
limited in number and breadth, specifically
requiring a connection to interstate
commerce, or limiting their scope to the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
In contrast, § 4248 targets "sexual
dangerousness" generally, without any
requirement that this undefined danger relate
to conduct that the federal government may
constitutionally regulate. Because most
crimes of sexual violence violate state and
not federal law, many commitments under
§ 4248 would prevent conduct prohibited
only by state law. Section 4248 thus sweeps
far too broadly to be a valid effort to prevent
federal criminal activity.
The principal case on which the Government
relies for its argument to the contrary,
United States v. Perry, 788 F.2d 100 (3d Cir.
1986), actually offers it no support. Notably,
at the outset, the Perry court recognized (as
the Government fails to here) that a specific,
enumerated federal power must support a
federal civil commitment:
[T]he federal government may resort
to civil commitment when such
commitment is necessary and proper
to the exercise of some specific
federal authority. Congress may not,
however, authorize commitment
simply to protect the general welfare
of the community at large.
Id. at I10 (emphasis added). Applying this
test, Perry upheld the constitutionality of the
Bail Reform Act of 1984, which authorizes
pretrial detention only if a court finds a
likelihood that the detainee will, if released,
commit one of four specific federal offenses.
The Bail Reform Act therefore contained a
clear connection between the pretrial
detentions and the Government's interest in
preventing federal crime.
In contrast, § 4248 contains no such
connection: it does not refer to any federal
crime, let alone require the Government to
demonstrate that a person presents a risk of
committing a specific federal crime. Indeed,
under § 4248, the federal government may
commit a person even though he has never
been convicted by any court-state or
federal-of any crime of sexual violence.
Section 4248 only requires that the
Government demonstrate that an individual
in United States custody is "sexually
dangerous," which encompasses any
"sexually violent conduct"-regardless of
whether state or federal law criminalizes this
conduct.
At its core, the Government's argument
attempts to "pile inference upon inference"
so as to "convert congressional authority
under the Commerce Clause to a general
police power of the sort retained by the
States." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567. Were we to
accept the Government's logic, Congress
could authorize the civil commitment of a
person on a showing that he posed a general
risk of any sexually violent conduct, even
though not all, or even most, of this potential
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conduct violated federal law. This argument
would convert the federal government's
limited power to criminalize narrow forms
of sexual violence into the general power to
regulate all sexual violence, including acts
which violate no criminal statute.
Congressional power does not reach so far.
3.
Finally, the Government maintains that the
Necessary and Proper Clause justifies §
4248 because it retains the "power to
prosecute" all persons in its custody charged
with criminal offenses. But the Government
has already charged, tried, and convicted
Comstock, Matherly, Vigil, and Revland of
all alleged federal crimes; it retains no
power to prosecute them.
Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366
(1956), on which the Government heavily
relies, does not suggest, let alone hold, to the
contrary. Rather, Greenwood simply
upholds a statute that permits the federal
civil commitment of a person charged with
federal crimes but found incompetent to
stand trial. To prevent "frustrat[ion]" of
federal prosecutions in such cases,
Greenwood authorizes the commitment of
these incompetent individuals, reasoning
that they might someday regain competence
and so be able to stand trial. Furthermore,
the statute upheld in Greenwood requires the
Attorney General to determine that "suitable
arrangements for State custody and care of
the person are not available" before the
federal government can undertake any
commitment. 18 U.S.C. § 4246(a) (2006).
In sum, Greenwood only approved the
federal civil commitment of persons who
had been charged with federal crimes but
found incompetent to stand trial, and for
whom no state would take custody.
Greenwood certainly did not approve the
federal civil commitment of persons-like
Comstock, Matherly, Vigil, and Revland-
who have stood trial, been convicted, and
fully served all federal prison sentences.
Accordingly, because no federal prosecution
has been frustrated here, we cannot sustain
§ 4248 under Greenwood.
III.
For these reasons, we can only conclude that
the district court correctly held § 4248
unconstitutional. The challengers have made
a "plain showing" that, in enacting § 4248,
Congress exceeded its constitutional
authority.
Our holding, however, does not require that
the Government's legitimate policy concerns
go unaddressed. If the federal government
has serious concerns about the
dangerousness of a person due to be released
from federal prison, it can notify state
authorities, who may use their well-settled
police and parens patriae powers to pursue
civil commitment under state law.
Moreover, if the relevant state authorities
prove reluctant to take charge of such
persons, the Government is not without
recourse. The federal government may, for
example, wield its spending power to
encourage state action by providing funding
to state institutions for this purpose. But
Congress's perceived need for the sort of
civil commitment statute at issue here does
not create constitutional power where none
exists. Congress must instead seek
alternative, constitutional means of
achieving what may well be commendable
objectives.
The power claimed by § 4248-forcible,
indefinite civil commitment-is among the
most severe wielded by any government.
The Framers, distrustful of such authority,
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reposed such broad powers in the states,
limiting the national government to specific
and enumerated powers. -[T]hat those limits
may not be mistaken, or forgotten. the
constitution is wvritten." Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
Section 4248 thus cannot be sustained as an
exercise of Congress's authority under the
Commerce Clause or any other provision of
the Constitution. For these reasons, we
affirm the judgment of the district court.
AFFIRMED
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"Supreme Court to Review Sex Offender Law"
7he Christian Science Monitor
June 22, 2009
Warren Richey
The US Supreme Court has agreed to decide
the constitutionality of a law that allows the
federal government to indefinitely detain a
person deemed -sexually dangerous," even
after that person has finished serving a full
prison sentence.
The issue arises in the case of a man who
has been confined to a North Carolina
federal prison for more than two years after
completing his three-year sentence for
receiving child pornography. The man,
Graydon Earl Comstock, has no firm release
date.
In January, a federal appeals court panel
declared the law unconstitutional. "The
Constitution does not empower the federal
government to confine a person solely
because of asserted 'sexual dangerousness'
when the government need not allege (let
alone prove) that this 'dangerousness'
violates any federal law," wrote Judge Diana
Gribbon Motz of the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals based in Richmond.
The provision in question was passed as part
of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and
Safety Act of 2006. It authorizes the
attorney general to seek the court-ordered,
open-ended civil commitment of any
"sexually dangerous person" already in US
custody.
The measure is controversial in part because
it relies on anticipation of future
dangerousness to society, rather than actual
or planned violations of law.
The case, which the high court will hear in
the fall, is significant legally because it tests
the breadth of federal power under the
Constitution's necessary and proper clause.
The Obama administration is currently
considering enacting a legal regime to
indefinitely detain Al Qaeda terror suspects
currently at Guantdnamo who can't be put
on trial but who are deemed too dangerous
to be released.
In May, a panel of the St. Louis-based
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the
same provision of the Child Protection and
Safety Act. That court ruled that Congress
had the authority under the necessary and
proper clause to provide for civil
commitment as a means of preventing future
sex crimes.
In contrast, the Fourth Circuit concluded
that the law is not a "necessary and proper"
function of the federal government because
the job of policing violent sexual attacks
belongs to state and local law enforcement
agencies.
The North Carolina case involves inmates
being held at the Federal Correctional
Complex at Butner, N.C. Since the law
passed, the federal government has sought to
indefinitely detain 95 individuals it deemed
"sexually dangerous," 77 of whom are
housed at Butner.
"Congress could reasonably determine that
it is 'appropriate'-and therefore 'necessary
and proper' under [the 1819 landmark
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decision McCulloch v. Maryland]-to
protect private persons from sexually
dangerous, mentally ill persons whom the
federal government has taken into its
custody," writes Solicitor General Elena
Kagen.
Mr. Comstock's lawyer, Jane Pearce, an
assistant federal public defender in Raleigh,
argues that the law exceeds Congress's
legislative authority under the necessary and
proper clause. In addition, she says the
statute violates due process protections
because it allows the government to
imprison someone potentially for life using a
relaxed burden of proof rather than the
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard
required for a criminal conviction and jail
term.
lIThis law] expands federal civil
commitment into an area never before
contemplated by the federal government,
an area that has historically been the
province of the states," Ms. Pearce writes in
her brief.
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"Release of Sex Offenders Delayed"
SCOTUS Blog
April 3, 2009
Lyle Denniston
Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., put on
hold on Friday a federal appeals court ruling
that the federal government contended
would lead to the early release of "the great
majority" of "sexually dangerous" inmates
now held in federal prison. In a brief order,
the Chief Justice said there was "a
presumption of constitutionality" of the
2006 federal law that the Fourth Circuit
Court struck down. He thus blocked
temporarily the Circuit Court ruling, until
the Justices act on a new government appeal
filed Friday (U.S. v. Comstock, et al., 08-
1224).
Roberts took little time to act. The Justice
Department in the morning asked for a delay
of the appeals court decision, but also sought
an "immediate, interim" stay while its
request was awaiting the Chief Justice's
reaction. Roberts, without seeking a
response from the challengers to the federal
law, by late afternoon issued his order fully
staying the Circuit Court.
The law at issue is the Adam Walsh Child
Protection and Safety Act, described by one
of its Senate sponsors as "the most
comprehensive child crimes and protection
bill in our nation's history." It was named
for a child who died in a brutal crime
attributed to a sex offender.
In a ruling on Jan. 8, the Fourth Circuit
nullified the part of the Act that allows the
government to put in indefinite civil
commitment federal prisoners who have
been found mentally incompetent to stand
trial, or have had criminal charges dismissed
because of their mental condition.
Under the Act, government officials certify
such an inmate as "sexually dangerous," and
ask a federal judge to order commitment.
Once the government files such a request,
release of the inmate is delayed until court-
ordered review procedures are completed.
If the judge agrees that the individual meets
the dangerousness definition, a commitment
order must be issued. If such an individual
cannot be placed in a state facility, they
must remain in federal custody until no
longer "sexually dangerous."
The constitutionality of that regime was
challenged by five inmates facing
commitment in federal court in North
Carolina. The federal Bureau of Prisons
facility for most of those who have been
certified as "sexually dangerous" is at
Butner, N.C., in the Fourth Circuit's area.
A federal judge, Senior District Judge W.
Earl Britt of Raleigh, dismissed the
commitment proceedings for each of them.
The Fourth Circuit, in its ruling against the
Act's validity, found that Congress did not
have the constitutional authority to create a
regime involving "unprecedented [federal]
authority over civil commitment - an area
long controlled by the states." The Court
commented: "The Constitution does not
empower the federal government to confine
a person solely because of asserted 'sexual
dangerousness' when the government need
not allege (let alone prove) that this
'dangerousness' violates any federal law."
That was the only part of the new federal
law that was at issue.
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The Fourth Circuit was the first appeals
court to rule on the Act's constitutionality;
that issue, however, has divided federal
District Courts across the country. The
Supreme Court, in rulings in 1997 and 2002,
had upheld state legislation on commitment
of sexually violent predator acts. The
federal government contended in the case
involving the 2006 federal law that Congress
was following the Supreme Court's lead, but
challengers contended that the broad
commitment scheme of that law differed
significantly from what the Justices had
upheld.
In asking the Chief Justice to postpone the
lower court decision, the Justice Department
(in application 08A863) said that the release
of inmates at Butner could have come as
early as next Tuesday. The application
argued: -The court of appeals has held
unconstitutional on its face an important Act
of Congress that was passed to protect the
public from mentally ill and sexually
dangerous persons held in federal custody."
The stay of the Circuit Court ruling, the
Chief Justice's order said, will last "pending
the disposition of the petition for a writ of
certiorari," and would remain in effect if
review is granted, but otherwise would
terminate.
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"4th Circuit Strikes Down Indefinite Lock-up of Those Tagged
'Sexually Dangerous'
The American LawiYer
January 13, 2009
Pamela A. McLean
The 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has
struck down as unconstitutional a 2006 law
that allowed the federal government to place
under indefinite lock-up anyone considered
"sexually dangerous" even beyond the end
of prison sentences. The conservative 4th
Circuit became the first federal appellate
court to weigh in on the constitutionality of
the Adam Walsh Child Protection and
Safety Act, striking down the civil
commitment of five men held years beyond
their completed prison terms.
The 4th Circuit panel held that Congress
exceeded its power in violation of the
Constitution's commerce clause by creating
a national program to impose civil
commitment of sexually dangerous
defendants, a power generally reserved for
states. U.S. v. Comstock, 2009 WL 42476
(4th Cir. Jan. 8, 2009).
The Justice Department did not immediately
comment on the case.
The case strikes down civil commitment in
five combined cases of prisoners held at the
federal Butner prison hospital facility in
North Carolina, including Graydon
Comstock, sentenced to three years for
receipt of child pornography. Prosecutors
blocked his release six days prior to his
release, and he has been held two added
years.
Others included Markis Revland, Shane
Catron, Thomas Matherly and Marvin Vigil.
In each case the men were ordered held
under civil commitments less than a month
before the release from their prison terms
and each has been held more than two added
years, according to the court.
The Federal Public Defender's office will
not comment on the decision, said Elizabeth
Luck, spokeswoman for the office.
The ruling does not affect other terms of the
Adam Walsh Act, including creation of a
national sex offender registry, increased
punishment for crimes against children and
stronger prohibitions against child
pornography. Referring to prior U.S.
Supreme Court rulings that struck down
harsher punishment for guns near school
grounds and violence aimed at women, the
panel stated, "Federal commitment of
.sexually dangerous persons' may well be-
like the suppression of guns in schools or the
redress of gender-motivated violence-a
sound proposal as a matter of social policy.
But policy justifications do not create a
constitutional authority."
While the federal government enjoys broad
power during imprisonment of defendants,
"these powers are far removed from the
indefinite civil commitment of persons after
the expiration of their prison terms, based
solely on possible future actions that the
federal government lacks power to regulate
directly," wrote Judge Diana Gribbon Motz.
She called the civil commitment authority
"among the most severe wielded by any
government."
225
The decision points out that federal
prosecutors still have the option of asking
state authorities to invoke state civil
commitment proceedings for those federal
prisoners considered "sexually dangerous,"
in those states with civil commitment laws.
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"8th Circuit Says Adam Walsh Act Constitutional"
Missouri Lawyers Weekly
May 15, 2009
Angela Riley
The 8th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has
upheld the constitutionality of a law
allowing for the civil commitment of a
-sexually dangerous person."
The decision directly conflicts with a
previous 4th Circuit ruling, which said
Section 4248 of The Adam Walsh Child
Protection and Safety Act was
unconstitutional. The Adam Walsh Act was
enacted in 2006 and named after the son of
-America's Most Wanted" host John Walsh.
Adam was kidnapped in 1981 and later
found murdered. The act encompasses a
wide number of issues designed to protect
children from sexual exploitation and
violent crimes. The act created a national
sex offender registry, instituted new policies
on how often sex offenders must update
their whereabouts and created civil
commitment procedures.
In the 8th Circuit case, Roger Dean Tom
pleaded guilty to one count of sexual abuse
of a minor. He was sentenced to 120 months
in prison and housed in the Federal Medical
Center in Rochester, Minn. He was
scheduled to be released in October 2006,
but his release was stayed after the United
States filed a petition alleging a Rochester
mental health staff member had examined
Tom and determined that he is a sexually
dangerous person. The Adam Walsh Act
requires the district court to stay a release
pending a hearing determining whether the
person is sexually dangerous.
Tom's attorneys at the Federal Defender's
Office of Minnesota moved to dismiss the
proceeding, arguing that Section 4248 was
unconstitutional because neither the
Commerce Clause nor the Necessary and
Proper Clause of the Constitution authorized
its enactment. They also argued the section's
enactment encroached on the powers
awarded to the states under the 10th
Amendment.
The district court agreed, and Tom's motion
to dismiss was granted.
The issue before the 8th Circuit was one of
first impression. No district court in the 8th
Circuit has addressed The Adam Walsh
Act's civil commitment procedures, said
Tom's attorney, Kate Menendez, of the
Federal Defender's Office of Minnesota.
Mendendez also said the office has not seen
another case involving federal civil
commitments under the act since Tom's.
On appeal, the government argued that
Section 4248 was needed for the operation
of the federal prison and criminal justice
systems, as well as to prevent federal
crimes.
In making its decision, the 8th Circuit
looked at the Supreme Court's decision in
Greenwood v. U.S., which determined that
Congress was authorized by the Necessary
and Proper Clause to enact legislation
authorizing a civil commitment of a person
incompetent to stand trial.
The appeals court applied the same
reasoning in Tom's case.
"We conclude that Congress having been
empowered by the Commerce Clause to
criminalize and punish the conduct of which
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Tom is guilty, has the ancillary authority
under the Necessary and Proper Clause to
provide for his civil commitment so that he
may be prevented from its commission in
the first place," Judge Diane E. Murphy
wrote for the court.
The court also noted that many, if not most,
sex offenders are housed outside of their
home state or the state in which they were
convicted. It is not unreasonable to assume
that upon release, the sex offenders will
travel outside of the state of their
incarceration, the court said.
The court remanded the decision to the
district court for a hearing to determine if
Tom is a sexually dangerous person.
The 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has
been the only other appellate court to
address Section 4248's constitutionality.
The court concluded in U.S. v. Comstock,
that the provision was unconstitutional
because it "neither regulated economic
activity nor activities substantially affecting
interstate commerce and was therefore
beyond the reach of the Commerce Clause."
It also rejected the government's arguments
the Necessary and Proper Clause could
authorize the legislation.
Other district courts that have addressed the
issue have split on the statute's
constitutionality. District courts in
Massachusetts and North Carolina said it
was unconstitutional while district courts in
Hawaii, Massachusetts and Oklahoma said it
was.
The government has appealed the decision
in the Comstock case to the U.S. Supreme
Court. While the court has yet to accept
transfer. it has granted a stay on the release
of the inmate.
Menendez said that the Federal Defender's
Office plans on appealing the court's
decision and that the issue would be a good
one for the Supreme Court to rule on.
"It does seem like there are a lot of contrary
opinions about the constitutional issues and
not the specific facts," she said. "There
might not be other circuits that weigh on this
particular issue for a long time because these
cases are brought where these prisoners are
located at-not where their case originated.
There are only sexual predator treatment
programs in prisons in certain parts of the
country."
Messages left to the U.S. Department of
Justice were not returned.
The case is US. v. Tom, 08-2345.
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"4th Circuit Got It Right in Comstock"
Sex Crimes Blog
January 8, 2009
Corey Rayburn Yung
(In the interest of full disclosure, I did help
out in a very minor way in the Comstock
appeal, so I'm not a wholly disinterested
spectator in this case.)
The Fourth Circuit issued a unanimous and
very noteworthy AWA opinion today in a
case that I have blogged about a few times
before. In U.S. v. Comstock, the Fourth
Circuit affirmed the district court judgment
that 18 U.S.C. 4248 of the Adam Walsh Act
was unconstitutional because the federal
government lacks the authority to enact the
provision. Section 4248 concerns the civil
commitment of sex offenders after
incarceration. This is from the opinion:
After carefully considering the
Government's arguments, we
conclude, for the reasons set forth
below, that § 4248 does indeed lie
beyond the scope of Congress's
authority. The Constitution does not
empower the federal government to
confine a person solely because of
asserted "sexual dangerousness"
when the Government need not
allege (let alone prove) that this
"dangerousness" violates any federal
law. We therefore affirm the
judgment of the district court.
I have been arguing for quite some time that
certain portions of the AWA are unlawful
exercises of congressional power under the
Commerce Clause so I'm extremely happy
to finally see a federal appellate court reach
a similar conclusion. I think the case against
4248 is stronger than that against SORNA
provisions because there simply was no
jurisdictional limitation in the civil
commitment section. Given the lack of
Congressional findings and jurisdictional
statement, Congress was basically thumbing
its nose at Morrison (which also concerned
federal authority over sexual violence).
Eugene Volokh has chimed in and he is a
little more critical of the opinion. From his
post:
At the same time, presumably civil
commitment of sexual offenders is
aimed at preventing repeat sexual
offenses. (Let's set aside whether
such civil commitment after the end
of a sentence may sometimes deny
people liberty in violation of the Due
Process Clause; that's an issue
unrelated to the federal power
question, since it would apply
equally to states.) And presumably
someone who committed a federal
sex crime (e.g., possession or
trafficking of child pornography) is
pretty likely to commit another crime
of much the same variety-which
will likely be a federal crime-and
not just some other random state sex
crime. If the Commerce Clause
power to regulate commerce
authorizes Congress to ban
commerce in child pornography, and
the Necessary and Proper Clause
therefore authorizes Congress to ban
even private possession of child
pornography, then it's hard to see
why the Necessary and Proper
Clause wouldn't authorize continued
detention of people who have shown
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a willingness to commit such federal
crimes.
This was certainly the government's
position, but I just don't know how you can
reconcile such reasoning with the holding in
Morrison. The Necessary and Proper Clause
alone can never provide a basis for federal
jurisdiction. It needs another jurisdictional
hook, in this case the Commerce Clause. At
the time of civil commitment, the prisoner
(or in many cases under 4248, the former
prisoner) has no connection to interstate
commerce. He or she may have at the time
of the original conviction, but that time has
long since passed. Volokh argues that
prevention of future sex crimes might be
sufficient, but that rationale was explicitly
rejected in Morrison. Even if you believe
these particular persons are of a higher risk
than the hypothetical tort defendants under
VAWA, that risk seems unrelated to a basis
for federal jurisdiction. Volokh's argument
similarly is in conflict with Lopez. Why
couldn't the Necessary and Proper Clause
have provided sufficient basis for preventing
guns from being possessed near schools
since such possession could well increase
the risk of gun violence toward children?
Volokh then takes his argument in a
different direction (which was not in the
briefing that I remember) that presents more
difficulty than his initial claim:
One way of thinking about it might
be to think about the historically
established practice of civil
commitment of people found not
guilty by reason of insanity. If
someone is tried for a federal crime
and found insane, he won't be
imprisoned for the crime-since he's
not criminally guilty-but he will be
locked up in a mental hospital so
long as he is thought to be
dangerous. I think that's right, but
how does it fit the panel's decision?
After all, the person is not guilty. so
Congress can't appeal to its power to
punish federal criminals (just as the
people in this case can't be further
criminally punished, since their
terms are up). True, we worry that
this insane person will commit
another crime, but under the panel's
reasoning, that might well be a state
crime. So must Congress release
such people unless it gets a state to
agree to take custody of them?
Perhaps that's the right answer, since
Congress lacks the enumerated
power to detain them-but I'm
skeptical that this is so.
I think the initial decision to send someone
to a civil facility based upon a finding of
insanity is clearly tied to the Commerce
Clause in the same way a criminal sentence
would be. That jurisdictional hook exists
based upon the original crime. I think the
tougher issue is the decision to release or not
release someone from a civil facility upon
completion of their treatment. Such cases
seem somewhat analogous to the 4248
provisions. However, I think there is a
strong argument for the Necessary and
Proper Clause in the insanity case because a
decision on further treatment or release
simply must be made-it is "necessary." In
contrast, the 4248 commitment is a wholly
separate procedure that bears no relation to
the original conviction (as proven by the fact
that the government has attempted to use the
procedure for persons not convicted for sex
offenses).
Volokh concludes by stating that this case is
likely headed to the USSC. I'm not so sure.
First, there will almost certainly not be a
circuit split on this issue simply because
almost all of the cases of this type go
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through the same district in North Carolina
as that is the site of the only appropriate
federal facility. (Edit: As noted in the
comments, there is at least one other facility
so the possibility of a circuit split is certainly
present. I think it is much more likely now
that the case will go to the USSC). Second,
since this provision affects so few people,
I'm not sure it is worth USSC time.
Ultimately, I think the USSC is likely to
take up a SORNA case instead simply
because there is a much tougher legal issue
(since a jurisdictional limitation exists) and a
far larger number of people are affected by
the statute (500,000+). Either way, it is
about time for the Court to clean up the
Commerce Clause mess after Raich, so I
hope they look at one of the AWA
provisions.
Update: Illya Somin, also at Volokh
Conspiracy, has added his thoughts as well.
Somin, as exhibited in our previous debates
about different provisions of the AWA,
takes a very broad view of "economic
activity" as defined by Raich. Notably, the
government did not defend his position in its
briefs in Comstock. In fact, the government
banked heavily on the Necessary and Proper
Clause argument that was well-captured by
Volokh's post. From Somin's post:
Finally, Raich restored the so-called
"rational basis" test for judicial
review of Commerce Clause cases.
In plain English, that means that the
government doesn't have to actually
prove that Section 4248 regulates
" economic activity" or that it is part
of a broader regulatory scheme.
Rather, the government can win
simply by showing that Congress
might have had some "rational"
reason for believing that one of these
two conclusions is correct. And by
-rational," the Court means merely
that there is some possibility, even if
a very remote one, that Congress'
putative reasoning might be sound.
Unfortunately, the Comstock
decision dismisses Raich in a brief
footnote that ignores most of the
considerations discussed here. The
Fourth Circuit does rely heavily on
the Court's two earlier Commerce
Clause decisions in United States v.
Lopez and United States v. Morrison,
but essentially ignores the way in
which Raich greatly undercuts those
precedents by virtually confining
them to their facts. I discuss the
impact of Raich on Lopez and
Morrison in my article linked above;
see also this excellent piece by co-
conspirator Jonathan Adler.
I continue to think that Somin overestimates
the degree to which courts will adopt such
an expansive position as to the definition of
"economic activity." Even in cases where
courts have upheld other provisions of the
AWA (specifically, SORNA), they have
most often done so under the 2nd Lopez
prong. It isn't clear how rational basis
applies in such cases. The government
briefing in Comstock was confused as to
which prong they felt justified 4248, so the
rational basis discussion was not really
played out. Hence, the 4th Circuit's
dismissal of Raich in a footnote seems
appropriate.
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"U.S. Plans to Detain Worst Sex Offenders"
USA Today
December 14, 2006
The Justice Department is planning to detain
an undetermined number of violent sex
offenders after they have completed their
federal prison sentences as part of a program
aimed at protecting children, U.S. Attorney
General Alberto Gonzales says.
The initiative, modeled after controversial
"civil commitmenft laws in 18 states that
have kept more than 2,000 sex offenders
locked up after they have served their
sentences, will identify federal inmates who
authorities think would pose a threat if they
were released without treatment.
It's unclear how officials would decide
which offenders should be held past their
sentences. The potential impact on the
federal prison system could be significant:
Of the system's 190,000 inmates, 11,000 are
sex offenders.
"We're working with the Bureau of Prisons
to see how we implement" the plan,
Gonzales said in an interview. "It's an
ongoing project."
Civil commitment laws, which survived a
U.S. Supreme Court challenge in 1997, have
been one of the most extreme measures
states have used to clamp down on repeat
sex offenders. This year, the federal
government won authority to pursue such a
strategy with the passage of the Adam
Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act.
"Congress has been creative," Gonzales told
federal prosecutors during a recent gathering
in Washington. "They've given us the right
to pursue (civil commitments) and others
like it, and we are going to."
Dennis Doren, a Wisconsin psychologist and
a consultant to the Bureau of Prisons, says
U.S. authorities are reviewing the
backgrounds of imprisoned sex offenders to
determine who might pose a threat if they
were released.
-They are looking at lots of cases."
Civil commitment programs for sex
offenders have passed legal muster on the
state level because courts have viewed them
as being similar to laws that allow open-
ended confinements of mentally ill criminals
until they are deemed well enough to return
to society.
For years, authorities from Virginia to
Washington state have detained sex
offenders well past their release dates and
kept them in state treatment facilities.
Typically, civil trials determine whether
offenders should stay in custody past their
sentences, be released or submit to a form of
monitoring similar to parole.
Since 2003, 41 sex offenders have been
committed to indefinite terms of treatment in
Virginia. In Minnesota, 342 offenders have
been detained since 1994.
Of the more than 2,000 sex offenders who
have been committed across the nation, only
about 10 percent have been released after
achieving an acceptable level of
rehabilitation, Doren says.
Civil rights advocates have blasted
commitment programs, saying they unfairly
extend punishments beyond sentences levied
by judges and juries.
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"This is merely camouflage for lifetime
sentences for some offenses," says William
Buckman of the National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers' sex offender
policy task force. "It's hard to consider this
a rational criminal justice strategy."
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"New Law Designed to Provide More Protection for Children"
Baton Rouge Advocate
August 14, 2006
Sonya Kimbrell
Federal officials say a law recently passed
by the Congress and signed by President
Bush gives teeth to efforts to investigate and
prosecute crimes involving sexual
exploitation of children.
"This is just one piece of a larger effort,"
U.S. Attorney David Dugas said of the
Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety
Act, which President George W. Bush
signed into law in late July.
The Adam Walsh Act is part of an effort
called Project Safe Childhood, an initiative
launched earlier this year by the U.S.
Department of Justice. The project's mission
is to combat technology-related sexual-
exploitation crimes against children. The
initiative is based on Project Safe
Neighborhoods, a national program started
in 2001 to reduce gun crime.
Both initiatives coordinate federal, state,
local and tribal law enforcement as well as
prosecutors, community leaders and
nonprofit agencies in each federal judicial
district. There are several points in the law
that give broader federal authority, but the
most significant change is the federal
database of sex offenders.
Registration requirements vary by state.
Though Megan's Law, a federal law,
requires states to release information to the
public about convicted sex offenders, the
law does not require active notification nor
does it specify how the information is to be
released.
Megan's Law was named after Megan
Kanka, a 7-year-old New Jersey girl who
was raped and murdered in 1994 by a
neighbor with a history of being a child-sex
predator.
Louisiana passed a law in 1997 authorizing
a central registry of sex offenders
maintained by the Bureau of Criminal
Investigation. Information is available
online by parish and includes photographs of
the offenders, the offenders' addresses,
physical descriptions, known aliases and the
nature of their crimes. There are more than
7,000 individuals registered on Louisiana's
registry.
The Adam Walsh Act specifies that
registration information include name,
Social Security number, address, license
plate information and automobile
description, physical description, criminal
history, photo, finger and palm prints, and a
DNA sample.
The lack of a national database has made it
easy for sex offenders to move to another
state and not register in their new location,
Dugas said.
The Adam Walsh Act also targets sex
offenders who use technology such as the
Internet to entice children or to distribute
child pornography.
"Strangers can get into a home through the
Internet; sexual predators have more access
to children via the Internet," Dugas said.
234
In August 2005, a California man was
indicted on federal charges for luring a 13-
year-old Zachary girl to Texas for sex. They
allegedly met in an Internet chat room.
"That happened right here. That crime
couldn't have happened without the
Internet," Dugas said.
Already, said Dugas and Baton Rouge U.S.
Marshal Carey Jenkins, there have been
many coordinated efforts among local, state
and federal officials in tracking sex
offenders. Joining those efforts have been
local agents with the FBI, the Louisiana
Cybercrimes Task Force and Internet
Crimes Against Children Task Force.
"*The cooperation has been good, but this
gives statutory power to track these people,"
Jenkins said of the new law.
The Adam Walsh Act designates the U.S.
Marshals Service as the lead agency to track
fugitive felons who fail to register when
they move.
A news release from the U.S. Marshals said
unregistered sex offenders will be a priority
for deputy U.S. marshals nationwide.
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Briscoe v. Virginia
07-11191
Ruling Below: Magruder v. Virginia, 275 Va. 283, 657 S.E.2d 113 (Va. 2008).
Virginia's state statutory scheme provides that a certificate of forensic laboratory analysis may
be entered into evidence at a criminal trial without testimony from the technician who prepared
the report unless the defendant calls the analyst to testify as an adverse witness. Defendants
argue that this procedure violates their Sixth Amendment right of confrontation.
Question Presented: If the state allows the prosecutor to introduce a certificate of forensic
laboratory analysis without presenting testimony of the analyst who prepared the certificate, does
the state avoid violating the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment by providing that the
accused has a right to call the analyst as his own witness?
Michael Ricardo Magruder
V.
Commonwealth of Virginia;
Sheldon A. Cypress
V.
Commonwealth of Virginia;
Mark A. BRISCOE
V.
Commonwealth of VIRGINIA
Supreme Court of Virginia
Decided February 29, 2008
[Excerpt: some footnotes and citations omitted]
OPINION BY Justice CYNTHIA D.
KINSER.
In each of these appeals, the defendant
claims that the admission into evidence,
pursuant to Code § 19.2-187, of a certificate
of analysis in the absence of testimony at
trial from the person who performed the
particular analysis and prepared the
certificate violated his rights under the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment. Because the procedure
provided in Code § 19.2-187.1 adequately
protects a criminal defendant's rights under
the Confrontation Clause and because the
defendants in these appeals failed to utilize
that procedure, we conclude that they
waived the challenges under the
Confrontation Clause to the admissibility of
the certificates of analysis. We will therefore
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affirm the judgments of the Court of
Appeals upholding the various convictions
at issue.
1. REILEVANT
PROCEEDINGS
FACTS AND
Although these appeals involve a common
dispositive question of law, which we
review de novo, Torloni v. Commonwealth,
274 Va. 261, 267 (2007), their facts and
procedural histories differ. Therefore, we
will first summarize the relevant facts of
each case and then analyze the dispositive
issue that the appeals share. The appeal by
Mark A. Briscoe involves one additional
issue that we will address separately
following the analysis of the dispositive
issue.
B. Cypress v. Commonwealth
Sheldon A. Cypress was a passenger in an
automobile being driven by his cousin when
a trooper with the Virginia State Police
stopped the vehicle because of its
improperly tinted windows. The driver
consented to a search of the vehicle. During
that search, the trooper found, among other
things, two plastic bags-one under the
driver's seat and one under the passenger's
seat--each containing a "chunky white
substance" that the trooper suspected was
crack cocaine. Subsequent forensic testing at
the Department of Forensic Science revealed
that the substance was cocaine, totaling 60.5
grams. A certificate of analysis reporting
those results bore the signature of the
forensic analyst who conducted the testing
and included an attestation that she had
performed the analysis.
Cypress was indicted in the Circuit Court of
the City of Chesapeake for possession of
cocaine wvith the intent to distribute, haxing
previously committed the offense of
distribution or possession with the intent to
distribute, in violation of Code § 18.2-
248(C). At a bench trial, the Commonwealth
moved to admit the certificate of analysis
into evidence. Cypress objected, arguing
that under the holding in Crawford the
certificate fell into a core class of
testimonial evidence and was therefore
inadmissible in the absence of testimony
from the person who performed the analysis
of the seized substance. The circuit court
overruled the objection, holding that "the
scientific results stated in the certificate of
analysis are not testimonial statements as
that term is defined or described in
Crawford v. Washington."
Cypress did not call the forensic analyst as a
witness and presented no evidence. The
circuit court convicted Cypress of
possession of cocaine with the intent to
distribute, second or subsequent offense, and
sentenced him to imprisonment for 15 years,
with 10 years suspended, and a fine of
$1,000.
The Court of Appeals denied Cypress'
appeal in an unpublished per curiam order.
Citing its decision in Brooks, the Court of
Appeals stated: "assuming a certificate of
analysis constitutes testimonial evidence
under Crawford, a defendant's confrontation
rights are nonetheless protected by the
procedures provided by Code §§ 19.2-187
and 19.2-187.1." The Court of Appeals,
however, held that Cypress waived his right
to confront the forensic analyst who
prepared the certificate of analysis because
he did not utilize the procedure set forth in
Code § 19.2-187.1. For the reasons stated in
the January 3, 2007 order, a three-judge
panel of the Court of Appeals also denied
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the petition for appeal. Now on appeal to
this Court, Cypress raises two assignments
oferror:
1. The trial court erred by allowing
into evidence the certificate of
analysis over Defendant's objection
that its introduction violated his
Sixth Amendment Confrontation
Clause rights as articulated in
Craiiford v. Washington and its
progeny; the trial court erred by
finding Cypress guilty of possession
with intent to distribute cocaine
where the only evidence that he
possessed cocaine came from this
drug certificate which should have
been excluded from evidence[.]
II. The Court of Appeals erred by
ruling that Defendant waived his
Confrontation Clause rights by
declining to subpoena the chemist
who prepared the certificate and this
ruling impermissibly, and
unconstitutionally, required
Defendant to take affirmative steps
to safeguard his Confrontation
Clause rights[.]
C. Briscoe v. Commonwealth
Police officers with the City of Alexandria
Police Department executed a search
warrant for the apartment of Mark A.
Briscoe. During the search, the officers
seized suspected cocaine scattered about in
the apartment's kitchen area, as well as two
scales, a razor blade, a 100-gram weight, a
box of plastic sandwich bags, and a plate.
Many of these items appeared to have
deposits of drug residue on them. In a search
of Briscoe's person. the police seized a
white, rock-like substance wrapped in
plastic from the pocket of his shorts.
The police submitted the items of suspected
cocaine to the Department of Criminal
Justice Services, Division of Forensic
Science, for testing. In two certificates of
analysis, a forensic analyst reported that the
confiscated substances were "solid material"
cocaine totaling 36.578 grams. The
certificates also contained the analyst's
signature and attestation that she performed
the analyses and that the certificates
accurately reflected the results of those
analyses.
Briscoe was indicted in the Circuit Court of
the City of Alexandria for possession with
the intent to distribute cocaine, in violation
of Code § 18.2-248(C), unlawful
transportation of cocaine into the
Commonwealth with the intent to distribute,
in violation of Code § 18.2-248.01, and
conspiracy to distribute cocaine, in violation
of Code §§ 18.2-248 and 18.2-256. During a
bench trial, the Commonwealth sought to
admit into evidence the two certificates of
analysis. Briscoe objected, arguing that their
admission, without the forensic analyst
present to testify, violated his confrontation
rights under the Sixth Amendment. Relying
on the decision in Crawford, Briscoe
asserted that the certificates were testimonial
because they contained solemn declarations
or affirmations that the Commonwealth
sought to use in order to establish an
element of the charged offenses. Briscoe
also claimed that the procedure provided in
Code § 19.2-187.1 permitting a defendant to
call a forensic analyst as an adverse witness
does not protect his confrontation rights and
actually imposes an unconstitutional
affirmative step that he must take in order to
assert his Sixth Amendment right of
confrontation.
The circuit court overruled Briscoe's
objection, holding that the procedure in
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Code § 19.2-187.1 preserved his right to
cross-examine the forensic analyst. In
response to the circuit court's ruling, Briscoe
further argued that the statutory right to call
the forensic analyst as an adverse witness
does not satisfy his constitutional right to
confront the Commonwealth's witness and
also impermissibly shifts the burden to
produce evidence to a criminal defendant.
The circuit court did not change its ruling.
Briscoe did not call the forensic analyst to
testify and presented no evidence. The
circuit court convicted Briscoe of possession
with the intent to distribute cocaine and
transportation of cocaine into the
Commonwealth with the intent to distribute.
The court sentenced Briscoe to a total of 20
years of incarceration, with all but 5 years
and 8 months suspended.
The Court of Appeals denied Briscoe's
appeal in an unpublished per curiam order.
Assuming, without deciding, that the
certificates of analysis constituted
"testimonial" evidence under Crawford, the
Court of Appeals held that Briscoe's right to
confront the forensic analyst was protected
by the procedure provided in Code § 19.2-
187.1. The court further held that, by failing
to follow that statutory procedure, Briscoe
waived his constitutional right to confront
the forensic analyst who prepared the
certificates. Briscoe sought review of the
Court of Appeals per curiam order, and a
three-judge panel denied that petition for
appeal for the reasons stated in the January
18, 2007 order.
On appeal to this Court, Briscoe raises this
assignment of error with regard to the
certificates of analysis:
I. The Court of Appeals erred in
upholding the trial court's finding
that Defendant's constitutional right
to confront and cross-examine
adverse witnesses was not violated
by the admission of the certificates
of drug analysis into evidence.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Confrontalion Clause
The dispositive issue before us is whether
the procedure set forth in Code § 19.2-187.1
adequately protects a criminal defendant's
rights under the Confrontation Clause of the
Sixth Amendment, and if so, whether
Magruder, Cypress, and Briscoe
(collectively, the defendants) waived their
Confrontation Clause challenges to the
admissibility of the respective certificates of
analysis by failing to utilize that procedure.
Before resolving that issue, we first turn to
the decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States in Crawford v. Washington,
since the defendants relied on it in claiming
that admission into evidence of the
certificates of analysis violated their
confrontation rights. Prior to that decision,
the Confrontation Clause had not been
construed to bar the admission of an
unavailable witness' hearsay statement
against a criminal defendant if the statement
bore sufficient "indicia of reliability" either
by falling within a "firmly rooted hearsay
exception" or by "a showing of
particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness." Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S.
56, 66 (1980). In Crawford, the Supreme
Court rejected the Roberts analysis and held
that "[w]here testimonial evidence is at
issue, . . . the Sixth Amendment demands
what the common law required:
unavailability [of the witness] and a prior
opportunity for cross-examination." 541
U.S. at 68.
Now, under Crawford, the question whether
admission of a hearsay statement against a
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criminal defendant violates the
Confrontation Clause turns on whether the
statement is "testimonial" in nature. The
Supreme Court declined to provide a
comprehensive definition of the term
"testimonial" in Crawfbrd, but it did state
that the term "applies at a minimum to prior
testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a
grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police
interrogations." 541 U.S. at 68.
In these appeals, it is not necessary to decide
whether a certificate of analysis is
"testimonial." Even if we assume the
certificates in the cases at bar are
testimonial, the decision in Crawford did not
address the issues before us, i.e., whether a
prescribed statutory demand procedure
adequately protects a criminal defendant's
rights under the Confrontation Clause and
whether failure to follow that procedure
waives the right to confront a particular
witness.
We now begin our analysis by examining
the two relevant statutes, Code §§ 19.2-187
and 19.2-187.1. The first statute permits a
certificate of analysis, when "duly attested"
by the "person performing an analysis or
examination" in certain laboratories, to be
admitted into evidence "[i]n any hearing or
trial of any criminal offense . . . as evidence
of the facts therein stated and the results of
the analysis or examination referred to
therein." Code § 19.2-187. The only proviso
is the requirement that the certificate of
analysis be "filed with the clerk of the court
hearing the case at least seven days prior to
the hearing or trial." Id The second statute,
Code § 19.2-187.1, establishes a procedure
that presents an accused with the
opportunity to question the person
performing the analysis or examination as an
adverse witness. That statute states:
The accused in any hearing or trial in
which a certificate of analysis is
admitted into evidence pursuant to
§ 19.2-187 or § 19.2-187.01 shall
have the right to call the person
performing such analysis or
examination or involved in the chain
of custody as a witness therein, and
examine him in the same manner as
if he had been called as an adverse
witness. Such witness shall be
summoned and appear at the cost of
the Commonwealth. Code § 19.2-
187.1.
In each of the cases before us, the Court of
Appeals relied on its decision in Brooks to
hold that the defendants waived their right to
confront the forensic analysts who prepared
the certificates of analysis admitted into
evidence at their respective trials because
they failed to utilize the statutory procedure
available to them. In Brooks, the accused
objected to the introduction of certificates of
analysis into evidence on the basis that "the
Commonwealth's failure to call the forensic
scientist who tested the substances denied
him his constitutional right to confrontation
under Crawford" 49 Va. App. at 158. The
Court of Appeals rejected that argument,
holding that "Code § 19.2-187.1 sets out a
reasonable procedure to be followed in order
for a defendant to exercise his right to
confront a particular limited class of
scientific witnesses at trial and that a
defendant's failure to follow this procedure
amounts to a waiver of the constitutional
right to confront such witnesses." Id. at 164-
65.
Noting that an accused can voluntarily
waive the right of confrontation and that
reasonable requirements may be attached to
the assertion of federal constitutional rights,
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the Court of Appeals reasoned that, in light
of the decision in Crauiford, **Code §§ 19.2-
187 and 19.2-187.1[ ] are merely a request
to the defendant to stipulate to the
admissibility of the contents of any properly
filed certificates of analysis" and that when
an accused "waits until trial to assert his
right to cross-examine the analyst who
prepared a particular certificate, he accepts
the request to stipulate and waives his right
to confront that witness." Id at 167.
Continuing, the Court of Appeals explained
that, if an accused does not wish to accept
the requested stipulation, "Code § 19.2-
187.1 provides the mechanism by which he
may reject the request and have the analyst
summoned to appear at trial at the cost of
the Commonwealth in order to be subject to
cross-examination." Brooks, 49 Va.App. at
167-68.
Finally, the Court of Appeals held that the
argument claiming the procedure in Code
§ 19.2-187.1 unconstitutionally places the
burden on an accused to present evidence in
order to exercise his confrontation rights
was not before it because the defendant did
not summon the forensic analyst or ask the
Commonwealth to do so. Thus, according to
the Court of Appeals, the trial court never
had the occasion to rule on any challenge
regarding the order of proof.
The defendants here assert that Brooks was
wrongly decided and argue that they did not
waive their Sixth Amendment right to
confront the forensic analysts by failing to
call those persons as adverse witnesses
under the provisions of Code § 19.2-187.1.
According to the defendants, the procedure
provided in Code § 19.2-187.1 does not
adequately protect the Sixth Amendment
right of confrontation for several reasons:
(1) the statute requires an accused to take
impermissible affirmative steps to secure the
right to confront the forensic analyst; (2) the
statute does not provide any notice that
failure to utilize its provisions will
automatically waive the right to confront the
forensic analyst; (3) the statute does not
insure that a waiver of the Sixth Amendment
right to confront the forensic analyst is
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent; (4) the
statute by its terms addresses the order of
proof and impermissibly requires an accused
to present evidence in order to preserve
confrontation rights; and (5) the statute
allows an accused to cross-examine the
forensic analyst only after a certificate of
analysis has already been admitted into
evidence.
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States provides that, "[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the
witnesses against him." U.S. Const. amend.
VI. This guarantee is enforced against the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Confrontation Clause secures the
"literal right to 'confront' the witness at the
time of trial." California v'. Green, 399 U.S.
149, 157 (1970). "The substance of the
constitutional protection is . . seeing the
witness face to face, and . . . subjecting him
to the ordeal of a cross-examination."
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244.
The right to confront "(1) insures that the
witness will give his statements under oath .
(2) forces the witness to submit to cross-
examination .. . ; [and] (3) permits the jury
that is to decide the defendant's fate to
observe the demeanor of the witness in
making his statement." Green, 399 U.S. at
158. "The combined effect of these elements
of confrontation-physical presence, oath,
cross-examination, and observation of
demeanor by the trier of fact-serves the
purposes of the Confrontation Clause by
ensuring that evidence admitted against an
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accused is reliable and subject to the
rigorous adversarial testing that is the norm
of Anglo-American criminal proceedings."
khnryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 846
(1990).
With this understanding of the
Confrontation Clause, the question whether
the procedure provided in Code § 19.2-187.1
adequately protects a criminal defendant's
right to confront the forensic analyst turns
on whether the statute supplies the
"elements of confrontation-physical
presence, oath, cross-examination, and
observation of demeanor by the trier of
fact." Craig, 497 U.S. at 846. We conclude
that it does. Pursuant to Code § 19.2-187.1,
the defendants could have insured the
physical presence of the forensic analysts at
trial by issuing summons for their
appearance at the Commonwealth's cost, or
asking the trial court or Commonwealth to
do so. At trial, the defendants could have
called the forensic analysts as witnesses,
placed them under oath, and questioned
them as adverse witnesses, meaning the
defendants could have cross-examined them.
The trier of fact would then have had the
opportunity to observe the demeanor of the
witnesses. In short, if the defendants had
utilized the procedure provided in Code
§ 19.2-187.1, they would have had the
opportunity to cross-examine the forensic
analysts. Contrary to the defendants'
position, the Confrontation Clause does not
insure that opportunity before a certificate of
analysis is admitted into evidence.
Nevertheless, the defendants argue that this
statutory procedure impermissibly burdens
the exercise of their right under the
Confrontation Clause by requiring them to
take certain affirmative steps in order to
assert that right. While "[m]ost . . . Sixth
Amendment rights arise automatically on
the initiation of the adversary process and no
action by the defendant is necessary to make
them active in his or her case," Tajlor v.
Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410 (1988), "the right
to confront and to cross-examine is not
absolute and may, in appropriate cases, bow
to accommodate other legitimate interests in
the criminal trial process." Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973). For
example, " 'trial judges retain wide latitude'
to limit reasonably a criminal defendant's
right to cross-examine a witness 'based on
concerns about, among other things,
harassment, prejudice, confusion of the
issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation
that is repetitive or only marginally
relevant.' " Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S.
145, 149 (1991). Even after Crawford, the
Confrontation Clause does not bar the
admission of testimonial hearsay statements
if the declarant is unavailable, so long as the
accused had a prior opportunity to cross-
examine the witness. 541 U.S. at 68.
Moreover, "[a] state procedural rule which
forbids the raising of federal questions at
late stages in the case, or by any other than a
prescribed method, has been recognized as a
valid exercise of state power." Williams v.
Georgia, 349 U.S. 375, 382-83 (1955).
Virginia has adopted several provisions that
require criminal defendants to take certain
procedural steps in order to exercise or
vindicate a myriad of constitutional rights.
Pursuant to Code § 19.2-266.2, an accused
must file a written motion to suppress
evidence allegedly obtained in violation of
the Fourth, Fifth, or Sixth Amendments no
later that seven days before trial. Failure to
follow this statutory requirement results in a
waiver of an accused's constitutional
challenge to the admissibility of the
evidence. Schmitt v. Commonwealth, 262
Va. 127, 145-46 (2001). Similarly, the
provisions of Code § 18.2-67.7 impose
notice-and-hearing requirements in order to
introduce evidence concerning a victim's
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past sexual conduct with a person other than
the accused. Such requirements are not
unconstitutional but "serve[ ] legitimate
state interests in protecting against surprise,
harassment, and undue delay." Lucas, 500
U.S. at 152-53.
An accused must also. upon request of the
Commonwealth, disclose whether he intends
to introduce evidence to establish an alibi.
Rule 3A:11(c)(2). In Williams v. Florida,
399 U.S. 78 (1970), the Supreme Court held
that a similar alibi-notice rule did not violate
the Fifth Amendment. The Court observed
that the rule, "[a]t most . . . only compelled
[the defendant] to accelerate the timing of
his disclosure, forcing him to divulge at an
earlier date information that the [defendant]
from the beginning planned to divulge at
trial." Id. at 85, 90.
"The test is whether the defendant has had 'a
reasonable opportunity to have the issue as
to the claimed right heard and determined by
the state court.' " Michel v. Louisiana, 350
U.S. 91, 93. The provisions of Code § 19.2-
187.1 pass this test. We agree with the
holding of the Court of Appeals in Brooks:
"Code § 19.2-187.1 sets out a reasonable
procedure to be followed in order for a
defendant to exercise his right to confront a
particular limited class of scientific
witnesses at trial." 49 Va.App. at 164.
Legislatures may pass laws
regulating, within reasonable limits,
the mode in which rights secured to
the subject by bills of right and
constitutions shall be enjoyed, and if
the subject neglects to comply with
these regulations he thereby waives
his constitutional privileges.
State v. Berg, 237 Iowa 356 (Iowa 1946).
Furthermore, nothing in the records before
us suggest that any defendant was somehow
precluded from utilizing the procedure
provided in Code § 19.2-187.1 or that the
procedure was unduly burdensome.
The defendants do, however, claim that the
statutory procedure. by its terms, shifts the
burden of producing evidence and requires a
criminal defendant to call the forensic
analyst in order to exercise his right to
confront that witness. This argument is not
cognizable under the Confrontation Clause.
Instead, it raises due process concerns that
are not properly before us in these appeals.
Because the defendants did not avail
themselves of the opportunity to require the
presence of a particular forensic analyst at
trial, they were never in the position of
being forced, over their objection, to call a
forensic analyst as a witness. In other words,
no defendant said to the respective circuit
court, "the forensic analyst is here to testify
but the Commonwealth must first call the
witness." Like the situation in Brooks, "the
trial court never had occasion to address the
proper order of proof." 49 Va.App. at 168.
Finally, it is undisputed that a criminal
defendant can waive the right to
confrontation. The decision in Crawford did
not alter that fact. Hinojos-Mendoza, 169
P.3d at 668. Indeed, a criminal defendant
can waive a panoply of constitutional rights.
The defendants, however, contend that any
waiver of confrontation rights cannot be
presumed from a silent record and that,
given the absence of any notice of a waiver
in Code § 19.2-187.1, they did not
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
waive their Sixth Amendment right to
confront the forensic analysts. This Court,
however, has never held that the record, in
all circumstances, must affirmatively reveal
that a criminal defendant personally waived
his right to confrontation. In Bilokur v.
Commonwealth, 221 Va. 467, 474 (1980),
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we concluded that a defendant's "silence
was tantamount to assent" that an
incriminating extrajudicial statement would
be admitted by stipulation. Id We held "that
the defendant, acting through counsel,
waived his right to invoke the constitutional
guarantee of confrontation." Id.
We recognize that [w]aiver is ordinarily an
intentional relinquishment or abandonment
of a known right or privilege." Allen v.
Commoni'ealth, 252 Va. 105, 111 (1996).
"What suffices for waiver depends on the
nature of the right at issue." New York v.
Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 114 (2000). As the
Supreme Court explained:
"Whether the defendant must
participate personally in the waiver;
whether certain procedures are
required for waiver; and whether the
defendant's choice must be
particularly informed or voluntary,
all depend on the right at stake."
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S.
725, 733 (1993). For certain
fundamental rights, the defendant
must personally make an informed
waiver. For other rights, however,
waiver may be effected by action of
counsel. "Although there are basic
rights that the attorney cannot waive
without the fully informed and
publicly acknowledged consent of
the client, the lawyer has-and must
have-full authority to manage the
conduct of the trial." Taylor v.
Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988). As to
many decisions pertaining to the
conduct of the trial, the defendant is
"deemed bound by the acts of his
lawyer-agent and is considered to
have 'notice of all facts, notice of
which can be charged upon the
attorney.' " Link v. Wabash R. Co.,
370 U.S. 626, 634 (1962). Thus,
decisions by counsel are generally
given effect as to what arguments to
pursue, what evidentiary objections
to raise, and what agreements to
conclude regarding the admission of
evidence. Absent a demonstration of
ineffectiveness, counsel's word on
such matters is the last. Id. at 114-15.
The provisions of Code §§ 19.2-187 and
19.2-187.1 adequately inform a criminal
defendant of the consequences of the failure
to exercise the right to have a forensic
analyst present at trial for cross-
examination. Pursuant to Code § 19.2-187, a
"duly attested" certificate of analysis that
has been timely filed with the appropriate
clerk of court is "admissible in evidence as
evidence of the facts therein stated and the
results of the analysis or examination
referred to therein." The provisions of Code
§ 19.2-187.1 then inform a criminal
defendant about what steps to take in order
to secure the physical presence of the
forensic analyst and subject that person to an
oath, cross-examination, and a credibility
determination by the trier of fact-the
elements of confrontation. Once the forensic
analyst appears at trial for cross-
examination, any Confrontation Clause
problem disappears.
Based on the provisions of Code §§ 19.2-
187 and 19.2-187.1, no criminal defendant
can seriously contend that he is not on notice
that a certificate of analysis will be admitted
into evidence without testimony from the
person who performed the analysis unless he
utilizes the procedure provided in Code
§ 19.2-187.1. Failure to use the statutory
procedure obviously waives the opportunity
to confront the forensic analyst.
Additionally, "everyone is conclusively
presumed to know the law-that is, he is
estopped from denying such knowledge."
King v. Empire Collieries Co., 148 Va. 585,
590 (1927). Thus, we reject not only the
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defendants' contention that the statutes need
to contain an explicit notice outlining the
consequences of failing to utilize the
procedure set forth in Code § 19.2-187.1,
but also the assertion that their waiver of
confrontation rights was not voluntary,
intelligent, and knowing. Confrontation
Clause rights are waived every day in this
Commonwealth when a criminal defendant's
attorney chooses not to object to the
admission of hearsay evidence or stipulates
to the admission of evidence. We have never
required, nor should we, that the record
affirmatively reflect a defendant's knowing,
voluntary, and intelligent agreement to such
waivers.
Thus, we hold that the procedure in Code
§ 19.2-187.1 adequately safeguards a
criminal defendant's rights under the
Confrontation Clause and that the
defendants' failure in these cases to utilize
that procedure waived their right to be
confronted with the forensic analysts, i.e., to
enjoy the elements of confrontation. Other
courts have reached similar conclusions. For
example, in Hinojos-Mendoza, the court
addressed a Colorado statute that makes
"[a]ny report . . . of the criminalistics
laboratory" admissible into evidence "'in
the same manner and with the same force
and effect as if the employee or technician
. . . had testified in person." 169 P.3d at
665. The court noted that pursuant to the
statute, "[a]ny party may request that such
employee or technician testify in person at a
criminal trial on behalf of the state . . . by
notifying the witness and other party at least
ten days before the date of such criminal
trial." Id. Failure to make a timely request
was held to amount to a waiver of the right
to confront the technician. In concluding
that the statute does not run afoul of the
Confrontation Clause, the court explained
that the statutory procedure "for ensuring the
presence of the lab technician at trial does
not deny a defendant the opportunity to
cross-examine the technician, but simply
requires that the defendant decide prior to
trial whether he will conduct a cross-
examination. The statute provides the
opportunity for confrontation-only the
timing of the defendant's decision is
changed." Id at 668.
The court further noted that when "a
defendant chooses not to take advantage of
the opportunity to cross-examine a witness,
the defendant has not been denied his
constitutional right to confrontation." Id.
Thus, the court held that, "where a
defendant . . . is represented by counsel, the
failure to comply with the statutory
prerequisites . . . waives the defendant's
right to confront the witness just as the
decision to forgo cross-examination at trial
would waive that right." Id. at 670.
We recognize that some courts have reached
contrary conclusions, but we are not
persuaded by their rationales.
Therefore, we hold that the Court of Appeals
did not err in affirming the judgments of the
circuit courts admitting into evidence the
respective certificates of analysis at issue in
these appeals.
* * *
III. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we will affirm the
judgment of the Court of Appeals in each of
these appeals.
Record No. 070762
Record No. 070815
Record No. 070817
- AFFIRMED.
AFFIRMED.
AFFIRMED.
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DISSENT
JUSTICE KEENAN, with whom CHIEF
JUSTICE HASSELL and JUSTICE
KOONTZ join, dissenting.
Today the majority holds that a defendant's
failure to exercise a statutory right under
Code § 19.2-187.1 results in the forfeiture of
his Sixth Amendment right "to be
confronted with the witnesses against him."
In my view, this analysis confuses the
waiver of a statutory right with the waiver of
a constitutional right. Because the
certificates of analysis at issue were
"testimonial" hearsay, within the meaning of
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006),
and Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36
(2004), their admission into evidence under
Code § 19.2-187 in the prosecution's cases
in the absence of supporting testimony from
certificates' authors, violated the
defendants' Confrontation Clause rights.
Thus, I disagree with the majority's holding
that Code § 19.2-187.1 preserves a
defendant's Confrontation Clause rights, or
that a defendant's failure to exercise rights
accorded under that statute results in the
surrender of Confrontation Clause rights.
I. "TESTIMONIAL" CHARACTER OF
EVIDENCE
I would hold that the certificates of analysis
are "testimonial" hearsay based on the
Supreme Court's analysis of that term in
Davis and Crawford In particular, the
analysis in Davis instructs us to examine the
purpose for which a non-testifying witness
initially made the statements that were later
introduced in evidence at a criminal trial,
and to inquire whether the person making
the hearsay statements was "testifying" and
"acting as a witness." See Davis, 547 U.S. at
828.
In Crawford, the Supreme Court held that
the Sixth Amendment forbids the admission
in a criminal trial of "testimonial" hearsay
statements made against an accused by a
witness who does not testify at the trial,
unless the witness is unavailable or the
defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-
examine that witness. At the defendant's
criminal trial in Crawford, the trial court
admitted in evidence a tape-recorded
statement that the defendant's wife made to
police officers during a police investigation
of the crime for which the defendant was
charged. The Supreme Court held that the
defendant's confrontation rights were
violated by admission of his wife's tape-
recorded statement because the statement
was "testimonial" in nature and the wife did
not testify at trial. Although the Supreme
Court in Crawford declined to provide a
comprehensive definition of the term
"testimonial," the Court indicated that some
statements would always be categorized as
"testimonial," including ex parte testimony
given at a preliminary hearing and
statements taken by police officers during
the course of a police interrogation.
In Davis, the Supreme Court revisited the
definition of "testimonial" hearsay. The
Court held that:
Statements are nontestimonial when
made in the course of police
interrogation under circumstances
objectively indicating that the
primary purpose of the interrogation
is to enable police assistance to meet
an ongoing emergency. They are
testimonial when the circumstances
objectively indicate that there is no
such ongoing emergency, and that
the primary purpose of the
interrogation is to establish or prove
past events potentially relevant to
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later criminal prosecution. 547 U.S.
at 822.
In Davis, the Court considered two separate
situations in which the statements of a
witness, who did not testify at trial, were
admitted in evidence concerning a
defendant's illegal conduct. In the first
situation, the Court held that statements
made to law enforcement personnel during a
"911" emergency telephone call were not
"testimonial" in nature because the purpose
of the statements was to elicit assistance
during an ongoing emergency. The Court
reasoned that the speaker was not "acting as
a witness" or "testifying" because, unlike a
witness, she was describing events "as they
were actually happening, rather than
describ[ing] past events." Id. at 827-28.
The second situation in Davis concerned
statements recorded in an affidavit obtained
by police following a domestic dispute. The
Court concluded that these statements were
"testimonial" in character because the
declarant's purpose in making the
statements was not to describe an ongoing
emergency situation, but to supply
information in a police investigation about
past criminal conduct. The Court concluded
that the statements were "inherently
testimonial" because they were "an obvious
substitute for live testimony," and they did
"precisely what a witness does on direct
examination." 547 US. at 829-30.
Based on the holdings in Davis and
Crawford, I would conclude that a
certificate of drug analysis, in function, "acts
as a witness" against an accused. Much like
any other expert witness, the scientist
preparing a certificate of analysis does so
based on a factual foundation supplied from
past events. Thus, the certificate admitted
under Code § 19.2-187.1 functions in the
same manner as expert witness testimony
because the certificate describes the
scientist's procedures and conclusions
concerning the material submitted for
analysis. The holding in Davis further
reinforces the "testimonial" nature of a
certificate of analysis, because the certificate
is created "to establish or prove past events
potentially relevant to later criminal
prosecution." See Davis, 547 U.S. at 822. A
forensic scientist prepares the certificates in
these cases for the purpose of proving a
critical element of a criminal offense,
namely, that the chemical sample submitted
for analysis is an illegal substance. In the
parlance of Davis, the certificates of analysis
in the present cases functioned as "an
obvious substitute for live testimony,"
because the Commonwealth introduced
them in lieu of the scientists' testimony, and
otherwise would have been required to
establish the illegal nature of the substances
by presenting actual testimony from the
scientists themselves.
Applying additional rationale employed by
the Supreme Court in Davis, I also observe
that the forensic scientists' analyses were
not performed under circumstances of an
emergency or contemporaneously with the
commission of the crimes, but were
accomplished well after the criminal events
had transpired. In fact, the scientists
prepared the certificates in response to
police investigations.
Moreover, the certificates fall into the
category of "formalized testimonial
materials, such as affidavits," which the
Supreme Court in Crawford included in its
examples of the types of statements that
would be considered testimonial. The
certificates contain a "solemn declaration or
affirmation" by the forensic scientists who
prepared them, in conformance with the
requirement of Code § 19.2-187 that such
certificates be "duly attested" before being
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admitted in evidence. See ('raiiAgrd 541
U.S. at 51.
Based on the holdings in Dav'is and
Crau lord, I would conclude that the
certificates of analysis admitted in evidence
in the present cases served to "bear
testimony" against the defendants and,
therefore, were "testimonial" evidence
within the meaning of those holdings. I
would further conclude that the defendants
in these cases had a Sixth Amendment right
to be confronted with the testimony of the
forensic scientists who prepared the
certificates, because the Commonwealth
failed to demonstrate that the scientists were
unavailable or that the defendants had a
prior opportunity to cross-examine them.
II. VIOLATION OF CONFRONTATION
CLAUSE RIGHTS
I would further hold that the defendants'
Confrontation Clause rights were violated
when the certificates of analysis were
admitted in evidence under Code § 19.2-
187. The Confrontation Clause is worded in
the passive, rather than in the active, voice.
Thus, under that constitutional guarantee, an
accused enjoys the right "to be confronted"'
by the prosecution with the witnesses
against him.
As the majority correctly observes, the Sixth
Amendment confrontation right has long
been held to include a defendant's
"opportunity for effective cross-
examination." This opportunity is "one of
the safe-guards essential to a fair trial," and
is "a right long deemed so essential for the
due protection of life and liberty that it is
guarded against legislative and judicial
action by provisions in the Constitution."
Pointer, 380 U.S. at 404. The Confrontation
Clause "ensure[s] that evidence admitted
against an accused is reliable and subject to
the rigorous adversarial testing that is the
norm of Anglo-American criminal
proceedings." State v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836,
846 (1990).
This Court consistently has recognized that
in criminal trials, the Confrontation Clause
preserves for a defendant the right to cross-
examine prosecution witnesses. The
opportunity for effective cross-examination
of prosecution witnesses, however,
presupposes that a defendant has an
opportunity to cross-examine those
witnesses during the prosecution's case.
Thus, preservation of the Sixth Amendment
confrontation right requires that the
prosecution call a defendant's accusers as
witnesses to actively confront the defendant.
Code § 19.2-187 forces a defendant to
relinquish his right "to be confronted"' in the
prosecution's case in chief, because the
statute permits a timely-filed certificate of
analysis to be admitted automatically in the
absence of testimony from the scientist who
prepared the certificate. That statute allows
admission of the certificate irrespective
whether a defendant chooses to call the
forensic scientist to testify in his own case
under the provisions of Code § 19.2-187.1.
Thus, I would conclude that a Confrontation
Clause violation occurred in the present
cases because the defendants were not able
to subject the contents of the certificates of
analysis to adversarial scrutiny before the
prosecution concluded its cases in chief.
1II. WAIVER INAPPLICABLE
The provisions of Code § 19.2-187.1 did not
remedy this Confrontation Clause violation.
That section provides a criminal defendant
the statutory right to call the forensic
scientist who prepared a certificate of
analysis as a witness in the defendant's own
case. Thus, Code § 19.2-187.1 merely
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provides a criminal defendant the
opportunity to seek evidence in his favor by
questioning the scientist \\ho prepared the
certificate that has already been admitted in
evidence against him.
The majority asserts, however, that the
present cases are analogous to other
situations in which we have held that
criminal defendants are required to take
"certain procedural steps" in order to
preserve their constitutional rights. In my
opinion, this argument misconstrues the very
nature of Code § 19.2-187.1. No "procedural
step" under Code § 19.2-187.1 will preserve
a defendant's Sixth Amendment
confrontation right, because that section
merely establishes a separate, statutory right
for a defendant to call the forensic scientist
as a witness in a defendant's own case.
Thus, Code § 19.2-187.1 does not impact a
defendant's Sixth Amendment right "to be
confronted" by the witnesses against him,
because the statute cannot revive a
defendant's right to be confronted by the
prosecution with the scientist's evidence.
The majority seeks to avoid this dilemma by
stating that the defendants failed to raise a
due process challenge alleging that Code
§ 19.2-187.1 impermissibly shifted the
burden of producing evidence to the
defendants, which is a claim not cognizable
under the Sixth Amendment. This argument,
however, is unavailing because the majority
confuses the issue whether a defendant may
be required to produce evidence in a
criminal trial with the issue whether the
statutory mechanism at issue in this case,
which requires a defendant to produce
evidence, is capable of preserving his
Confrontation Clause rights.
A defendant's constitutional right to be
confronted with the witnesses against him
arises automatically, and the state may not
require a defendant to take an affirmative
action to preserve this right. While a
defendant's failure to act under Code § 19.2-
187.1 may constitute a waiver of his
statutory right under that Code section to
call the forensic scientist in the defendant's
case, the fact that he chooses not to exercise
this statutory right is insufficient to establish
a waiver of his separate constitutional
confrontation right that is guaranteed to him
throughout his criminal trial. A defendant
cannot waive a right that he has already been
denied. The extent of a defendant's waiver
of a right under Code § 19.2-187.1
necessarily is limited to rights he possesses
under the statute. Thus, the defendants in
these cases could not have waived under
Code § 19.2-187.1 rights that had already
been denied by operation of Code § 19.2-
187.
Even if the majority were correct, however,
that Code § 19.2-187.1 offers a defendant
the protection of a confrontation right, the
record does not support a conclusion that
these defendants waived that right. A waiver
of a constitutional right requires a clear
showing that there was an "intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right or privilege." Barber, 390 U.S. at 725
(1996). The record fails to establish a
"knowing and intelligent" waiver under
Code § 19.2-187.1 because that Code
section does not provide a defendant with
notice that if he fails to avail himself of the
statute's provisions, he waives his Sixth
Amendment right. This Court should not
presume a defendant's waiver of his
Confrontation Clause rights from a silent
record.
I would hold that a constitutional application
of Code § 19.2-187 requires that if the
prosecution wishes to introduce in evidence
a certificate of analysis contemplated by
Code § 19.2-187, the prosecution must
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obtain from a defendant a stipulation
regarding the admissibility of the contents of
that certificate, or an affirmative waiver by a
defendant of his Confrontation Clause rights
regarding the certificate. In the absence of
such a stipulation or affirmative waiver, the
Sixth Amendment requires that the
prosecution call in its case in chief the
forensic scientist who prepared the
certificate to present this "testimonial"
evidence. Because there were no such
affirmative waivers or stipulations in the
cases before us, and the forensic scientists
did not testify regarding the contents of the
certificates in the prosecution's cases in
chief, I would hold that the certificates of
analysis in these cases were admitted in
violation of the defendants' Confrontation
Clause rights. Therefore, I would reverse the
defendants' convictions and remand the
cases for new trials, if the Commonwealth
be so advised.
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"Analysis: Is Melendez-Diaz Already Endangered?"
The Scoius Blog
June 29, 2009
Lyle Deniston
A fascinating possibility emerged Monday
afternoon as the Supreme Court closed its
Term: Judge Sonia Sotomayor, if confirmed
as a Justice, may hold the deciding vote on
the future of a controversial ruling that the
present Court issued just last Thursday: the
ruling in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts
(07-591).
A strongly worded dissent in that case made
it clear that four Justices would not soon be
reconciled to that decision-a ruling that
they argued would result in "a distortion of
the criminal justice system."
The ruling, made under the Constitution's
Confrontation Clause, requires the
prosecution, if it plans to present a lab report
as evidence in a criminal trial, to make the
analyst who prepared it available for on-
demand cross-examination by defense
counsel. The decision came on a 5-4 vote.
If it were possible to pick up a fifth vote,
could the dissenters from that case then lead
the Court to reconsider-or least narrow
considerably-the decision in Melendez-
Diaz? Perhaps; one of the five in the
majority was Justice David H. Souter, who
retired on Monday. There is, it would seem,
at least a chance that his designated
successor, Judge Sotomayor, would not be
prepared to embrace Melendez-Diaz, at least
without some restriction on its scope; she
has a record on criminal law issues that
appears to be somewhat more prosecution-
oriented than Justice Souter's has been.
This is speculation, of course, but there is
little else to suggest why the Court
announced Monday that, next Term, it will
review the case of Briscoe, et al., v. Virginia
(07-11191). Here is the question raised in
the Briscoe petition, filed in May of last
year by University of Michigan law
professor Richard D. Friedman:
"If a state allows a prosecutor to introduce a
certificate of a forensic laboratory analysis,
without presenting the testimony of the
analyst who prepared the certificate, does
the state avoid violating the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment by
providing that the accused has a right to call
the analyst as his own witness?"
If one reads the majority opinion in
Melendez-Diaz, the Court appears to have
decided that issue already: it is not enough,
the Court said last week, to allow the
accused to call the lab technician as a
defense witness; the prosecution must have
the technician available for cross-
examination, if the accused wishes to invoke
that right under the Sixth Amendment.
The Court clearly had been holding the
Briscoe case until it decided Melendez-Diaz,
and then, according to the electronic docket,
scheduled it for consideration at the final
Conference Monday, in the wake of
Melendez-Diaz. If normal procedures had
been followed, Justice Antonin Scalia, the
author of the Melendez-Diaz, would have
prepared a memo on what to do with
Briscoe-ordinarily, recommending that it
simply be denied, or that it be vacated and
sent back for reconsideration. Indeed, the
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reconsideration alternative was ordered by
the Court in five other cases that the Court
had been holding for Melendez-Diaz.
Instead, the Court-or at least four
Justices-voted to grant review in Briscoe,
and set the Court on the path to full review
next Term. It would be no surprise
whatsoever if the state of Virginia-or some
of the amici in support-would use Justice
Anthony M. Kennedy's rhetoric from the
dissent last Thursday to assail Melendez-
Diaz, and to suggest that, if it is not to be
overruled outright, it should be made easier
to get around-as in requiring the accused's
lawyer to summon the technician to the
stand as his own witness.
The Virginia law that is at issue in the case
requires an accused to call as a defense
witness the technician who prepared a lab
report that is being used as evidence
supporting guilt. The state Supreme Court
ruled that, if an accused does not follow that
procedure, he surrenders his right to
confront and cross-examine the report's
author.
The petition wxas granted in the second
round of the Court's orders Monday,
disposing of remaining cases before the
summer recess began.
It is a rare thing, of course, for the Court to
reconsider a decision so soon after it has
been decided. But it is not unprecedented,
and the rhetorical and logical assertiveness
of the Melendez-Diaz dissent certainly raises
the chance that the decision's life as a
precedent, at least as it fully emerged, may
be shortened.
Along with Justices Scalia and Souter, the
majority in Melendez-Diaz included Justices
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, John Paul Stevens
and Clarence Thomas. Joining Kennedy in
dissent were Chief Justice John G. Roberts,
Jr., and Justices Samuel A. Alito, Jr., and
Stephen G. Breyer.
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"U.S. Supreme Court to Hear Virginia Confrontation Case"
l irginia Lanyer 's W1'eekly
June 29, 2009
Alan Cooper
The remand of the Supreme Court of
Virginia's ruling in Magruder v.
Commonwealth appeared to be the most
likely result of the U.S. Supreme Court's
ruling on Thursday on the application of the
Confrontation Clause to lab reports.
The U.S. Supreme Court said, in essence,
that an affidavit by a lab technician is no
substitute for a live technician in court but
described a constitutionally acceptable
procedure for presenting the testimony by
affidavit unless the defense insists on a
personal appearance.
At first glance, Virginia's system appeared
to be short of the standard set by the court.
But on the last day of its term today, the
high court agreed to hear Magruder, now
styled Briscoe v. Virginia, Record No. 07-
11191, because Magruder, the first of three
defendants in separate cases decided by the
Virginia Supreme Court, did not appeal.
The grant of certiorari was especially
surprising because the U.S. Supreme Court
remanded cases to courts in Ohio and
California for consideration in light of the
Thursday opinion, Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts.
Veteran Supreme Court observer and analyst
Lyle Denniston speculates on
SCOTUSblog.com that the dissenters in
Melendez-Diaz may be setting up a quick
reversal of the case. It was decided 5-4, and
Justice David Souter, one of the five, is
leaving the court. His likely successor,
Judge Sonia Sotomayor, could side with the
justice who dissented in the Massachusetts
case, Denniston says.
The alliance to rewrite the court's
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence differs
from the high court's predictable division.
Three members usually considered part of
the court's liberal wing-Souter, John Paul
Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg-joined
conservatives Antonin Scalia and Clarence
Thomas, while the liberal Stephen G. Breyer
sided with conservatives John G. Roberts
Jr., Samuel A. Alito Jr. and Anthony M.
Kennedy in dissent.
The Virginia attorney general's office has a
less conspiratorial view of the situation. "In
Melendez-Diaz, the Court signaled its
approval of 'notice-and-demand' statutes.
The next logical step in the Court's
jurisprudence is to decide which 'notice-
and-demand' statutes are permissible, and
which are not. We did not expect a remand
in light of Melendez-Diaz, because the
Supreme Court of Virginia expressly
declined to hold whether certificates of
analysis were testimonial-the core holding
of Melendez-Diaz."
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"Requiring Accused to Demand Presence of Analyst Doesn't
Deny Confrontation Right"
US Law Wieek
March 25, 2008
A Virginia statute that authorizes the
admission of laboratory analysis certificates
in criminal trials without the supporting
testimony of the preparer unless the accused
requests that the analyst be called to testify
at state expense does not violate defendants'
Sixth Amendment right of confrontation, the
Virginia Supreme Court held Feb. 29
The court found no constitutional problem
with requiring defendants affirmatively to
ask for an analyst's presence or with
inferring a waiver from their failure to do so.
Craiford v. Washington established that
out-of-court testimonial statements by a
person who does not testify may be admitted
only if the declarant is unavailable and the
defendant has had a prior opportunity to
cross-examine him or her.
Under Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-187, a
certificate containing the findings of lab
analysis of forensic evidence is admissible at
trial if the person who performed the
analysis has duly attested to it. Subsection
187.1 provides that, when such a certificate
is admitted, the accused 'shall have the right
to call the person performing such analysis
or examination or involved in the chain of
custody as a witness therein, and examine
him in the same manner as if he had been
called as an adverse witness," at the cost of
the state.
In the consolidated cases before the Virginia
high court, each defendant was charged with
a drug offense and the state offered into
evidence at trial a drug analysis certificate
compliant with the state rule. The
defendants did not call the analysts to the
stand. The trial judges rejected the
defendants' confrontation clause objections
and admitted the certificates. The defendants
all were convicted and the state intermediate
appellate court upheld the convictions.
Waiver of Confrontation
The state Supreme Court, in an opinion by
Justice Cynthia D. Kinser, affirmed, ruling
that the scheme for admitting the analysis
certificates does not run afoul of Crawford
and that the defendants' failure to invoke the
statutory protections waived their
confrontation rights.
At the outset, the court noted that Crawford
did not address whether the right of
confrontation can be waived. Citing with
approval the lower appellate court's decision
in Brooks v. Commonwealth, it concluded
both that the right can be voluntarily waived
and that reasonable requirements may be
placed on defendants' exercise of it. The
court decided that it does not place an
unreasonable burden on the defense to
require it simply to call an analyst to the
stand and cross-examine him or her.
The procedure provided by Section 19.2-
187.1 adequately safeguards an accused's
Sixth Amendment rights, the court said, by
providing the essential elements of
confrontation-physical presence, oath,
cross-examination, and observation of
demeanor by the trier of fact.
The court rejected the defendants' argument
that the statutory scheme impermissiblN
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burdens their confrontation rights by
requiring them to take the affirmative step of
calling an analyst to testify. It pointed out
that defendants must jump through
procedural hoops to vindicate a broad array
of constitutional rights.
For instance, it noted, defendants must file a
motion within a certain time frame to
suppress evidence that has been
unconstitutionally obtained, they must
disclose in advance that they plan to pursue
an alibi defense, and they must provide
notice they intend to introduce evidence of a
victim's prior sexual conduct.
The court added that the defendants'
argument that the statutory procedure
unconstitutionally shifts the burden of
producing evidence to the defense -is not
cognizable under the confrontation clause."
And because they did not avail themselves
of the chance to call an analyst, the court
decided that any due process argument was
not properly before it.
Affirmative Waiver Unnecessary
Finally, the court explained, there is no
dispute that the right to confrontation, like
myriad other constitutional rights, can be
waived. The defendants argued that a
knowing and conscious waiver cannot be
presumed from a silent record.
However, the court responded that it "has
never held that the record, in all
circumstances, must affirmatively reveal
that a criminal defendant personally waived
his right to confrontation." It noted, for
example, that a defendant who stipulates to
evidence effectively relinquishes the right of
confrontation against the witness who would
establish the stipulated fact.
The provisions of Virginia's forensic
evidence rules provide adequate notice of
the consequences of not calling the analyst
to testify, the court said, and it concluded
that "[f]ailure to use the statutory procedures
obviously waives the opportunity to
confront the forensic analyst."
A number of courts from other jurisdictions
have come to the same conclusion with
respect to similar statutory procedures.
Justice Barbara Milano Keenan, joined by
Chief Justice Leroy Rountree Hassell Sr.
and Justice Lawrence L. Koontz Jr. in
dissent, accused the majority of confusing
the waiver of a statutory right with waiver of
a constitutional right. Pointing to the
confrontation clause's use of the passive
phrase "to be confronted," Keenan argued
that "[a] defendant's constitutional right to
be confronted with the witnesses against him
arises automatically, and the state may not
require a defendant to take an affirmative
action to preserve this right." In any event,
she contended, the statute's failure to require
that a defendant be notified that he will
waive his Sixth Amendment right by
neglecting to avail himself of the procedure
renders any purported waiver invalid.
Joseph R. Winston, Clement & Wheatley,
Danville, Va., represented the lead
defendant. Stephen R. McCullough, Virginia
Solicitor General's Office, Richmond, Va.,
and Alice T. Armstrong and Eugene
Murphy, Virginia Attorney General's
Office, Richmond, represented the
commonwealth.
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"AG Candidate Wants Special Session After Supreme Court Ruling"
Issociated Press
July 10, 2009
Virginia's Republican candidate for attorney
general said Friday that the General
Assembly should hold a special session to
deal with a U.S. Supreme Court ruling that
he said could cripple the state's criminal
justice system.
Ken Cuccinelli said some prosecutors are
suspending drug and drunken driving
prosecutions because of last month's
decision in a Massachusetts case. In that 5-4
ruling, the court said prosecutors must make
forensic scientists available for defense
cross-examination about lab reports on
drugs and other trial evidence.
The ruling raises questions about a Virginia
law that puts the onus on defendants to
subpoena scientists if they wish to challenge
the accuracy of lab reports. Defendants who
fail to take such action in a timely manner
waive their rights under the Constitution's
Confrontation Clause, according to the
Virginia statute.
The U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to
review Virginia's law, but Cuccinelli-a
state senator from Fairfax County-said the
legislature should go ahead and change it
rather than wait for a potentially damaging
ruling.
"If we lose that case, there's going to be a
lot of remands for new trials," Cuccinelli
said in a telephone interview. "That's going
to be a sudden workload hit."
Cuccinelli sent a letter to Gov. Timothy M.
Kaine, urging him to call a special session.
He wrote that "there is a need to act quickly
to avoid very significant problems once
some ongoing cases start to run up against
speedy trial limitations as a result of
continuances that are currently being
requested and granted" because of the
ruling.
Kaine spokesman Gordon Hickey said it's
too early to convene a special session.
-The governor is well aware of this issue,"
Hickey said. "Certainly legislation would be
one solution, but let's not leap to that before
we give it a little thought. The governor's
legal team is looking at other ways to fix it."
The General Assembly also could call itself
into special session if two-thirds of the
members of both houses make written
requests to the governor.
Louisa County Commonwealth's Attorney
Tom Garrett said prosecutors across the state
support a special session.
"You'd be hard-pressed to find a
commonwealth's attorney who isn't in
support of it," he said, adding that the
problems are too urgent to follow the usual
procedure and take up the matter at the next
regular session in January.
"I can't wait until July 1, 2010, for a new
law to take effect," he said.
Garrett said his relatively small jurisdiction
has "dozens and dozens" of cases that could
be affected by the ruling. He said one
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cocaine case in Louisa already has been
dismissed because the forensic analyst was
not present.
Garrett said the state Department of Forensic
Science simply doesn't have the manpower
to have its examiners running all over the
state to testify. About 160 employees
conducting casework handled nearly 60,000
cases last year, the department says. The
number of tests would be even higher
because many cases involve multiple pieces
of evidence.
Fixing the state's law would not be difficult,
Garrett said. He said the statute could be
amended to require the state to subpoena the
scientists and give the defense a deadline for
stating whether they want them to appear.
The justices signaled in their ruling that such
"notice and demand" statutes in three states
are constitutional, Garrett said.
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Citizens United v. F.E.C.
08-205
Ruling Below: Citizens United ix. FE.C., 530 F Supp. 2d 274 (D.D.C. 2008)
The district court ruled that § 201 of the 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) applied
to ads promoting the documentary Hillary: the Movie. The ads should have included disclosures
as required by BCRA to comply with federal election law. The ads and movie are considered
"electioneering communications" because they are susceptible to no other interpretation than to
inform the electorate that Hillary Clinton is unfit for office.
Questions Presented: (1) Were all as-applied challenges to disclosure requirements (reporting
and disclaimers) imposed on "electioneering communications" by BCRA resolved by
McConnell's statement that it was upholding disclosure requirements against facial challenge
"'for the entire range of electioneering communications' set forth in the statute"? (2) Do BCRA's
disclosure requirements impose unconstitutional burden when applied to electioneering
communications protected from prohibition by appeal-to-vote test, FEC v. Wis. Right to Life
(WRTL If), because such communications are protected "political speech," not regulable
"campaign speech," in that they are not "unambiguously related to the campaign of a particular
federal candidate," Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), or because disclosure requirements fail
strict scrutiny when so applied? (3) Does WRTL II's appeal-to-vote test require clear plea for
action to vote for or against candidate, so that communication lacking such clear plea for action
is not subject to electioneering communication prohibition, 2 U.S.C. § 441b? (4) Is a broadcast
feature-length documentary movie that is sold on DVD, shown in theaters, and accompanied by
compendium book to be treated as broadcast "ads" at issue in McConnell, or is a movie not
subject to regulation as electioneering communication?
CITIZENS UNITED, Plaintiff,
V.
FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, Defendant.
United States District Court, District of Colombia
Decided January 15, 2008
[Excerpt: some footnotes and citations omitted]
PER CURIAM. enforcing provisions of the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002 ("BCRA"),
For the reasons that follow we deny Citizens with respect to Citizens' advertisements for
United's ("Citizens") motions for a a movie-Hillary: The Movie-and its
preliminary injunction to enjoin the Federal distribution of The Movie through cable TV
Election Commission ("FEC") from video on-demand.
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I.
Citizens United is a nonprofit membership
corporation, tax-exempt under Internal
Revenue Code § 501(c)(4). Citizens
produced a movie titled Hillary: The Movie.
The Movie focuses on Senator Hillary
Rodham Clinton's "Senate record, her White
House record during President Bill Clinton's
presidency, . . . her presidential bid," and
includes "express opinions on whether she
would make a good president." Citizens
plans to distribute The Movie in January or
February 2008 through theaters, video on-
demand ("VOD") broadcasts, and DVD
sales. Citizens notified the court on January
7, 2008, that it had released The Movie for
"public sale and exhibition." The Movie's
release date coincides with the dates when
many states will hold primary elections or
party caucuses. Senator Clinton is a
presidential candidate in those states.
Citizens intends to fund at least three
television advertisements-two 10-second
advertisements, "Wait" and "Pants," and one
30-second advertisement, "Questions" to
coincide with the release of its movie. The
advertisements promote The Movie and
direct viewers to The Movie's website for
more information about the film and how to
see or purchase it. If Senator Clinton
becomes the Democratic presidential
nominee, Citizens plans to broadcast the
three advertisements and possibly other
advertisements within 30 days before the
Democratic National Committee Convention
and within 60 days before the November
general election-both periods are within
BCRA's definition of an electioneering
communication. Citizens has elected not to
broadcast its advertisements pending
resolution of this litigation. It has entered
into negotiations to broadcast The Movie
through the "Political Movies" component
of a new nationwide VOD channel,
"Elections '08," but has decided to forego
the opportunity pending resolution of the
current litigation because, according to
Citizens, the broadcast would be banned
under BCRA and, even if this were not so,
the broadcast would require Citizens to
disclose certain information and make
certain statements as described below.
BCRA amended the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971 ("FECA"). Passed in
2002, it represented "the most recent federal
enactment designed to purge national
politics of what was conceived to be the
pernicious influence of 'big money'
campaign contributions." McConnell v.
FEC. BCRA introduced a new system for
regulating what it termed "electioneering
communications." Under BCRA § 201, an
"'electioneering communication" is:
any broadcast, cable, or satellite
communication which-
(I) refers to a clearly identified
candidate for Federal office;
(LI) is made within-
(aa) 60 days before a general,
special, or runoff election for the
office sought by the candidate; or
(bb) 30 days before a primary or
preference election, or a convention
or caucus of a political party that has
authority to nominate a candidate,
for the office sought by the
candidate. ...
For presidential candidates, the
communication must also be capable
of being received by 50,000 or more
persons. Citizens recognizes that
under this statutory definition, both
its advertisements and a VOD
broadcast of The Movie would be
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electioneering communications.
Electioneering communications are
subject to a host of restrictions
imposed by BCRA. Three are
relevant here: § 203, § 201, and
§ 311. Section 203 prevents
corporations and labor unions from
funding electioneering
communications out of their general
treasury funds, unless the
communication is made to its
stockholders or members, to get out
the vote, or to solicit donations for a
segregated corporate fund for
political purposes. 2 U.S.C.
§ 441b(b)(2). This provision does not
bar electioneering communications
paid for out of a segregated fund that
receives donations only from
stockholders, executives and their
families. Any electioneering
communication that is not prohibited
is subject to the disclosure
requirements of § 201 and the
disclaimer requirements of § 311,
which are set out in part II.B.
Citizens' complaint, filed on December 13,
2007, contains two major claims: (1) that
§ 203's prohibition of corporate
disbursements for electioneering
communications violates the First
Amendment on its face and as applied to
The Movie and to the 30-second
advertisement "Questions"; and (2) that
BCRA § 201 requiring disclosure and § 311
requiring disclaimers are unconstitutional as
applied to Citizens' three advertisements
(and to The Movie, if Citizens broadcasts it
in a manner that does not violate § 203).
II.
The court will not issue a preliminary
injunction unless the movant shows that it
has "1) a substantial likelihood of success on
the merits, 2) that it would suffer irreparable
injury if the injunction is not granted, 3) that
an injunction would not substantially injure
other interested parties, and 4) that the
public interest would be furthered by the
injunction." Granting injunctive relief is an
"extraordinary and drastic remedy," and it is
the movant's obligation to justify. "by a
clear showing," the court's use of such a
measure.
A.
We will analyze first Citizens' likelihood of
prevailing on the merits of its claims
regarding The Movie. In McConnell, the
Supreme Court upheld § 203 on its face,
rejecting claims that the financing of
"electioneering communications"
constituting express advocacy or its
functional equivalent were within the
protection of the First Amendment.
McConnell did not, however, "purport to
resolve future as-applied challenges." FEC
v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., ("WRTL"). The
Chief Justice's opinion in WRTL stated that
an advertisement could not be considered
the functional equivalent of express
advocacy unless it "is susceptible of no
reasonable interpretation other than as an
appeal to vote for or against a specific
candidate." To promote the objectivity of
this analysis, courts are to disregard
contextual evidence of the corporation's
intent in running an advertisement.
Citizens wants us to enjoin the operation of
BCRA § 203 as a facially unconstitutional
burden on the First Amendment right to
freedom of speech. The theory is that with
respect to § 203, WRTL narrowed
McConnell to such an extent that it "left the
door open to facial invalidation based on the
sort of circumstances that have now arisen."
For Citizens to prevail on this claim, we
would have to overrule McConnell, which is
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to say that Citizens has no chance of
prevailing. Only the Supreme Court may
overrule its decisions. The lower courts are
bound to follow them.
With respect to Citizens's as-applied claims
regarding The Movie, the first question
under Chief Justice Roberts' WR TL
opinion-and as it turns out, the last
question-is whether the film is express
advocacy or its functional equivalent. If it is,
McConnell makes it likely that Citizens
would not win on the merits of its claim that
the First Amendment permits it to broadcast
the movie within the electioneering
communications period as currently funded.
Citizens contends that The Movie is issue
speech and, as it stated in oral argument, that
issue speech is any speech that does not
expressly say how a viewer should vote. The
trouble is that the controlling opinion in
WRTL stands for no such thing. Instead, if
the speech cannot be interpreted as anything
other than an appeal to vote for or against a
candidate, it will not be considered genuine
issue speech even if it does not expressly
advocate the candidate's election or defeat.
The Movie does not focus on legislative
issues. The Movie references the election
and Senator Clinton's candidacy, and it takes
a position on her character, qualifications,
and fitness for office. Dick Morris, one
political commentator featured in The
Movie, has described the film as really
"giv[ing] people the flavor and an
understanding of why she should not be
President." After viewing The Movie and
examining the 73-page script at length, the
court finds Mr. Morris's description to be
accurate. The Movie is susceptible of no
other interpretation than to inform the
electorate that Senator Clinton is unfit for
office, that the United States would be a
dangerous place in a President Hillary
Clinton world, and that viewers should vote
against her. The Movie is thus the functional
equivalent of express advocacy. As such, it
falls within the holding of McConnell
sustaining, as against the First Amendment,
§ 203 insofar as it bars corporations from
funding electioneering communications that
constitute the functional equivalent of
express advocacy. There is no substantial
likelihood that Citizens will prevail on its
as-applied challenge with respect to The
Movie.
B.
Citizens' proposed advertisements present a
different picture. The FEC agrees that
Citizens may broadcast the advertisements
because they fall within the safe harbor of
the FEC's prohibition regulations
implementing HJRTL. They did not advocate
Senator Clinton's election or defeat; instead,
they proposed a commercial transaction-
buy the DVD of The Movie. Although
Citizens may therefore run the
advertisements, it complains that
requirements of § 201 and § 311 of BCRA,
2 U.S.C. §§ 434(f)(2), 441 d, impose on it
burdens that violate the First Amendment.
Section 201 is a disclosure provision
requiring that any corporation spending
more than $10,000 in a calendar year to
produce or air electioneering
communications must file a report with the
FEC that includes-among other things-
the names and addresses of anyone who
contributed $1,000 or more in aggregate to
the corporation for the purpose of furthering
electioneering communications. Section 311
is a disclaimer provision. For advertisements
not authorized by a candidate or her political
committee, the statement " is
responsible for the content of this
advertising" must be spoken during the
advertisement and must appear in text on-
screen for at least four seconds during the
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advertisement. In addition, such
advertisements are required to include the
name, address, and phone number or web
address of the organization behind the
advertisement.
Citizens thinks that § 201 and § 311 are
unconstitutional because its advertisements
do not constitute express advocacy or the
functional equivalent of express advocacy.
The argument is that the Supreme Court's
WVR TL decision narrowed the
constitutionally permissible scope of what
could be considered an electioneering
communication. Under Citizens' reading of
WRTL, anything that is not express
advocacy or not "susceptible of [a]
reasonable interpretation other than as an
appeal to vote for or against a specific
candidate" cannot be constitutionally
regulated by Congress under BCRA.
We do not believe WRTL went so far. The
only issue in the case was whether speech
that did not constitute the functional
equivalent of express advocacy could be
banned during the relevant pre-election
period. Although McConnell upheld the
§ 203 prohibition on its face, the Court left
open the issue that was presented in WRTL,
reserving it for decision on an as-applied
basis. In contrast, when the McConnell
Court sustained the disclosure provision of
§ 201 and the disclaimer provision of § 311,
it did so for the "entire range of
electioneering communications" set forth in
the statute. Citizens' advertisements
obviously are within that range.
Although Citizens styles its argument as an
as-applied challenge, it offers only one
distinction between its advertisements and
the mine-run of speech that constitutes
electioneering communication under BCRA.
The distinction, so goes the argument, is that
Citizens' speech is constitutionally
protected, as ifRTL holds. We know that the
Supreme Court has not adopted that line as a
ground for holding the disclosure and
disclaimer provisions unconstitutional, and
it is not for us to do so today. And we know
as well that in the past the Supreme Court
has written approvingly of disclosure
provisions triggered by political speech even
though the speech itself was constitutionally
protected under the First Amendment.
The McConnell Court did suggest one
circumstance in which the requirement to
disclose donors might be unconstitutional
as-applied-if disclosure would lead to
reprisals and thus "impose an
unconstitutional burden on the freedom to
associate in support of a particular cause."
To this, the Court added that the plaintiff
must show a "reasonable probability that the
compelled disclosure of . . . contributors'
names will subject them to threats,
harassment, or reprisals." Citizens'
memorandum in support of its motion states
that there may be reprisals, but it has
presented no evidence to back up this bald
assertion. In that respect, Citizens is thus in
a similar position as the parties in
McConnell who made the same assertion but
presented no specific evidentiary support.
We therefore hold that Citizens has not
established the requisite probability of
prevailing on the merits of its arguments
against the disclosure and disclaimer
provisions-§ 201 and § 311, respectively.
C.
Citizens tells us that without a preliminary
injunction it will not be able to broadcast
The Movie, that it will have to disclose the
identity of its contributors to the FEC if it
runs the advertisements, and that some
portion of the time it purchased for the
advertisements would be consumed by the
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disclaimers BCRA requires. If Citizens had
made more of a showing that it had a chance
of prevailing in this court on the merits,
these kinds of harms might have warranted
preliminary relief. But in the face of
McConnell's ruling that the disclosure and
disclaimer provisions are constitutional and
that the restriction on corporate speech
advocating the defeat of a candidate does
not violate the First Amendment, Citizens is
unable to raise "questions going to the
merits so serious, substantial, difficult and
doubtful, as to make them a fair ground for
litigation and thus for more deliberate
investigation."
As to the remaining factors governing
preliminary relief, we cannot say that
enjoining enforcement of the BCRA
provisions at issue would serve the public
interest in view of the Supreme Court's
determination that the provisions assist the
public in making informed decisions, limit
the coercive effect of corporate speech, and
assist the FEC in enforcing contribution
limits.
Citizens' motion for preliminary injunction
with respect to the § 203 Prohibition as
applied to "Questions" shall be DENIED as
moot as set forth in footnote 9 and shall be
DENIED with respect to all other claims. A
separate order shall issue this date.
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"Court Appears Poised to Rewrite Spending Rules"
New York Times
June 30, 2009
Adam Liptak
WASHINGTON-A Supreme Court case
concerning a quirky documentary critical of
Hillary Rodham Clinton may result in a
major overhaul of rules governing campaign
spending by corporations, the court signaled
Monday.
Rather than deciding the case, the only one
the justices left unresolved before leaving
for their summer break, the court asked for
more briefs and a second argument, to be
held on Sept. 9, almost a month before the
start of the next term.
The parties were asked to offer their views
on whether the court should overrule a 1990
decision, Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce, which upheld restrictions on
corporate spending to support or oppose
political candidates, and part of McConnell
v. Federal Election Commission, the 2003
decision that upheld the central provisions of
the McCain-Feingold campaign finance law.
"The court is poised to reverse longstanding
precedents concerning the rights of
corporations to participate in politics," said
Nathaniel Persily, a law professor at
Columbia. "The only reason to ask for
reargument on this is if they're going to
overturn Austin and McConnell."
If Judge Sonia Sotomayor, President
Obama's Supreme Court nominee, is
confirmed by the Senate by then, the case
will be the first one she hears.
The case involves Hillary: The Movie, a
slashing political documentary released last
year while Mrs. Clinton, now the secretary
of state, was seeking the Democratic
presidential nomination. The film was
produced by Citizens United, a conservative
advocacy group that is a nonprofit
corporation.
The McCain-Feingold law bans the
broadcast, cable or satellite transmission of
" electioneering communications" paid for
by corporations in the 30 days before a
presidential primary and in the 60 days
before a general election.
The law, as narrowed by a 2007 Supreme
Court decision, applies to communications
"susceptible to no reasonable interpretation
other than as an appeal to vote for or against
a specific candidate." It also requires spoken
and written disclaimers in the film and ads
for it, along with the disclosure of
contributors' names.
Citizens United lost a suit against the
Federal Election Commission last year and
then withdrew plans to show its
documentary on a cable video-on-demand
service and to broadcast television
advertisements for it. But the film was
shown in theaters in six cities, and it remains
available on DVD and online.
Several justices seemed sympathetic to the
group's position that its First Amendment
rights had been violated when the case was
argued in March. The government said
Congress had the power to ban political
books, signs and Internet videos as long as
they were paid for by corporations and
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distributed not long before an election.
The court could have ruled in tavor of
Citizens United in relatively narrow ways.
Its decision to set the case down for
reargument suggests that it is considering a
much broader ruling, one that may allow
unlimited spending from corporate treasuries
for television advertisements and other
communications to support or oppose
candidates.
The Austin decision said campaign speech
financed by corporations was suspect. "The
corrosive and distorting effects of immense
aggregations of wealth that are accumulated
with the help of the corporate form," Justice
Thurgood Marshall wrote for the majority in
1990, "have little or no correlation to the
public's support for the corporation's
political ideas."
Shifts in court personnel since then,
particularly the replacement of Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor by Justice Samuel A.
Alito Jr. in 2006, have substantially altered
the court's attitude to campaign finance
laws.
The Roberts court has struck dowx n every
campaign finance regulation to reach it, and
it seems to have a majority prepared to do
more. Indeed, last year, in Federal Election
Commission v. Davis, Justice Alito, writing
for the majority, said leveling the electoral
playing field was not a matter for the courts
or constitutional.
The Davis case struck down the
"millionaire's amendment," which raised the
donor limits for rivals of rich politicians
who finance their own campaigns.
In his opinion, Justice Alito cited Justice
Anthony M. Kennedy's dissent in the Austin
case. "The notion that the go-vernment has a
legitimate interest in restricting the quantity
of speech to equalize the relative influence
of speakers on elections," Justice Kennedy
wrote in the passage cited by Justice Alito,
is "antithetical to the First Amendment."
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"High Court Hears Arguments over Anti-Clinton Film"
USA Today
March 25, 2009
Joan Biskupic
WASH[NGTON-The Supreme Court
appeared open to vigorous arguments
Tuesday that federal campaign-finance law
wrongly limits corporate-funded messages
in political elections.
Theodore Olson, representing the producers
of a 90-minute movie highly critical of
former Democratic presidential contender
Hillary Rodham Clinton, told the justices
that the First Amendment freedom to
participate in the political process -Is being
smothered by one of the most complicated,
expensive and incomprehensible regulatory
regimes ever invented."
Olson specifically protested a provision of
the 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
that kept Citizens United, a conservative
group that produced the film, from
distributing Hillary: The Movie through a
video-on-demand program in early 2008.
More significantly, Olson asked the court to
reverse long-standing cases allowing
government to restrict campaign spending
by corporations and unions because of the
potentially corruptive aspect of big-money
interests.
The justices' comments, along with their
recent pattern of increasingly scrutinizing
laws that limit corporate-funded political
speech, suggested that Citizens United
would prevail. Yet it was not clear how
broadly the justices might rule and affect
money in elections.
Justice Anthony Kennedy questioned
whether, if the majority finds corporate
campaign limits do not cover the feature-
length movie, "then the whole statute
(barring corporate-funded broadcasts)
should fall."
There was no obvious consensus among a
majority of the nine justices on the potential
loosening of limits on corporate money.
The law at issue bars TV or radio ads
financed with corporate or labor union
money that refer to a candidate for federal
office 30 days before a primary or 60 days
before a general election.
Olson contended the movie, produced partly
with corporate contributions, differs from
the usual 60-second ads that Congress
targeted. He characterized it as a
documentary about Clinton, now secretary
of State.
Deputy U.S. Solicitor General Malcolm
Stewart countered that "the film repeatedly
criticizes Hillary Clinton's character and
integrity" and said Congress aimed to curb
electioneering regardless of a message's
length.
He noted that the law applies to any
"broadcast, cable or satellite
communication" before an election.
Chief Justice John Roberts was skeptical of
Stewart's argument. "So if Wal-Mart airs an
advertisement that says, 'We have candidate
action figures for sale, come buy them,' that
counts as an electioneering
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prohibited campaign ad.
Stew,\art said it could. He also said Congress
might be able to bar corporate spending to
publish and publicize a campaign book
before an election.
The four liberal justices, including David
Souter, seemed ready to view the movie as a
-Doesn't this one fall into campaign
advocacy?" Souter said, referring to
quotations in the movie that say, She will
lie about anything. She is deceitful. She is
ruthless, cunning. dishonest. . .' This
sounds to me like campaign advocacy."
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communication? "
"The Supreme Court Reviews Hillary: The Movie"
Slate
March 24, 2009
Dahlia Lithwick
Hillary: The Mowie: The critics rave.
"This film, which I saw
comedy. "
-Justice Stephen Breyer
"As Justice Breyer said,
comedy. "
-it is not a musical
it's not a musical
Justice David Souter
In 2008, a conservative group called
Citizens United produced Hillary: The
Movie, a 90-minute documentary in which
Hillary Clinton, then seeking the Democratic
presidential nomination, is variously
described as "deceitful," "ruthless," and
"cunning," as well as "dishonest,"
"reckless," a "congenital liar," and "not
qualified as commander in chief." For
ideological balance, Dick Morris says that
"Hillary is the closest thing we have in
America to a European socialist." The
movie did not expressly urge voters to vote
against her. It simply implied that friends
don't let friends vote for evil people.
Citizens United released the film in six
theaters and on DVD, actions not subject to
federal regulation. But when they sought to
distribute the film by paying $1.2 million to
sell it through a video-on-demand service,
the Federal Election Commission contended
that the film was no different from the kind
of "electioneering communication"
regulated under the McCain-Feingold
campaign finance law. That was the 2002
statute that tried to limit the influence of big
money on elections. If subject to the
constraints of McCain-Feingold, the film
could not be financed by corporate treasuries
or broadcast within 30 days of a primary or
60 days of a general election. The federal
court of appeals agreed with the FEC,
finding that the movie could be interpreted
as nothing but an effort to "inform the
electorate that Senator Clinton is unfit for
office." Citizens United appealed.
The question for the high court in Citizens
United v. Federal Election Commission is
whether the film is more like a 90-minute
version of one of those swift-boat ads or
more like The Federalist-core political
speech that warrants the highest level of
constitutional protection. At oral argument
this morning, the government-seemingly
unafraid of the latter comparison-takes the
position that in the right circumstances, even
books can be banned under campaign
finance laws. And that's when the justices
start hyperventilating.
Former Bush administration Solicitor
General Ted Olson represents Citizens
United, and because the justices had just
screened the virulently anti-Clinton film, his
claims that the movie simply "informs and
educates" the public about important issues
are generally met by stony silence. Nobody
really thinks it is an episode of 60 Minutes.
Olson does get the bunch hopping when he
characterizes McCain-Feingold as "one of
the most complicated, expensive, and
incomprehensible regulatory regimes ever
invented by the administrative state." Olson
notes that the Reporters Committee for
Freedom of the Press (which he accidentally
calls "the Reporters Committee for the Right
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to Life") filed a brief on his side of the case
urging that the Hillary movie "is
indistinguishable from other news-media
commentary." (Disclosure: I am on the
steering committee of the Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press; I am
still wait-listed for Reporters Committee for
the Right to Life.)
Several of the justices seem bothered by
Olson's claim that Hillary did not represent
electioneering. "'This sounds to me like
campaign advocacy," insists Justice David
Souter. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg adds,
"If that isn't an appeal to voters, I can't
imagine what is." To which Olson replies
that the film is merely "a long discussion of
the record, qualifications, history, and
conduct of someone who is in the political
arena, a person who already holds public
office, who now holds a different public
office, who, yes, at that point, Justice Souter,
was running for office." But Justice
Anthony Kennedy observes that a 90-minute
attack ad is pretty much by definition more
potent than a 30-second one: "'[I]f we take
this as a beginning point-that a short, 30-
second campaign ad can be regulated-you
want me to write an opinion and say, well, if
it's 90 minutes, then that's different. It
seems to me that you can make the argument
that 90 minutes is much more powerful in
support or in opposition to a candidate."
Olson seems to be of the view that a good
way to peel off five votes at the court is by
berating the justices about the general
twirliness of the campaign finance laws, as
evidenced by the fact that "since 2003, this
court has issued something close to 500
pages of opinions . . . and 22 separate
opinions from the Justices of this Court
attempting to figure out what this statute
means." A defensive Chief Justice John
Roberts observes that the statute gives the
court "mandatory appellate jurisdiction"-it
has to hear these cases. A tetchy John Paul
Stevens snaps: "And maybe those cases
presented more difficult issues than this
one!"
Note to Olson: Don't tell the justices they
are too stupid to understand McCain-
Feingold.
Deputy Solicitor General Malcolm Stewart
rises to argue the case for the FEC. His job
is to persuade the court that they can and
should ban 90-minute attack ads. But when
Justice Samuel Alito asks whether the
government-if it can regulate
documentaries-might also regulate a book
containing "express advocacy" prior to an
election, Stewart agrees that it might.
"That's pretty incredible," splutters Alito.
"You think that if-if a book was published,
a campaign biography that was the
functional equivalent of express advocacy,
that could be banned?" Not banned, clarifies
Stewart. Congress could just "prohibit the
use of corporate treasury funds" to publish
it. Oh, Malcolm Stewart. Malcolm Stewart.
With your Macbeth-y first name and your
Macbeth-ier last name. You did not just say
the government might engage in a teensy
little bit of judicious, narrowly tailored
book-banning, did you?
At this point, a horrified Anthony Kennedy
gets even paler than his usual pale self: "Is it
the Kindle where you can read a book? I
take it that's from a satellite. So the existing
statute would probably prohibit that under
your view? . . . If this Kindle device where
you can read a book which is campaign
advocacy, within the 60- to 30-day period, if
it comes from a satellite, it can be prohibited
under the Constitution and perhaps under
this statute?" Again Stewart clarifies that it
wouldn't be banned, but a corporation could
be barred from using its general treasury
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funds to publish such a book and would be
required to publish it through a PAC. The
chief justice seeks to clarify that this would
be so even in a 500-page book with only one
sentence that contained express advocacy.
Stewart cheerfully agrees. The chief justice
wonders whether this would apply even "to
a sign held up in Lafayette Park saying vote
for so-and-so." Stewart doesn't quite say no.
Justice Breyer keeps trying to shake Stewart
over his head-like an Etch A Sketch-to
erase the noxious image of government-
sponsored book banning and get him to stop
chatting about issues that are not before the
court. But it's too late. Now Souter looks
even paler than Kennedy.
For the past few years, the Roberts court has
been slowly chipping away at McCain-
Feingold. wvith Justices Roberts and Alito
tapping on the brakes as Kennedy, Scalia,
and Thomas revved the motor. But it seems
to me that all this talk of book banning and
government regulation of signs in Lafayette
Park is a pretty good way to get all five of
them in the mood to run down yet more
restrictions on political advertising. And
maybe even back up and do it again.
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"Hillary: The Movie to Get a Supreme Court Review"
Los Angeles Times
November
David G.
15, 2008
Savage
The Supreme Court voted Friday to hear an
election-related case that will decide
whether a politically charged film-in this
case Hillary: The Movie-can be regulated
as a campaign ad.
The justices said they would hear an appeal
from a conservative group that had sought to
advertise its anti-Clinton documentary as the
New York senator competed for the
Democratic presidential nomination.
The Federal Election Commission said the
group could not broadcast the film on
television or air ads close to the election
without running afoul of campaign funding
laws.
The McCain-Feingold Act forbids
corporate-funded broadcast ads that attack a
candidate within a month of a primary or
general election. The law also requires
political groups to disclose who paid for the
ads.
But lawyers for Citizens United, the
conservative group, say limits on "core
political speech rights" are unconstitutional.
The court also said Friday that it would hear
a West Virginia case that has highlighted the
role of big money in state high court justice
races.
Both appeals were before the U.S. Supreme
Court for weeks, but justices waited until
after the Nov. 4 election to vote to take them
up.
In recent years, the court has been closely
split on cases involving money, politics and
the 1st Amendment. Since the arrival of
Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. and Justice
Samuel A. Alito Jr., the court has shifted
toward the view that the campaign laws
violate the free-speech rights of political
groups.
"The 1 st Amendment requires us to err on
the side of protecting political speech,"
Roberts said last year in a case involving a
Wisconsin anti-abortion group that had
broadcast ads critical of Sen. Russell D.
Feingold (D-Wis.)
Indiana attorney James Bopp Jr. represented
the Wisconsin anti-abortion group. This
year, he represented Citizens United, the
group that made Hillary: The Movie.
The 90-minute film was made by David N.
Bossie, a former congressional staffer who
was a relentless investigator of the Clintons
during the 1990s. The movie includes
interviews with Ann Coulter, Newt Gingrich
and Dick Morris.
The group planned to show the film in
selected theaters and distribute it on DVD.
That was not affected by the campaign
funding laws.
But the group also planned to run radio and
TV ads promoting the film and hoped to
broadcast the documentary on television.
Those issues were subject to the McCain-
Feingold Act because they were broadcasts
274
that attacked a candidate just prior to the
primary election contests.
In January, a three-judge panel of the U.S.
district court in Washington agreed with the
FEC that Hillary: The Movie was akin to a
campaign ad and could not be broadcast on
TV.
It told -the electorate that Sen. Clinton is
unfit for office . . . and that viewers should
vote against her," the court said.
The court did say that the group could run
TV ads that mentioned the film-but only
with a disclaimer and disclosure of its
donors. Bopp renewed his appeal in the
Supreme Court, and insisted the rules
requiring the disclosure of donors should be
thrown out.
He said Friday he was pleased the justices
voted to hear Citizens United vs. FEC. The
case is expected to be heard in February.
Bopp said in a statement: "The notion that a
feature-length movie can be banned is a
return to the days of government censorship
and book-burnings."
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"Now Showing: Hillary: The Movie and Election-Law Gripes"
Christian Science Monitor
February 1, 2008
Warren Richey
To many supporters of President Bush,
Michael Moore's 2004 documentary
Fahrenheit 9/11 was a blatant attempt to use
factual distortions, conspiracy theories, and
irreverent wit to undermine the reelection of
a sitting president.
The film's popularity did not go unnoticed
among Republicans. Now, with the 2008
presidential primaries well under way, a
Washington-based conservative advocacy
group has produced its own political
documentary. It's called Hillary: The Movie.
There's just one problem. Without extensive
broadcast advertising, few people will see it.
"I could have the movie in hundreds of
theaters. I just can't let anyone know it is
there by advertising it," complains executive
producer David Bossie. "I can't purchase ad
time on television or radio stations."
Hillary: The Movie premiered Jan. 16 in
Washington. It is being screened in select
cities, including showings in San Diego on
Feb. I and Santa Ana, Calif., on Feb. 2. But
because of its hard edge and timely political
subject matter, the Federal Election
Commission has put restrictions on three
broadcast advertisements promoting the
movie. Under campaign-finance regulations,
ads for the film must include a political
disclaimer and the film's financial backers
must be disclosed to the FEC and the public.
The group, Citizens United, objects to the
preconditions. Its leaders say they are just
trying to get people to see their movie or
purchase the DVD, not defeat a
presidential candidate. So they
federal court in Washington, D.C.-
particular
sued in
-and lost.
In an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, the
group's lawyer, James Bopp, argues that the
three ads are not "electioneering
communications" advocating the election or
defeat of a particular candidate. The ads are
simply an effort to inform potential viewers
about a political documentary. For the FEC
to impose disclosure and disclaimer
requirements is an unconstitutional
infringement of free speech, Mr. Bopp says.
Judges say election rules apply
Last week, a three-judge district court panel
rejected Bopp's argument. It found that
Hillary: The Movie is the functional
equivalent of the kind of corporate-funded
campaign attacks that election laws are
designed to prevent. The panel also ruled
that even though the advertisements about
the film did not themselves amount to
political attacks, the FEC was still within its
power to impose disclosure and disclaimer
requirements on the ads.
That's the issue Bopp is presenting to the
Supreme Court. The justices are scheduled
to discuss whether to take the case on an
expedited basis during their Feb. 15
conference.
"I just don't see how the Federal Election
Commission has the authority to use
campaign-finance rules to regulate
advertising that is not related to campaigns,"
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Bopp said in a phone interview.
The First Amendment lawyer is a prominent
opponent of the 2002 campaign-finance
reform law cosponsored by Sens. John
McCain (R) of Arizona and Russ Feingold
(D) of Wisconsin. Last year, Bopp
persuaded a majority of justices to scale
back rules in the McCain-Feingold law
governing "issue advertising." Analysts see
the latest lawsuit as a bid to extend that
holding.
"The law is clearly being tested, and I think
[Bopp's] assumption is that this court now is
going to be more sympathetic to these
challenges," says Washington lawyer Robert
Bauer, an election law expert. But it is not
clear, Mr. Bauer adds, that the Supreme
Court will agree to hear the case.
The market is now
Time is short, according to Mr. Bossie. The
market for a political documentary is
directly linked to elections, he says, and that
market disappears when the elections are
over. "We are harmed every minute the
court isn't hearing this case," he says.
The three ads in question can be viewed on
www.hillarythemovie.com. One of the 10-
second ads depicts an interview with
conservative firebrand Ann Coulter.
The narrator speaks: "First a kind word
about Hillary Clinton."
Ms. Coulter quips: "She looks good in a
pants suit."
The narrator: "Now a movie about
everything else." The screen flashes photos
of Senator Clinton.
The narrator: "Hillary: The Movie, on DVD
Under FEC rules, the movie producers must
include a four-second disclaimer stating that
the message was paid for by Citizens United
and is not affiliated with any candidate or
candidate's committee.
"What that does is it tells the people
watching that it is a political ad," says
Bossie, who is also president of Citizens
United. But the ads aren't about politics, he
says. Rather, they are about trying to drum
up business for a movie.
The three-judge panel watched the 90-
minute film and studied its 73-page script.
The judges concluded: "The Movie is
susceptible of no other interpretation than to
inform the electorate that Senator Clinton is
unfit for office, that the United States would
be a dangerous place in a President Hillary
Clinton world, and that viewers should vote
against her."
Bossie defends his work. "Our job is to
inform and educate the American people and
that is what we do in this film," he says.
A former congressional investigator, Bossie
says his efforts were partly inspired by
Fahrenheit 9/11. But he says he is more
faithful to facts than was Mr. Moore.
"Documentaries are a new art form for
politics. It is a new delivery device for
political issues," Bossie says. "I recognized
that in 2004 when Michael Moore's film had
enormous impact. I didn't like its impact, I
didn't agree with the film . . . however, I
recognized the power of film."
How did Fahrenheit 9/11 advertise?
Ads for Fahrenheit 9/11 ran into similar
problems at the FEC. Moore removed any
mention of Mr. Bush from ads airing close
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now."
to the election to avoid running afoul of the
law. "That's impossible for Citizens United
because the name of the movie is Hillay
The Movi'," says Bopp. "You can't say [in
an ad], 'Go see a movie, we just can't say
the name of it."'
"We want to fight this [Supreme Court case]
and win this battle," Bossie says, "because if
Hillary Clinton is not the Democratic
nominee we will have an Obama movie out
this summer."
Asked about Sen. Barack Obama's squeaky-
clean image, Bossie laughs. "Don't worry,
I'll have plenty to make a movie."
278
"Campaign '08: Advertising; Makers of Anti-Clinton Film Lose Ruling"
Los Angeles Times
January 16, 2008
From The Associated Press
A conservative group must abide by
campaign finance laws if it wants to run ads
promoting its anti-Hillary Rodham Clinton
movie, a federal court ruled Tuesday.
Citizens United had hoped to run the
television advertisements in key election
states during peak primary season. The court
ruling means the group must either keep its
ads off TV or attach a disclaimer and
disclose its donors.
Lawyers for the group had argued that its
90-minute Hillary: The Movie was no
different from documentaries seen on news
shows 60 Minutes and Nova. That prompted
skepticism and, at one point, laughter from
the judges during a hearing last week.
Campaign regulations prohibit corporations
and unions from paying for ads that run
close to elections and identify candidates.
Citizens United argued that the
advertisements promoted the movie and
should be treated as commercial speech as
opposed to advocacy against the Democratic
New York senator.
A three-judge panel disagreed.
The film does not address legislative issues
and was produced solely "to inform the
electorate that Sen. Clinton is unfit for
office, that the United States would be a
dangerous place in a President Hillary
Clinton world, and that viewers should vote
against her," the court wrote in its
unanimous ruling.
A similar issue surfaced in 2004, when
Citizens United sought to keep filmmaker
Michael Moore from advertising Fahrenheit
9/11 in the run-up to the presidential
election. The Federal Election Commission
dismissed the complaint after Moore said he
had no plans to run the ads during election
season.
The ads include clips from the movie,
including one in which Dick Morris-a
former advisor to President Clinton who is
now a critic of the Clintons-says the
senator is "the closest thing we have in
America to a European socialist."
Challenges to campaign finance regulations
are considered by a three-judge panel of
district and appellate judges in Washington.
During last week's hearing, Citizens United
drew the most criticism from the panel's two
Republican nominees-U.S. District Judge
Royce C. Lamberth and Judge A. Raymond
Randolph, an appellate judge. U.S. District
Judge Richard W. Roberts was a nominee of
President Clinton.
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"Some Who Fight for McCain Are Fighting Against McCain-Feingold"
The Wtashington Post
March 5, 2008
Matthew Mosk and Robert Barnes
Some of the same conservative activists who
have recently signed on to Sen. John
McCain's presidential campaign are also
still hard at work trying to undo his most
famous legislative accomplishment.
To date, these grudging McCain supporters
have mounted four Supreme Court
challenges and others in lower courts to
dismantle the landmark 2002 law known as
McCain-Feingold. The legislation, by
McCain and Sen. Russell Feingold (D-Wis.),
made broad changes in federal political
fundraising. Conservative activists have
attacked it since its passage as an
infringement on free speech.
Now, with McCain the apparent Republican
nominee, these same activists have said they
will support McCain but have no intention
of dropping their challenges to the
fundraising law. Their determination to undo
McCain's legislation speaks to the deep fault
lines that divide the Republican base from
McCain-and to the challenges McCain
faces in winning them over.
David Norcross, a former Republican
National Committee general counsel and
lobbyist who backed Mitt Romney earlier,
said he would support McCain "100
percent" while still trying to erase McCain's
campaign finance law from the books.
"Whether he's the nominee, the president or
whatever, those of us who have been in the
trenches are not about to back off," he said.
James Bopp Jr., an RNC member from
Indiana and early Romney supporter, said
that while he continues to challenge
McCain's legislation, he will also work to
deliver McCain to the White House.
"if you want to participate in politics, you
have to be prepared to deal in a world in
which there are imperfect choices," Bopp
said.
Some opponents of the law are still
weighing whether they will support McCain.
David Keating, a longtime conservative
activist who wants McCain-Feingold
overturned, last week called a McCain
presidency "a scary thought." He said
McCain's candidacy looks only narrowly
more palatable than that of his Democratic
opponents.
The McCain-Feingold legislation, known
formally as the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act, infuriated conservative
Republicans because of its ban on "soft
money"-unlimited contributions from
wealthy donors that were funneled through
political parties and into the hands of
political candidates. The law also limited the
ability of special-interest groups to
circumvent contribution limits by buying
their own ads on behalf of candidates or
against their opponents.
While McCain and other advocates
considered the ban crucial, opponents
contended that the measure trampled on free
speech.
Norcross, a trustee with the James Madison
Center, which spent more than $1 million
last year challenging the law, said efforts to
erase McCain's "pernicious" legislation are
gaining momentum. Multiple lawsuits are
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making their way to the Supreme Court, and
two challenges are pending. Bopp is the
center's general counsel.
The Supreme Court has already ruled in two
previous challenges. In 2003, the court
upheld key elements of McCain-Feingold as
constitutional. But President Bush has since
replaced two justices. When the second case
reached the court last year, Chief Justice
John G. Roberts Jr. rendered an opinion that,
by most readings, knocked a critical peg
from the law.
Roberts's ruling said corporate- or union-
financed "issue ads" prohibited by McCain's
legislation were no longer totally off-limits.
"Discussion of issues cannot be suppressed
simply because the issues may also be
pertinent in an election," Roberts wrote.
"Where the First Amendment is implicated,
the tie goes to the speaker, not the censor."
Election law expert Edward B. Foley, a law
professor at Ohio State University, said the
case exposed vulnerabilities in McCain-
Feingold. Bush's replacement of Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor-the key fifth vote in
swatting away the first court challenge-
with Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. has
"absolutely" changed the court's view of the
law, he said.
One matter that will be argued before the
court in April challenges what is sometimes
called the "Millionaires Amendment," a
provision that loosens fundraising
restrictions for candidates running against
wealthy, self-financed opponents.
The court should announce soon whether it
will also hear the case brought by the
makers of Hillary: The Movie who want to
eliminate a provision requiring groups that
finance campaign-related advertising to
disclose donor names.
Fred Wertheimer, who heads the watchdog
group Democracy 21, an architect of
McCain-Feingold, said he recognizes that
with the changes in the court's makeup, new
challenges are likely. But he said he took
solace in the fact that no one has yet
challenged the legislation's core provision-
the soft-money ban.
Even that may change, said Bopp, who has
handled many of the challenges, including
the pending disclosure case. Bopp said he
believes the soft-money ban is "fraught with
the same problems that the rest of the law is
fraught with, which is its breadth."
Bopp said he agreed to support McCain after
the Arizona senator promised to appoint
strict-constructionist judges who are faithful
to the First Amendment.
Since McCain's emergence as the likely
Republican nominee, he has faced pressure
from Bopp and others to clarify his vision
for future Supreme Court appointments and
mollify concerns that campaign finance
would become a litmus test for judicial
appointments.
McCain was put on the defensive by
conservative columnists who said the
senator in a private meeting had questioned
whether Alito was too openly conservative.
McCain, who supported Alito's
confirmation, denied making the statement.
He told the Federalist Society he would
"insist" on judicial nominees such as
Roberts and Alito, who are "faithful to the
Constitution" and "had a record that
demonstrated that fidelity."
Foley called the comment ironic in the
context of McCain's campaign finance
legislation. "It occurred to me that might
contribute to the undoing of his legislative
legacy."
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"Citizens United: Did the Supreme Court Ask for a Briefing to Cure an
Incurable Defect?"
Electionlawblog. org
June 30, 2009
Rick Ilasen
As I noted, the parties in this case have been
asked to address the question: "Should the
Court overrule either or both Austin v.
Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S.
652 (1990), and the part of McConnell v.
Federal Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93
(2003), that addresses the facial validity of
Section 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act of 2002, 2 U.S.C. s441b ...
It is an odd formulation, but the reason for
the formulation may have to do with the
issue I've alluded to yesterday, whether the
question of overruling either case is properly
before the Court. From my review below, it
appears that neither of these questions is
properly before the Court.
This may shed more light on why the case
was reset for argument in September.
Perhaps the five conservatives circulated a
draft overruling either Austin, McConnell or
both, and the would-be dissenters made the
argument that the question was not properly
before the Court. If that's true, it would
make overruling these cases even more
audacious, leading to charges of
conservative "judicial activism."
If this theory is right, the full briefing
ordered by the Court may have been ordered
with the intent to provide some cover for the
overreaching. Supplement briefing will give
the parties a chance to fully brief the
argument now. Nonetheless-and tellingly
the Court did not ask for supplemental
briefing on the question whether the issue of
overruling McConnell and Austin is properly
before the Court-supplemental briefing
cannot cure this defect: If an issue wvas not
raised below or fairly presented in the
jurisdictional statement, the Court should
not decide it. I expect that his argument will
surely figure prominently in any dissent
from a majority opinion overruling Austin,
McConnell, or both.
It is hard to imagine any other reason why
the Court ordered this supplemental briefing
now, rather than decide the case (and,
contrary to Mickey, I think if CJ Roberts
and Justice Alito just wanted to expand the
MCFL exemption, they likely could have
gotten some liberal votes for that, and would
not have needed to set the case for briefing
on a nuclear-type issue).
The rest of this post provides the details on
why these questions are not properly before
the Court. When the case began, a three-
judge court denied Citizens United's request
for a preliminary injunction barring FEC
enforcement of section 203. 530 F.Supp.3d
274 (D.D.C. 2008). On Citizens United's
facial challenge to the law, the court
construed it as an attack on McConnell and
held that it was without power to overrule
McConnell, as it was bound by Supreme
Court precedent. The initial opinion makes
no mention of an attack on Austin. Citizens
United appealed the denial of the
preliminary injunction to the Supreme
Court, which dismissed the appeal. 128 S.Ct.
1732. The three-judge court then granted
summary judgment for the FEC, in a single
paragraph opinion concluding: "Based on
the reasoning of our prior opinion, we find
that the Federal Election Commission is
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entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
2008 WL 2788753 (D.D.C. July 18, 2008).
The Supreme Court agreed to hear an appeal
of the summary judgment decision, 129
S.Ct. 594 (2008).
After the case got to the Supreme Court, CU
changed lawyers (from Jim Bopp to Ted
Olson) and changed strategy, mounting an
attack on Austin. It comes in an odd way, as
part of what it styles an "as applied"
challenge to McConnell. It notes that
McConnell is an "apparent extension" of
Austin and then offers reasons for Austin to
be overruled (see around pages 30-31).
The government's brief gives this argument
the back of its hand. The government begins
by noting that that: "Acceptance of
appellant's argument [to overrule Austin]
would effectively invalidate not only BCRA
Section 203, but also 2 U.S.C. 441b's
prohibition on the use of corporate treasury
funds for express advocacy, as well as any
state-law analogues. Notably, appellant does
not ask this Court to reconsider McConnell's
holding that, if corporate spending on
express advocacy in candidate elections may
be regulated, so may corporate spending that
is the functional equivalent of express
advocacy. Cf. WRTL, 127 S. Ct. at 2686
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment) (advocating, as "modest
medicine," the overruling of only
McConnell's comparatively recent holding
as to nonexpress advocacy). Rather,
appellant seeks to invalidate both forms of
regulation."
The government then states:
Appellant's argument is not properly
before the Court. Although appellant
previously sought to have BCRA
Section 203 declared facially
unconstitutional, see J.A. 24a, it later
abandoned that claim, and the district
court ultimately ordered dismissal of
the relevant count pursuant to the
parties' stipulation. See p. 10, supra.
In addition, appellant's jurisdictional
statement presented only "an as-
applied challenge to *** BCRA s
203." J.S. 5. In setting out the
substantial federal questions that it
believed warranted plenary review,
appellant identified a dispute over
the application of WRTL and a
question about whether Section 203
can be applied to a "feature-length
documentary movie." J.S. i, 24-28.
No issue as to the continuing vitality
of Austin was either "set out" in the
questions presented or "fairly
included therein." Sup. Ct. R. 14.1(a)
(rule for certiorari petitions), 18.3
(applying Rule 14 to jurisdictional
statements).
In any event, this case presents none
of the considerations that might
support a departure from this Court's
customary fidelity to precedent.
Austin has been relied on by the
other branches of the federal
government, especially in crafting
BCRA; by this Court, which applied
Austin in upholding that statute, see
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 203, 205
(explaining that none of the plaintiffs
in that case, which included
appellant, challenged the correctness
of Austin's holding); and by
legislatures and courts considering
state and local campaign-finance
measures. In short, "Congress'
power to prohibit corporations and
unions from using funds in their
treasuries to finance advertisements
expressly advocating the election or
defeat of candidates in federal
elections has been firmly embedded
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in our law." McConnell, 540 U.S. at
203.
Appellant makes virtually no effort
to explain why Austin should be
overruled under "the doctrine of
stare decisis or the Court's cases
elaborating on the circumstances in
which it is appropriate to reconsider
a prior constitutional decision."
Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 263
(2006) (Alito, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
Appellant devotes less than two
pages of its 58-page brief (Br. 30-3 1)
to this issue, and it identifies no
relevant new evidence or other
intervening development that was
unavailable to the Court when Austin
was decided. That "incomplete
presentation" is "reason enough to
refuse" appellant's extraordinary
request to overrule Austin, and as a
consequence the relevant holding of
McConnell as well. Randall, 548
U.S. at 263 (Alito, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
In arguing that Austin was "wrongly
decided" (Br. 30), appellant relies in
part on this Court's subsequent
decision in Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct.
2759 (2008). That ruling, however,
invalidated statutory conditions
placed on a wealthy individual's
expenditure of personal funds in
support of his own candidacy. See id.
at 2766-2767, 2770-2774. The case
therefore did not implicate this
Court's consistent "respect for the
'legislative judgment that the special
characteristics of the corporate
structure require particularly careful
regulation.~' McConnell, 540 U.S. at
205 (quoting National Right to Work
Conm., 459 U.S. at 209-2 10).
Indeed, neither the Court nor the
dissenters in Davis suggested that
there was any inconsistency between
that decision and the prior ruling in
Austin.
Appellant also relies (Br. 30) on
Bellotti, which was decided 12 years
before Austin. But the Court in
Bellotti, while invalidating state-law
restrictions on the use of corporate
funds to influence ballot-question
referenda, explained that its
"consideration of a corporation's
right to speak on issues of general
public interest implies no
comparable right in the quite
different context of participation in a
political campaign for election to
public office." 435 U.S. at 788 n.26.
The Court further observed that
"Congress might well be able to
demonstrate the existence of a
danger or apparent corruption in
independent expenditures by
corporations to influence candidate
elections." Ibid. Far from providing a
basis for overruling Austin, the
decision in Bellotti anticipated the
rationale on which, the Austin Court
later relied.
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"Justices Restrict Corporate Gifts For Politicians"
New York Times
March 28. 1990
Linda Greenhouse
The Supreme Court today upheld the power
of the Federal and state governments to
restrict corporate involvement in political
campaigns.
The Court, which had previously made clear
that corporations might be prohibited from
giving their own funds directly to political
candidates, held that they could also be
barred from spending those funds
independently, as with newspaper
advertisements, on candidates' behalf.
The 6-to-3 decision leaves corporations free
to make political expenditures through their
political action committees, which raise
money from stockholders and corporate
officials.
A Bitterly Divided Court
But the Court, bitterly divided over the
scope of First Amendment protection for
political expression by corporations, upheld
provisions of a Michigan campaign finance
law prohibiting corporations from spending
money from their own treasuries. Federal
election law and the laws of 20 other states
have similar prohibitions.
The decision today was the first time the
Court has upheld a prohibition on the
independent expenditure of funds for
political campaigns-that is, spending made
independently of a candidate's organization.
A Federal appeals court ruled in 1988 that
the Michigan prohibition violated the First
Amendment's guarantee of free speech. In
his opinion overturning that ruling today,
Justice Thurgood Marshall said the state had
a "compelling rationale" for placing limits
on "the corrosive and distorting effects of
immense aggregations of wealth that are
accumulated with the help of the corporate
form."
Right to Political Expression
The Michigan Chamber of Commerce,
which challenged the Michigan law, argued
that the right of its member companies to
political expression was not adequately
protected by the alternative of setting up
political action committees.
Under both state and Federal law, these
committees are strictly limited in the
contributors from whom they can raise
money and in the amounts they can spend.
The organization's 8,000 members sought
the right to spend ordinary corporate funds
in the political arena.
Previous decisions by the Court have upheld
limits on direct contributions to candidates
but have applied a different analysis to
spending that is not directed by the
campaign.
Recent Decisions Cited
The Court has ruled that such expenditures
by individuals are an aspect of political
speech that cannot be barred under the First
Amendment. But the Court had not directly
confronted the question of independent
expenditures by corporations.
Some previous opinions had indicated that
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limits on corporate political spending would
be upheld. But in a recent series of decisions
dealing with "corporate speech," the Court
has accorded corporations a substantial
measure of First Amendment protection
without indicating what distinctions it might
ultimately find between the rights of
individuals and the rights of corporations.
So today's decision was significant, beyond
the realm of campaign finance, in
announcing an apparent stopping point for
the corporate speech doctrine.
Strong Dissenting Opinions
That aspect of the decision drew strong
dissenting opinions. In a dissent joined by
Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Antonin
Scalia, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy said:
"The Court's hostility to the corporate form
used by the speaker in this case and its
assertion that corporate wealth is the evil to
be regulated is far too imprecise to justify
the most severe restriction on political
speech ever sanctioned by this Court."
Justice Scalia wrote a separate dissenting
opinion. He read portions of it from the
bench this morning, a step that Justices take
only rarely to emphasize the depth of their
conviction that the majority has erred.
He said the Court had failed to justify
permitting restrictions on corporate spending
that it had refused to permit on political
spending by individuals.
"The fact that corporations amass large
treasuries," Justice Scalia said, is "not
sufficient justification for the suppression of
political speech unless one thinks it would
be lawful to prohibit men and women whose
net worth is above a certain figure from
endorsing political candidates."
Ideological Lines Blurred
As in earlier disputes over campaign
financing, this case, Austin v. Michigan
State Chamber of Commerce, No. 88-1569,
blurred the usual ideological lines both on
the Court and among the groups that filed
briefs expressing their views.
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist joined
Justice Marshall's majority opinion, as did
Justices William J. Brennan Jr., Harry A.
Blackmun, Byron R. White and John Paul
Stevens. Chief Justice Rehnquist did not
write a separate opinion, but in earlier cases
he has supported strong state regulation of
corporations.
Common Cause, a public affairs lobby that
has pressed for campaign financing
restrictions, and the Federal Election
Commission filed briefs in support of the
Michigan law.
The Michigan Chamber of Commerce was
supported by a wide array of organizations,
including the American Civil Liberties
Union, which has long viewed most
campaign financing restrictions as
unconstitutional, and the American Medical
Association. The National Organization for
Woman, Planned Parenthood and the
National Right to Work Committee were
among the nonprofit corporations submitting
a joint brief in support of the Chamber of
Commerce.
Regulation Dates to 1907
Federal limits on political spending by
corporations date to a 1907 law, the Tillman
Act, passed at a time of growing concern
about the ability of railroads and other big
companies to buy influence in the political
process. While regulation has ebbed and
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flowed since then, it was not until today that
constitutional doubts about limits on
corporate political spending were resolved.
Three years ago the Court invalidated the
Federal campaign spending limits as applied
to a small Massachusetts anti-abortion
group, ruling that the group's First
Amendment right to advocate its views
publicly outweighed the Government's
interest in regulating its political
expenditures.
The United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit, which struck down the
Michigan law, based its decision largely on
that Supreme Court ruling, Federal Election
Commission v. Massachusells Citizens for
Life. But in his opinion today, Justice
Marshall said the decision in the
Massachusetts case was limited to
organizations that, while organized as
corporations, were distinguished by their
"narrow political focus" and lack of
connections to the world of business.
Justice Brennan, who wrote the opinion in
the Massachusetts case, filed a separate
concurring opinion today, noting that the
earlier ruling was intended to apply only to a
small category of corporations.
The Michigan Chamber of Commerce filed
a lawsuit challenging the state law in 1985.
The organization wanted to buy advertising
endorsing a candidate in a state legislative
election but, fearing prosecution, went to
Federal District Court seeking a ruling that
the law was unconstitutional. The court
upheld the law in 1986 and was in turn
reversed by the Court of Appeals.
Besides Michigan, the other states that
prohibit direct corporate campaign spending
are Alabama, Connecticut, Iowa, Kentucky,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, New
Hampshire, New York, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, West Virginia, Wisconsin and
Wyoming.
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"Justices Uphold Campaign Finance Law"
ffashington Post
December 1 1, 2003
Charles Lane
The Supreme Court endorsed the key
provisions of the McCain-Feingold
campaign finance law yesterday, issuing a
strong affirmation of Congress's authority to
regulate the flow of money in politics.
Rejecting opponents' claims that McCain-
Feingold stifles free speech, a slender but
emphatic five-justice majority upheld both
the law's ban on "soft money"-unregulated
donations to the parties from wealthy
individuals, corporations and unions-and
its new rules limiting campaign-season
political advertising.
The majority ruled that both parts of the
statute were appropriately designed to
combat a widespread and well-founded
perception that large donors exercise undue
influence over government.
The majority's main opinion, written by
Justices John Paul Stevens and Sandra Day
O'Connor, said the law effectively confronts
"the danger that officeholders will decide
issues not on the merits or the desires of
their constituencies, but according to the
wishes of those who have made large
financial contributions valued by the
officeholder."
The court's surprisingly unambiguous
reading of a dizzyingly complex statute
crowned a movement for campaign finance
change that had been energized both by
allegations of favoritism by the Clinton
White House toward soft-money donors and
by the Enron Corp. scandal surrounding the
current Bush administration. The movement
culminated last year in passage of what is
formally known as the
Reform Act (BCRA)
President Bush.
Bipartisan Campaign
and its signing by
Yesterday's ruling, delivered on an
expedited basis after the justices returned
early from their summer recess in September
to hear oral argument in the case, removed
lingering uncertainty about the impact of
McCain-Feingold on the 2004 presidential
election campaign, ensuring that virtually
the entire law will remain in force through
next year-and beyond.
So strongly did the majority back the law
that the main opinion often echoed not only
the reasoning but also the language of the
law's sponsors, Sens. John McCain (R-
Ariz.) and Russell Feingold (D-Wis.) and
Reps. Martin T. Meehan (D-Mass.) and
Christopher Shays (R-Conn.).
Stevens and O'Connor wrote of the need to
"plug the soft money loophole" in existing
campaign law, of pernicious "sham issue
advocacy" paid for by shadowy donors and
of the parties' "peddling" access to federal
lawmakers.
In the face of these problems, the BCRA
was a "modest" law that would have "only a
marginal impact on political speech," the
majority ruled.
Stevens and O'Connor noted that "in
considering Congress' most recent effort to
confine the ill effects of aggregated wealth
on our political system," the majority was
"under no illusion that BCRA will be the
last congressional statement on the matter.
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Money, like water, will always find an
outlet. What problems wN ill arise, and how
Congress will respond, are concerns for
another day. In the main we uphold BCRA's
two principal, complementary features: the
control of soft money and the regulation of
electioneering communications."
Stevens and O'Connor were joined by
Justices David H. Souter, Ruth Bader
Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer.
"This opinion represents a landmark victory
for the American people in the effort to
reform their political system," McCain,
Feingold, Meehan and Shays said in a
statement.
Through it all, the law has been opposed by
lawmakers and interest groups, from Sen.
Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) on the right to the
AFL-CIO labor federation on the left. They
argue that its restrictions on the free flow of
cash will stifle the free flow of political
ideas that money pays for.
"We believe the Court has moved in a
deeply troubling direction that could chill
important and worthwhile public expression
and activity," the AFL-CIO said in a
statement.
In the end, those concerns were shared by
only four members of the court: Chief
Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices
Antonin Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy and
Clarence Thomas.
"This is a sad day for the freedom of
speech," Scalia wrote in a dissenting
opinion. Ticking off a list of recent free-
speech decisions by the court, Scalia added:
"Who could have imagined that the same
Court which, within the past four years, has
sternly disapproved of restrictions upon ...
virtual child pornography, tobacco
advertising, dissemination of illegally
intercepted communications and sexually
explicit cable programming would smile
with favor upon a law that cuts to the heart
of what the First Amendment is meant to
protect: the right to criticize the
government."
Whereas the majority said it was showing
"proper deference" to Congress's judgment
"in an area in which it enjoys particular
expertise," the dissenters turned that
argument on its head, arguing that Congress
had enacted McCain-Feingold largely
because it stacks the political deck in favor
of incumbents.
In upholding McCain-Feingold's ban on the
parties' raising and spending of soft money,
the court also backed a ban on state parties'
using soft money to fund activities that are
ostensibly directed to voter registration or
state campaigns but also influence federal
elections; a prohibition on national and state
parties' funneling soft money to tax-exempt
organizations that engage in campaign
activity; and regulations on federal and state
candidates and officeholders' use of soft
money in connection with certain election-
related activities.
These provisions were consistent with the
court's ruling in its last landmark campaign
decision, the 1976 Buckley v. Valeo case,
which upheld limitations on political
contributions, the majority ruled. They were
indeed necessary if those limitations were to
have any meaning, the majority ruled.
"The main goal of the [soft-money ban] is
modest," Stevens and O'Connor wrote. "In
large part, it simply effects a return to the
scheme that was approved in Buckley and
that was subverted by" subsequent
interpretations of the law by the Federal
Election Commission. The FEC permitted
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political parties to fund federal campaigns
with a combination of soft money and "hard
money," cash raised in accordance with
disclosure rules and contribution limits.
This part of the decision had been widely
expected by legal analysts. More innovative
legally, however, was the majority's
conclusion that McCain-Feingold's
limitations on "issue ads" pass constitutional
muster.
The statute defines a new category of
"electioneering communications"-
basically, television and radio ads that
mention a federal candidate during the run-
up to a primary or general election.
It then requires such communications to be
paid for only with money raised and spent in
accordance with federal disclosure rules and
limitations on individual donations.
No soft money could be used to pay for the
ads. Instead, corporations, unions or interest
groups would have to set up federally
regulated political action committees and
pay for the ads through those.
This part of McCain-Feingold was meant to
overcome Buckley, which had said that the
government could regulate the financing
only of ads that "expressly advocated" the
election or defeat of a candidate through the
use of "vote for," "vote against" or similar
direct language.
McCain-Feingold advocates said that this
part of Buckley had turned into a huge
loophole that permitted often unaccountable
groups to sponsor "sham issue ads" in the
waning days of a campaign that were
obviously aimed at candidates.
Federal appeals courts and the Supreme
Court had hewed to the "express advocacy"
definition in the past, but yesterday the court
said the McCain-Feingold definition was
consistent with Buckley.
Stevens and O'Connor wrote that "although
the . . . advertisements do not urge the
viewer to vote for or against a candidate in
so many words, they are no less clearly
intended to influence the election."
The majority brushed aside concerns that the
provision would sweep too broadly and
discourage genuine discussion of issues as
well as disguised campaign ads.
The vote on this point showed the pivotal
role in the case of two justices, Rehnquist
and O'Connor.
The chief justice had supported a Michigan
ban on corporate-sponsored campaign ads in
a 1990 case-an act that had led McCain-
Feingold advocates to speculate he would
vote with them this time.
But Rehnquist, who had indicated during
oral argument in September that he was
reconsidering his 1990 vote, dissented on
the issue ad provision yesterday.
His vote was offset, however, by O'Connor,
who had dissented in the 1990 case, yet
supported the issue ad provision yesterday.
In his dissenting opinion, Kennedy called
the provision "a new and serious intrusion
on speech."
The court also upheld provisions of the law
that require election ads to identify the
candidate or other person who sponsors
them and that require broadcasters to keep
publicly available records of all requests to
purchase broadcast time for political
communications.
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The vote was 8 to I on the first of those
provisions, with Thomas dissenting. The
vote was 5 to 4 on the second, with the same
justices in the majority as on the soft-money
ban and issue-ad provisions.
By a 6 to 3 vote, with Stevens, Ginsburg and
Breyer dissenting, the court let stand a
provision that offers cheaper air time to
candidates who pledge not to use "attack
ads" against their opponents. The court
could not rule on the provision, Rehnquist
wrote, because McConnell, who had sued to
stop it, would not be subject to it until his
reelection campaign in 2008.
And by a 9 to 0 vote, the court upheld
provisions of McCain-Feingold that raised
the maximum allowable campaign donations
and indexed them for inflation. By the same
vote, it ruled that opponents lacked standing
to challenge the "millionaire's provisions"
that permit candidates running against
wealthy opponents to receive campaign
money in larger chunks than otherwise
permitted. That issue would have to be
litigated in another case.
There were only two minor exceptions to the
courtfs ruling that McCain-Feingold is
constitutional.
By a vote of 9 to 0, the court struck down a
provision that would have required political
parties to choose between making unlimited
independent expenditures or limited
coordinated expenditures in support of their
nominees.
And, also unanimously, the court struck
down a provision that would have prohibited
minors from donating to parties or
campaigns.
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United States v. Stevens
08-769
Ruling Below: UnitedStates v. Stevens, 533 F.3d 218 (3rd Cir. 2008)
Respondent sold videos of pit bulls engaged in dogfights and attacks on other animals. le was
prosecuted and found guilty of violating a federal law prohibiting the creation or sale of videos
depicting cruelty against animals. The law was designed to combat the sale of so-called "crush
videos," which depict women stepping on and torturing small animals, appealing to a very
specific sexual fetish. Stevens challenged his conviction on First Amendment grounds in the
Third Circuit. The Third Circuit reversed Stevens's conviction.
Question Presented: Is 18 U.S.C. § 48's ban on the creation and distribution of depictions of
animal cruelty valid under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment?
UNITED STATES of America, Petitioner,
V.
Robert J. STEVENS, Respondent.
Third Circuit
Filed July 18, 2008
[Excerpt: some footnotes and citations omitted]
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
The Supreme Court has not recognized a
new category of speech that is unprotected
by the First Amendment in over twenty-five
years. Nonetheless, in this case the
Government invites this Court to take just
such a step in order to uphold the
constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 48 and to
affirm Robert Stevens' conviction. For the
reasons that follow, we decline the
Government's invitation. Moreover, because
we agree with Stevens that 18 U.S.C. § 48 is
an unconstitutional infringement on free
speech rights guaranteed by the First
Amendment, we will vacate his conviction.
I.
[Stevens was indicted in 2004 for knowingly
selling depictions of animal cruelty with the
intention of placing them in interstate
commerce, violating 18 U.S.C. § 48. The
charges arose out of an investigation by
federal and Pennsylvania law enforcement
agents who discovered Stevens selling the
videos out of his Virginia residence.
Stevens moved to dismiss his case on the
basis that § 48 violated his free speech
rights, but the District Court denied his
motion. Stevens was convicted on each of
the three counts in the indictment.]
II.
Stevens' case is the first prosecution in the
nation under § 48 to proceed to trial, and this
appeal represents the first substantive
constitutional evaluation of the statute by a
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federal appellate court.
[The court quotes the language from § 48.]
Resort here to some legislative history is
instructive, not as a device to help us
construe or interpret the statute, but rather to
demonstrate the statute's breadth as written
compared to what may originally have been
intended. The legislative history for § 48
indicates that the primary conduct that
Congress sought to address through its
passage was the creation, sale, or possession
of -crush videos." [The court defines crush
videos as fetish videos depicting women
inflicting torture on animals.
These videos never show the woman's face
and make it difficult to prove jurisdiction in
state-law claims or that the acts occurred
within state statute of limitations.
The discussions in the House and Senate
focused on § 48 as a tool to eliminate the
crush videos.]
Yet, the government interests identified in
the House Committee Report in support of
§ 48 do not focus on crush videos. The
primary interest identified there is the
federal government's interest in "regulating
the treatment of animals." Similarly, the
House Report states that the Government
has an interest in discouraging individuals
from becoming desensitized to animal
violence generally, because that may serve
to deter future antisocial behavior toward
human beings.
This broader focus on animal cruelty is
consistent with the text of § 48 and it is also
reflected in the House Report's discussion of
why the speech that § 48 targets should be
deemed outside the protection of the First
Amendment. The Report concedes that § 48
is a content-based restriction, but states that
the harm it would address, by reducing
cruelty to animals, "so outweighs the
expressive interest, if any, at stake, that the
materials [prohibited by § 481 may be
prohibited as a class." The Report
minimizes the expressive interest of any
speech prohibited by the statute because
"[b]y the very terms of the statute, material
depicting cruelty to animals that has serious
utility -whether it be religious, political,
scientific, educational, journalistic, historic,
or artistic-falls outside the reach of the
statute."
III.
The Government does not allege that
Stevens participated in the interstate
transport of "crush videos." Nor does the
Government allege that the videos Stevens
sold contained prurient material. The
Government also concedes that § 48
constitutes a content-based restriction on
speech. Nonetheless, the Government argues
that the type of speech regulated by § 48
falls outside First Amendment protection.
By doing so, the Government asks us to
create a new category of unprotected speech.
. . . As shown below, the statute cannot
withstand [a] heightened level of scrutiny.
[The court condemns animal cruelty, but
states that § 48 is not a prohibition of animal
cruelty.] Rather, § 48 prohibits the creation,
sale, or possession of a depiction of animal
cruelty. That regulating a depiction has First
Amendment implications is obvious. We
begin, then, with the Government's
contention that the depictions of animal
cruelty restricted by 18 U.S.C. § 48 qualify
as categorically unprotected speech.
A. § 48 Regulates Protected Speech
It has been two and a half decades since the
Supreme Court last declared an entire
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category of speech unprotected. See New
York v. Ferber, 458 US 747 (1982)
(holding that child pornography depicting
actual children is not protected speech).
Other types of speech that are categorically
unprotected include: fighting words, threats,
speech that imminently incites illegal
activity, and obscenity. The common theme
among these cases is that the speech at issue
constitutes a grave threat to human beings
or, in the case of obscenity, appeals to the
prurient interest.
The Government acknowledges that the
speech at issue in this case does not fall
under one of the traditionally unprotected
classes. The Government argues, however,
that these categories may be supplemented.
That, in itself, is an unassailable proposition.
But, we disagree with the suggestion that the
speech at issue here can appropriately be
added on the extremely narrow class of
speech that is unprotected. Out of these
categories, only Ferber is even remotely
similar to the type of speech regulated by
§ 48. Recognizing this difficulty, the
Government attempts to analogize between
the depiction of animal cruelty and the
depiction of child pornography. That attempt
simply cannot carry the day.
[In Ferber, the Supreme Court upheld a
New York statute banning child
pornography,] holding that the statute was
constitutional because child pornography,
whether obscene or not, is unprotected by
the First Amendment. In reaching that
conclusion, the Court cited five factors
favoring the creation of a new category of
unprotected speech:
1. The State has a "compelling"
interest in "safeguarding the physical
well-being of a minor."
2. Child pornography is "intrinsically
related to the sexual abuse of
children in at least two ways. First,
the materials produced are a
permanent record of the children's
participation and the harm to the
child is exacerbated by their
circulation. Second, the distribution
network for child pornography must
be closed in order to control the
production of child pornography.
The Court explained that the
production of child pornography is a
"low-profile, clandestine industry"
and that the "most expeditious if not
the only practical method of law
enforcement may be to dry up the
market for this material" by
punishing its use.
3. "The advertising and selling
child pornography provide
economic motive for and are thus
integral part of the production"
child pornography.
of
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4. The possibility that there would be
any material of value that would be
prohibited under the category of
child pornography is "exceedingly
modest, if not de minimis."
5. Banning full categories of speech
is an accepted approach in First
Amendment law and is therefore
appropriate in this instance.
Without guidance from the Supreme Court,
a lower federal court should hesitate before
extending the logic of Ferber to other types
of speech. The reasoning that supports
Ferber has never been used to create whole
categories of unprotected speech outside of
the child pornography context. Furthermore,
Ferber appears to be on the margin of the
Supreme Court's unprotected speech
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jurisprudence. Part of what locates child
pornography on the margin as an un-
protected speech category is the conflation
of the underlying act with its depiction. By
criminalizing the depiction itself, "[c]hild
pornography law has collapsed the
'speech/action' distinction that occupies a
central role in First Amendment law[,]" and
"is the only place in First Amendment law
where the Supreme Court has accepted the
idea that we can constitutionally criminalize
the depiction of a crime." Child
pornography contrasts with other categories
of unprotected speech that share a much
closer nexus between speech and an
unlawful action that proximately results
from the unprotected speech. For these
reasons, we are unwilling to extend the
rationale of Ferber beyond the regulation of
child pornography without express direction
from the Supreme Court.
Even assuming that Ferber may, in limited
circumstances and without Supreme Court
guidance, be applied to other categories of
speech, 18 U.S.C. § 48 does not qualify for
such treatment. The Court cited five bases in
Ferber for upholding the anti-child
pornography law. The reasoning does not
translate well to the animal cruelty realm.
We address the five-factor rationale in its
entirety, although the first factor is the most
important because, under Ferber, if the
Government's interest is not compelling,
then this type of statute necessarily violates
the First Amendment.
1. First Ferber Factor
The compelling government interest inquiry
at issue here overlaps with the strict scrutiny
analysis discussed presently. No matter how
appealing the cause of the animal protection
is to our sensibilities we hesitate-in the
First Amendment context-to elevate it to
the status of a compelling interest.
Three reasons give us pause to conclude that
"preventing cruelty to animals" rises to a
compelling government interest that trumps
an individual's free speech rights. First, the
Supreme Court has suggested that the kind
of government interest at issue in § 48 is not
compelling. The Supreme Court in Lukumi
held that city ordinances that outlawed
animal sacrifices could not be upheld based
on the city's assertion that protecting
animals was a compelling government
interest. The Government contends that
Lukumi is inapplicable to a compelling
government interest analysis.
When we consider Lukumi along with the
fact that the Supreme Court has not
expanded the extremely limited number of
unprotected speech categories in a
generation, the only conclusion we are left
with is that we-as a lower federal court-
should not create a new category when the
Supreme Court has hinted at its hesitancy to
do so on this same topic.
Second, while the Supreme Court has not
always been crystal clear as to what
constitutes a compelling interest in free
speech cases, it rarely finds such an interest
for content-based restrictions. When it has
done so, the interest has-without
exception-related to the well-being of
human beings, not animals. When looking at
these cases, as well as the interests at issue
in the unprotected speech categories, it is
difficult to see how § 48 serves a compelling
interest that represents "a government
objective of surpassing importance."
Similarly, and even more fatal to the
Government's position, because the statute
does not regulate the underlying act of
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animal cruelty-which must be a crime
under state or federal law in order to trigger
§ 48-we can see no persuasive argument
that such a statute serves a compelling
government interest. While the statute at
issue in Ferber also prohibited the
distribution of the depiction of sexual
performances by children under the age of
16, the Supreme Court went to great lengths
to cabin its discussion of the depiction/act
conflation because of the special role that
children play in our society. Preventing
cruelty to animals, although an exceedingly
worthy goal, simply does not implicate
interests of the same magnitude as
protecting children from physical and
psychological harm.
Third, there is not a sufficient link between
§ 48 and the interest in "preventing cruelty
to animals." . . . Section 48 does nothing to
regulate the underlying conduct that is
already illegal under state laws. Rather, it
regulates only the depiction of the conduct.
In order to serve the purported compelling
government interest of preventing animal
cruelty, the regulation of these depictions
must somehow aid in the prevention of
cruelty to animals. With this depiction/act
distinction in mind, it seems appropriate to
recast the compelling government interest as
"preventing cruelty to animals that state and
federal statutes directly regulating animal
cruelty under-enforce." The House
Committee Report for § 48 stated that the
statute targeted the depiction rather than the
act because under-enforcement of state
animal cruelty laws is a particular problem
in the crush video industry. The Report
approvingly cited witnesses who testified to
this effect. Consistent with these findings,
the Government states that "as a practical
matter, it is nearly impossible to identify the
persons involved in the acts of cruelty or the
place where the acts occurred." While this
justification is plausible for crush videos, it
is meaningless when evaluating § 48 as
written. By its term, the statute applies
without regard to whether the identities of
individuals in a depiction, or the location of
a depiction's production, are obscured.
The Government also argues that § 48
indirectly serves to deter future animal
cruelty and other antisocial behavior by
discouraging individuals from becoming
desensitized to animal violence. As support
for its position, the Government approvingly
cited the House Committee Report, which
cited research that -suggest[ed] that violent
acts committed by humans may be the result
of a long pattern of perpetrating abuse,
which 'often begins with the torture and
killing of animals."'
We read this passage to mean that, by
broadly prohibiting these depictions of
animal cruelty, the drafters of the House
Committee Report believed that fewer
individuals will see and make such
depictions and therefore not be subject to
this desensitization.
This reasoning is insufficient to override
First Amendment protections for content-
based speech restrictions. The Supreme
Court has rejected a similar argument in the
context of virtual child pornography. . . .
When balanced against First Amendment
rights, the "mere tendency of speech to
encourage unlawful acts is not a sufficient
reason for banning it." . . .
For these reasons, we fail to see how 18
U.S.C. § 48 serves a compelling government
interest.
2. Second Ferber Factor
The second factor in the Ferber rationale,
that child pornography is "intrinsically
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related to the sexual abuse of children," is a
similarly weak position for the Government
to rely upon in this case. In Ferber, the
Court reasoned that child pornography
should be banned, in part, because the
pornographic material continues to harm the
children involved even after the abuse has
taken place. While animals are sentient
creatures worthy of human kindness and
human care, one cannot seriously contend
that the animals themselves suffer
continuing harm by having their images out
in the marketplace....
3. Third Ferber Factor
Both the second and third Ferber factors
assert that the distribution network for child
pornography must be closed so that the
production of child pornography will
decrease. This drying-up-the-market theory,
based on decreasing production, is
potentially apt in the animal cruelty context.
However, there is no empirical evidence in
the record to confirm that the theory is valid
in this circumstance. Indeed, the fact that
most dog fights are conducted at live venues
and produce significant gambling revenue
suggests that the production of tapes such as
those at issue in this case does not serve as
the primary economic motive for the
underlying animal cruelty the Government
purports to target. Moreover, standing alone
this factor sweeps so broadly it should not
be deployed to justify extracting an entire
category of speech from First Amendment
protections. Restriction of the depiction of
almost any activity can work to dry up, or at
least restrain, the activity's market.
4. Fourth Ferber Factor
The fourth Ferber factor is that the value of
the prohibited speech is "exceedingly
modest, if not de minimis." The Government
finds support for the low value of the speech
restricted by the Act by pointing to the
exceptions clause of 18 U.S.C. § 48(b).
Section (b) states that the Act "does not
apply to any depiction that has serious
religious, political, scientific, educational,
journalistic, historical, or artistic value." . . .
The exceptions clause cannot on its own
constitutionalize § 48. The exceptions clause
in this case is a variation of the third prong
of the Miller obscenity test. This prong asks
"whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value." Miller v. California, 413
US.15, 24 (1973)....
This type of exceptions clause has not been
applied in non-prurient unprotected speech
cases, and taking it out of this context
ignores the essential framework of the
Miller test. Congress and the Government
would have the statute operate in such a way
as to permit the restriction of otherwise
constitutional speech so long as part of the
statute allows for an exception for speech
that has "serious value." The problem with
this view is twofold. First, outside of
patently offensive speech that appeals to the
prurient interest, the First Amendment does
not require speech to have serious value in
order for it to fall under the First
Amendment umbrella. What this view
overlooks is the great spectrum between
speech utterly without social value and high
value speech. Second, if the mere appendage
of an exceptions clause serves to
constitutionalize § 48, it is difficult to
imagine what category of speech the
Government could not regulate through
similar statutory engineering. That is not a
road down which this Court is willing to
proceed.
In sum, the speech restricted by 18 U.S.C.
§ 48 is protected by the First Amendment.
The attempted analogy to Ferber fails
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because of the inherent differences between
children and animals. Those profound
differences require no further explication
here.
B. § 48 Cannot Survive Heightened Scrutiny
Because the speech encompassed by § 48
does not qualify as unprotected speech, it
must survive a heightened form of scrutiny.
A content-based restriction on speech is
"presumed invalid," and the Government
bears the burden of showing its
constitutionality. One scholar notes that "a
majority of the Court has never sustained a
regulation that was strictly scrutinized for
content discrimination reasons."
We have already shown why § 48 does not
serve a compelling government interest, thus
failing strict scrutiny. Because of the
peculiarities of this statute, though, we
briefly discuss the relationship between § 48
and the strict scrutiny analysis. The Supreme
Court's free speech jurisprudence regarding
content-based restrictions on speech in the
first instance appears simple to apply. First,
is the speech protected or unprotected? If the
speech is unprotected, then Congress can
regulate fairly easily. If the speech is
protected, does the statute survive strict
scrutiny? In practice, as pointed out
previously, this heightened level of scrutiny
nearly always results in the statute being
invalidated. At the risk of complicating this
parsimonious two-tiered structure, we note
that federalism concerns illustrate the
difficulties with the strict scrutiny analysis.
The problem lies in defining the compelling
government interest when Congress does not
have the constitutional power to regulate an
area that has traditionally been governed by
state statutes. When federalism concerns
arise, the "least restrictive means" analysis
necessarily informs the "compelling
government interest" analysis. The stated
governmental interest in 18 U.S.C. § 48 is to
"prevent cruelty to animals." Taking
federalism concerns into account, the
interest stated in this manner is too broad.
Absent demonstration of the requisite
impact on commerce which is absent on this
record, Congress does not have the
constitutional authority to pass the types of
animal cruelty statutes that are seen in the
fifty states and the District of Columbia. It is
for this reason that we have suggested that
the compelling government interest should
be redefined as "preventing cruelty to
animals that state and federal statutes
directly regulating animal cruelty under-
enforce." And once this reformulation of the
interest targeted by § 48 is accepted, we do
not see how a sound argument can be made
that the Free Speech Clause is outweighed
by a statute whose primary purpose is to aid
in the enforcement of an already
comprehensive state and federal anti-animal-
cruelty regime. Conversely, if we agree with
the Government that the compelling
government interest is "preventing cruelty to
animals," then we do not see how a sound
argument can be made that § 48 is narrowly
tailored and uses the least restrictive means.
The Supreme Court routinely strikes down
content-based restrictions on speech on the
narrow tailoring/least restrictive means
prong of strict scrutiny. Accepting for a
moment that Government's interest is
"preventing cruelty to animals," then § 48 is
not narrowly tailored.
First, with respect to the reach of the
Commerce Clause, § 48 does not prohibit
any depictions-including crush videos-
that are made solely for personal rather than
interstate commercial use. . . . Accordingly,
if we accept that the government interest
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served by § 48 is to prevent animal cruelty,
the statute is-by its very terms-under-
inclusiVe.
. . If the government interest is to prevent
acts of animal cruelty, the statute's
criminalization of depictions that were legal
in the geographic region where they were
produced makes § 48 overinclusive.
Third, the second Ferber factor implicitly
addressed the fit between regulating the
depiction of a behavior with preventing that
behavior. Specifically, the Supreme Court
stated that "the distribution network for
child pornography must be closed if the
production of material which requires the
sexual exploitation of children is to be
effectively controlled." To the extent that
this aspect of the intrinsic relationship
between banned speech and the harm to be
prevented applies to § 48, it applies to a
lesser degree, and the arguments by the
Government in support of this analogy fall
flat. The Government first asserts that, as is
true in the case of child pornography, the
actors and producers of crush videos and
other speech banned by § 48-i.e., the
perpetrators of the underlying acts of animal
cruelty-are very difficult to find and
prosecute for those underlying acts. This is
true as to crush videos because the only
person typically onscreen is the "actress,"
and only her legs or feet are typically
shown. However, as demonstrated by
Stevens' prosecution, crush videos
constitute only a portion of the speech
banned by the terms of § 48. Prosecution of
this sliver of the speech covered by § 48
could not, by itself, justify banning all of the
speech covered by the statute.
As to dog fighting, the Government argues
that the camera typically focuses on the
dogs, with their "handlers" being shown
mostly from the waist or elbows down, and
it is often difficult to determine when and
wN here such fights occur for purposes of the
statute of limitations and other enforcement
matters. At least with respect to the videos at
issue in this case. we find the Government's
argument empirically inaccurate. It is true
that in the first video, "Pick-A-Winna,"
much of the footage is old, but the faces of
the individuals involved are sometimes quite
clear. In the second video, "Japan Pit
Fights," the fights take place in Japan, where
dog fighting is apparently legal and
prosecution of those individuals for those
particular acts of animal cruelty could not be
pursued. The third video, "Catch Dogs,"
primarily features footage of dogs hunting
and subduing wild hogs and being trained to
do so. This video gives the name and
address of a catch dog supplier, and also
takes the viewer on several hunting trips
with these dogs. There is no effort to
conceal any of the faces of the people in the
video, and Stevens at several points
mentions their names and the location of the
hunts. In short, the research and empirical
evidence in the record before us simply does
not support the notion that banning
depictions of animal cruelty is a necessary
or even particularly effective means of
prosecuting the underlying acts of animal
cruelty. Much less is it the "most
expeditious" or the "only practical method"
of prosecuting such acts, as is the case
within the realm of child pornography and
child sexual abuse.
For these reason, § 48 is not narrowly
tailored using the least restrictive means.
IV.
"When the Government restricts speech, the
Government bears the burden of proving the
constitutionality of its actions." The
Government has not met this burden.
Therefore, we will strike down 18 U.S.C.
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§ 48 as constitutionally infirm because it
constitutes an impermissible infringement
on free speech. In light of this conclusion,
we will vacate Robert Stevens' conviction.
DISSENT
COWEN, Circuit Judge, dissenting with
whom FUENTES and FISHER, Circuit
Judges join
The majority today declares that the
Government can have no compelling interest
in protecting animals from intentional and
wanton acts of physical harm, and in doing
so invalidates as unconstitutional a federal
statute targeting the distribution and
trafficking of depictions of these senseless
acts of animal cruelty. Because we cannot
agree, in light of the overwhelming body of
law across the nation aimed at eradicating
animal abuse, that the Government's interest
in ensuring the humane treatment of animals
is anything less than of paramount
importance, and because we conclude the
speech prohibited by 18 U.S.C. §48 to be of
such minimal socially redeeming value that
its restriction may be affected consistent
with the First Amendment, we respectfully
dissent.
I.
a.
In discussing the contours of permissible
content-based regulations, the Supreme
Court has explained speech may be
restricted when its "utterances are no
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and
are of such slight social value as a step to
truth that any benefit that may be derived
from them is clearly outweighed by the
social interest in order and morality." . . .
Justice Brennan, in his concurrence in
Ferber, isolated the salient features: "[T]he
limited classes of speech. the suppression of
which does not raise serious First
Amendment concerns, have two attributes.
They are of exceedingly 'slight social
value,' and the State has a compelling
interest in their regulation." These
statements establish the constitutional floor:
for speech to be unprotected, at a bare
minimum, its value must be plainly
outweighed by the Government's asserted
interest. The speech in this case shares those
repeatedly emphasized features.
1.
We agree with the Government that its
interest in preventing animal cruelty is
compelling. The importance of this interest
is readily apparent from the expansive
regulatory framework that has been
developed by state and federal legislatures to
address the problem. These laws serve to
protect not only the animals, but also the
individuals who would commit the cruelty,
and more generally, the morals of society.
Our nation's aversion to animal cruelty is
deep-seated. [The dissenting judges
recounted the history of anti-animal cruelty
laws in America.] The fact that many states
have taken the additional step of
empowering local humane societies to
directly enforce anti-cruelty laws further
highlights the ardor with which our society
seeks to prevent cruelty.
[The dissenting judges discuss laws enacted
to protect animals, arguing that the large
body of law shows that the government has
a compelling interest in protecting animals.]
Our nation has extended solicitude to
animals from an early date, and has now
established a rich tapestry of laws protecting
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animals from the cruelty we so abhor. This
interest has nested itself so deeply into the
core of our society-because the interest
protects the animals themsevles, humans,
and public mores-that it warrants being
labeled compelling.
Notwithstanding the majority's assertion,
the Supreme Court in no way suggested to
the contrary in Church of the Lukumi Babalu
Aye, Incorporated v. City! of Hialeah. . . .
[T]he ordinances there failed not because
preventing cruelty to animals was not a
sufficiently paramount interest to be deemed
compelling; rather. the Court found that the
ordinances were so riddled with exceptions
exempting all other killings except those
practiced by Santeria adherents betrayed that
the real rationale behind the prohibitions
was an unconstitutional suppression of
religion. Indeed, Justice Blackmun was
explicit in rejecting the majority's instant
characterization of the decision. . . . Thus,
Lukumi does not contradict our conclusion
that preventing animal cruelty is a
compelling interest.
Furthermore, insofar as we understand the
majority to suggest that Congress cannot
have a compelling interest to advance a goal
when the subject of the regulation is not
directly within its constitutional sphere of
legislative authority, we must disagree with
this novel proposition. A congressional act
may certainly significantly advance a
governmental interest of paramount
significance, whether or not it does so
directly. For example, Congress has sought
to protect children from physical harm by
criminalizing the distribution of child
pornography, and to ensure the public's
health and general welfare by enacting laws
proscribing narcotics trafficking. That the
states have already comprehensively
criminalized child abuse and drug
distribution in no way relegates the federal
government's interests in doing the same to
a subordinate level; the means through
which Congress seeks to advance these
interests-that is, pursuant to its Commerce
Clause authority-has no bearing on the
uncontroversial propositions that the
interests implicated are nevertheless ones of
the most paramount order....
Nor do we find that section 48 is sufficiently
underinclusive as to undercut the
Government's claim of significance of its
interest. Where the allegedly ignored evils
are at the fringes of Congress's legislative
authority, that section 48 does not
criminalize the personal possession of
depictions of animal cruelty or the intrastate
trafficking of such materials does not render
it impermissibly under-inclusive. On the
contrary, Congress could have reasonably
decided to focus its attention on purely
interstate conduct, lest enforcement efforts
be hampered by costly constitutional
litigation. This is especially so in light of the
indication that the materials Congress
sought to prohibit "were almost exclusively
distributed for sale through interstate or
foreign commerce." We thus find no under-
inclusion in section 48 sufficient to cast
doubt on the Government's asserted interest
here.
2.
Next, we find that the depictions of animal
cruelty prohibited by section 48 also satisfy
the second part of the fundamental First
Amendment balancing inquiry because they
have little or no social value. This is
guaranteed by the very terms of the statute,
which excepts speech that has "serious
religious, political, scientific, educational,
journalistic, historical, or artistic value"
from its reach. While this exception removes
the possibility of the statute reaching serious
works, we consider it unlikely that visual
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depictions of animal cruelty will often
constitute an important and necessary part of
a literary performance, a scientific or
educational work, or political discourse. Nor
do we see any reason why. if some serious
work were to demand a depiction of animal
cruelty, either the cruelty or the animal
could not be simulated....
b.
We read Ferber, at its core, to stand for the
narrow proposition that a category of speech
may be constitutionally restricted where it
depicts-and thus necessarily requires-the
intentional infliction of physical harm on a
class of especially vulnerable victims in
violation of law, where the distribution of
such depictions spurs their production but
laws prohibiting the underlying acts are
woefully under-enforced, and where the
speech's social value is so de minimis as to
be outweighed by the important
governmental goal of protecting the victims.
We find that the depictions of animal cruelty
proscribed by section 48 possesses these
essential attributes.
In Ferber, the Supreme Court justified the
prohibition of child pornography based on
four grounds: [The dissenting judges list the
four Ferber factors.] We elaborate each of
these four parts below and detail how
depictions of animal cruelty implicate the
same interests.
First ... we find preventing animal cruelty
to also be a governmental interest of the
most paramount importance.
Second, the Supreme Court explained that
child pornography was an unprotected form
of speech because of the intrinsic
relationship between the distribution of child
pornography and the sexual abuse of
children....
The speech at issue here is also intrinsically
related to the underlying crime of animal
cruelty. most clearly because its creation is
also predicated on a violation of criminal
law. Implicated by the depictions at hand is
not the mere prospect of future crime, nor is
the instant proscription premised on
society's disapproval of the views of the
underlying depictions.... We do not quarrel
with the majority's statement that it would
be difficult to directly analogize this
ongoing psychological harm suffered by
child abuse victims to that of animals.
However, even a cursory consideration of
well-documented circumstances surrounding
animal abuse, such as those present in the
dogfighting context, counsels toward the
conclusion that the harms suffered by
abused animals also extend far beyond that
directly resulting from the single abusive act
depicted. Indeed, dogs that are forced to
fight are commonly the subjects of brutality
and cruelty for the entire span of their lives.
. . . In addition, law enforcement officials
face similar difficulties in prosectuing the
creation of animal cruelty depictions as they
do in policing child pornography, and
Congress could have thus reasonably
concluded that targeting the distributors
would be the most effective way of drying
up the animal-cruelty depictions market....
Third, the Supreme Court held in Ferber
that the advertising and sale of child
pornography must be targeted since they
"provide an economic motive for and are
thus an integral part of the production of
such materials." . ..
These factors are self-evidently present in
the instant case. As discussed, substantial
obstacles exist in effectively detecting and
prosecuting those directly involved in the
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creation of animal cruelty depictions.
Furthermore, the record here amply
demonstrates that thriving market exists for
depictions of animal cruelty....
Fourth, the Supreme Court justified its
restriction in Ferber on the fact that the
value of child pornography is de minimis.
[The dissenting judges conclude that
depictions of animal cruelty are of de
minimis value and § 48 excludes any work
that might have value]
The speech at issue in this case possesses the
essential attributes of unprotected speech
identified generally in Chaplinsk and of
child pornography as discussed in Ferber.
To reiterate, the Government has a
compelling interest in eradicating animal
cruelty, depictions of animal cruelty are
intrinsically related to the underlying animal
cruelty, the market for videos of animal
cruelty incentivizes the commission of acts
of animal cruelty, and such depictions are of
de minimis value. In reaching this decision,
however, we emphasize that we have before
us, not a statute broadly purporting to ban all
depictions of criminal acts, but merely one
prohibiting depictions of a narrow subclass
of depraved acts committed against an
uniquely vulnerable and helpless class of
victims. As such, we deem it unlikely that
our ruling as to the constitutionality of the
latter would have broad negative
repercussions to First Amendment freedoms.
Accordingly, because Congress may
proscribe depictions of animal cruelty
without running afoul of the First
Amendment, we would reject Stevens's
challenge to the constitutional validity of 18
U.S.C. § 48.
II.
Section 48 is also not unconstitutionally
overbroad. . . . As the Supreme Court
recently emphasized: "In order to maintain
an appropriate balance, we have vigorously
enforced the requirement that a statute's
overbreadth be substantial, not only in an
absolute sense, but also relative to the
statute's plainly legitimate sweep." Courts
should invalidate a statute on overbreadth
grounds only when the law "reaches a
substantial number of impermissible
applications." . . . There is no such
substantial overbreadth here.
. . . The Government may legitimately
endeavor to quash the entire industry in all
its manifestations. Furthermore, because the
difficulty in determining where or when the
underlying acts of animal cruelty occurred
was part of Congress's motivation for
enacting section 48 in the first place,
excepting depictions that occurred at a time
or in a place where the conduct was not
illegal would essentially gut the instant
statute.
Stevens also argues that the statute is
overbroad because it reaches individuals
who took no part in the underlying conduct.
This argument is likewise foreclosed by
Ferber, where the Court ruled that it was
permissible for the government to annihilate
the child pornography market at all levels,
which included penalizing distributors.
Similarly, for the Government to extinguish
the market for depictions of animal cruelty,
it must be allowed to attack its most visible
apparatus-the commercial distribution
network.
Stevens's final argument that the statute is
overbroad because it could extend to
technical violations of hunting and fishing
statutes is also unpersuasive. . ..
Turning to the statute at hand, we are unable
to imagine circumstances that would have to
coalesce for such a video to come within the
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reaches of section 48, especially in light of
its exceptions clause. In short, there is
simply no "realistic danger" that the
challenged statute will deter such depictions.
Moreover, even if technical violations were
to slip through the section 48(b) bulwark, we
are confident that they would amount to no
more than a "tiny fraction" of the depictions
subject to the statute, which thus may "be
cured through case-by-case analysis of the
fact situations to which its sanctions,
assertedly, may not be applied."
Accordingly, section 48 is not substantially
overbroad.
Ill.
Finally, Stevens contends that the statute is
unconstitutionally vague. ...
Stevens's primary argument, that the statute
is necessarily vague because the definition
of "depiction of animal cruelty" is
predicated on state law is unavailing. A
federal statute is not rendered
unconstitutionally vague merely because it
incorporates state law; to the contrary, such
is a legitimate drafting technique frequently
utilized by Congress. ...
IV.
To be sure, we are not insensitive to the
concerns implicated when a federal court
declares an entire category of speech outside
the purview of the First Amendment. Nor
can we disagree with our majority
colleagues that judicial power in this realm
of constitutional law is one that should be
wielded sparingly, and then only with great
deliberation and care. However, we know of
no principle that lower courts should refrain
from developing our nation's free speech
jurisprudence and decline to analogize and
apply the Supreme Court's precedents in this
area without first receiving the express
permission to do so. In the absence of a
Supreme Court pronouncement to the
contrary, and in light of the unique
circumstances before us, we believe our
determination-that the depictions of animal
cruelty prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 48 are not
protected by the Constitution-both
faithfully discharges our judicial obligation
to duly advance the law's development
when appropriate to do so, and comports
with the Supreme Court's articulation of the
limits of the First Amendment's protections
as set forth in Chaplinsky and Ferber.
In conclusion, 18 U.S.C. § 48 significantly
advances the Government's compelling
interest in protecting animals from wanton
acts of cruelty, and the depictions it
prohibits are of such minimal social value as
to render this narrow category of speech
outside the scope of the First Amendment.
Furthermore, the statute is neither
substantially overbroad nor un-
constitutionally vague. Thus, we would hold
that section 48 is a valid congressional act,
and would therefore AFFIRM Stevens's
conviction.
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"Animal Cruelty Law Draws U.S. High Court Review in Speech Case"
Bloomberg
April 20, 2009
Greg Stohr
The U.S. Supreme Court will consider
reviving a federal criminal law aimed at
videos that show animal cruelty, agreeing to
review a federal appeals court's conclusion
that the measure infringes speech rights.
The court will hear a government appeal in
the case of a Virginia man who was
sentenced to three years and one month in
prison for selling videos that depict pit bulls
fighting each other and attacking other
animals. The lower court overturned the
sentence.
The dispute centers on a 1999 law aimed
primarily at "crush videos," which show
women crushing small animals with their
feet in a manner that some people find
sexually arousing. Although the law has yet
to be applied in a crush-video case, the
government has pressed at least three
prosecutions in other contexts.
The Justice Department in its appeal likened
animal cruelty to child pornography, which
the Supreme Court has said doesn't qualify
as speech protected by the Constitution.
"Depictions of the intentional infliction of
suffering on vulnerable creatures plays no
essential role in the expression of ideas," the
appeal contended.
The law covers interstate, commercial
trafficking in depictions of animal cruelty.
The measure contains an exception for items
that have "serious religious, political,
scientific, educational, journalistic, historical
or artistic value."
Law Voided
The Philadelphia-based appeals court struck
down the law on a 10-3 vote, saying the
Constitution generally "does not require
speech to have serious value in order for it
to fall under the First Amendment
umbrella." The court rejected the analogy to
child pornography, pointing to "the inherent
differences between children and animals."
The man challenging the law, Robert J.
Stevens, describes himself as a 69-year-old
book author and documentary film producer
who specializes in promoting pit bulls.
Stevens says his small business sells
educational material about the breed,
including a video that documents the use of
pit bulls to help hunters catch prey. The
video shows a Japanese pit bull fight, a
scene that Stevens says is used to distinguish
dogs trained for hunting from those trained
for fighting.
Stevens was indicted after law enforcement
officials bought three videos from him
through the mail. The Justice Department
said in its appeal that Steven's videos
"include scenes of savage and bloody dog
fights and of pit bulls viciously attacking
other animals."
The government didn't allege that Stevens
took part in any acts of cruelty, a fact he
says is constitutionally crucial.
"While the government may well have a
significant interest in combating acts of
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animal cruelty, it has not established a
compelling interest in prohibiting speech-
visual or aural depictions-about such
conduct," Stevens argued.
All 50 states and the District of Columbia
have laws banning animal cruelty.
The court will consider the case during its
2009-10 term, which starts in October. The
case is United States v. Stevens, 08-769.
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"No Crime to Depict Animal Cruelty, Court Rules"
Los Angeles Times
July 18, 2008
David G. Savage
In a setback for the animal-rights movement,
a U.S. appeals court struck down on free-
speech grounds Friday a federal law that
made it a crime to sell videos of dogs
fighting and other acts of animal cruelty.
All 50 U.S. states have laws against the
abuse of animals, the appeals court said, but
"a depiction of animal cruelty" is protected
by the First Amendment.
The ruling overturns a Virginia man's
conviction, the nation's first under the law.
Robert J. Stevens of Pittsville, Va.,
advertised and sold two videos of pit bulls
fighting each other and a third showing the
pit bulls attacking hogs and wild boars.
He sold the videos to prosecutors in
Pittsburgh, was prosecuted, convicted and
given three years in prison.
In Friday's decision, the appeals court in
Philadelphia, by a 10-3 vote, said it was not
prepared to recognize a new category of
speech that is unprotected by the First
Amendment.
Acts of cruelty to animals "warrant strong
legal sanctions," the appeals court said, but
it ruled unconstitutional the effort to
criminalize for-profit depictions of animal
cruelty.
Congress passed the law in 1999 in hopes of
stamping out the trade in animal-cruelty
videos. Because the videos rarely showed
persons who could be identified, state
prosecutors often could not prove where the
videos were made.
The law also was designed to stop so-called
"crush videos." According to a
congressional report cited by the court, these
were said to be "depictions of women
inflicting torture (on animals) with their bare
feet or while wearing high-heeled shoes.
The cries and squeals of the animals,
obviously in great pain, can also be heard in
the videos."
The law itself spoke broadly. It called for up
to five years in prison for anyone who
"creates, sells or possesses a depiction of
animal cruelty" for the purpose of making
money. This includes the showing of a
"living animal" being "maimed, mutilated,
tortured, wounded or killed."
Usually, videos and photographs are
protected as free speech, even if they show
illegal or abhorrent conduct. But in 1982,
the Supreme Court made an exception for
child pornography. It ruled that sexual
depictions of children could be prosecuted
as a crime, despite the First Amendment.
This was the only way to stamp out such
abuse of children, the high court said.
Government lawyers said the animal-cruelty
law should be upheld on the same basis. It
was needed to stop the abuse of animals for
profit, they said.
The appeals court disagreed, however.
"Preventing cruelty to animals, although an
exceedingly worthy goal, simply does not
implicate interests of the same magnitude as
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protecting children from physical and
psychological harm," wrote Judge Brooks
Smith of the 3rd U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals.
The three dissenters said the law should
have been upheld so as to help in "protecting
animals from wanton acts of cruelty."
The Justice Department had no reaction
Friday to the ruling. Normally, however, the
government appeals to the Supreme Court
when a federal law is struck down as
unconstitutional.
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"Dogfighting Underworld Stretches Through Western Pennsylvania"9
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette
August 28, 2007
Torsten Ove
NFL star Michael Vick's guilty plea may
have raised news media awareness of
dogfighting, but police, prosecutors and
humane officers have long battled this
bloody underworld.
In Western Pennsylvania, as elsewhere, the
subculture attracts a range of enthusiasts,
from urban gangsters reveling in the my-
dog-is-tougher-than-your-dog ethos to
purists who regard the blood sport as
legitimate, lucrative competition.
Kathy Hecker, humane officer for Animal
Friends in Ohio Township, has described the
Pittsburgh region as a "hotbed" of
dogfighting.
One sign of dogfighting's growth is the
increasing number of pit bulls arriving at her
shelter and others.
Much of the fighting seems to have shifted
away from the city, where pit bulls have
been associated with drug dealers protecting
their turf, to more remote areas like Fayette
and Greene counties.
Arrests are not particularly high here, police
say. But there have been some significant
cases in recent years, including the first
federal prosecution in the United States for
the sale of dogfighting videos.
The most prominent local case started in
2001, when state troopers began infiltrating
a six-county dogfighting network in which
wagering reached $50,000 a bout and
injured animals were sometimes killed.
In buying treadmills, steroids and other
items related to the industry, undercover
troopers also came across a device made of
plastic pipe rigged with an extension cord
and alligator clips used to electrocute dogs.
The following year, police arrested men
from Verona, Jeannette and Bedford and
three others from McKeesport, including
two brothers. They all pleaded guilty to
animal cruelty for their roles in staging
dogfights, supplying equipment or drugs, or
handling promotion.
In 2004, the second phase of that
investigation culminated in the arrest of two
out-of-state men who ran the Sporting Dog
Journal, a national underground magazine
devoted to ranking dogs and promoting
fights across the country.
Agents filed animal cruelty charges against
James J. Fricchione, then 34, of Westtown,
N.Y., and John -Jack" Kelly, then 80, of
Jefferson, Ga., the owner and editor,
respectively, of the journal.
The attorney general's office said the case
was the largest of its kind ever brought in
Pennsylvania and shut down a major conduit
that fed illegal betting.
In another dubious distinction, the region
became the focal point of a unique case in
U.S. District Court which sent a Virginia
man to federal prison in 2005 for selling
dogfighting videos here.
Robert J. Stevens, 67, of Pittsville, Va., was
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the first person to go to trial under a 1999
law that prohibits the sale of depictions of
animal cruelty.
The statute was originally motivated by a
movement in California to ban "crush
videos," in which women wearing spike
heels and short skirts slowly crush small
animals to death for the sexual gratification
of foot fetishists.
All states ban cruelty to animals, but no laws
made distribution of videos showing cruelty
illegal until then-President Clinton signed
the law.
Mr. Stevens and his wife, Julie, advertised
videos in the Sporting Dog Journal and sold
tapes to undercover agents.
Mr. Stevens sold "Pick-A-Winna" and
"Japan Pit Fights," both of which feature
dogs mauling each other in a ring, complete
with handlers, spectators and voice-over
narration.
A judge sent Mr. Stevens to prison for 37
months and ordered him not to associate
with dogfighting anymore.
"I'm through with pit bulls," he promised.
But as the Michael Vick case shows, lots of
others are not.
310
"Authorities Out to Crush Animal Snuff Films"
US.1 Today
August 27, 1999
Martin Kasindorf
The two snippets of videotape played in
criminal court here Thursday were not for
the squeamish. The scenes came from a one-
hour commercial tape produced for a kinky
worldwide Internet trade in what devotees
call "crush videos." Titled "The 'Tails' of
Charlie's Ankles," the tape first shows a
woman stomping a squeaking mouse with
her high-heeled pumps.
The other segment introduced as evidence
shows the same deep-voiced woman,
wearing short shorts, torturing a white
mouse with nudges from open-toed shoes
with 6-inch heels. The woman taunts the
mouse. "You're going to listen, and you're
going to die my way," she says. Then she
crushes the mouse's head underfoot.
Diane Chaffin, 35, the star of the production,
wore a lime-green jail uniform at the
defense table. Municipal Court Judge R.
Bruce Minto denied a defense motion to
reduce three felony charges of animal
cruelty to misdemeanors "because of the
maliciousness involved." Instead, he ordered
the La Puente, Calif., woman held for trial.
Arrested two weeks ago, she remains in
custody and has pleaded innocent.
Crush videos have emerged from
underground whispers to become the focus
of police investigations and outcries from
national animal-rights organizations.
Proposed federal legislation that would
clamp down on the sadistic filmmakers will
get a hearing before a House committee in
October.
The alleged producer of the stomach-turning
footage shown in court Thursday, Gary
Thomason, 47, of Long Beach, is being
sought on an arrest warrant. The video is
similar to 21 others hawked at prices up to
$90 on Thomason's Web site, prosecutors
say.
Thomason allegedly is one of four known
U.S.-based producers of crush videos.
American-made animal snuff films typically
show scantily dressed women stomping rats,
mice, hamsters or insects. But Tom
Connors, deputy district attorney of Ventura
County, Calif., says he has downloaded
photos from overseas Web sites showing the
killing of kittens, puppies and monkeys.
Devotees buy nearly $1 million worth of the
tapes every year, Connors says. Mexico,
Brazil, Britain, and Japan are among other
production and distribution centers, he says.
The charges against Chaffin and Thomason
mark the second U.S. crush video
investigation to result in police action. In
May 1998, Long Island authorities charged
Thomas Capriola, 28, with animal cruelty
for allegedly taping spike-heeled women
killing rabbits, guinea pigs, mice, rats,
turtles and snakes. Capriola will go on trial
Sept. 28.
Crush videos incense Hollywood's celebrity
animal-rights activists. The Doris Day
Animal League is taking the lead in
supporting a bill introduced in Congress in
May by Rep. Elton Gallegly, R-Calif. The
bill would make it a crime for anyone to
offer any "depiction of animal cruelty" for
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sale in interstate commerce. If convicted, a
person could face up to five years'
imprisonment.
Soon, there could be something even worse
than animal crush tapes, Connors worries.
"We have some stills of a baby doll they're
crushing," he says. "So our feeling is that in
time, like all perversions, buyers will get
desensitized and it'll get to be a baby. It's a
sick world."
That forecast is "nonsense," says former
crush-video maker Jeff Vilencia, of
Lakewood, Calif. Vilencia says recent
publicity forced his Squish Productions out
of the business of selling insect-crushing
videos through adult magazines.
The desire to see women stomping tiny
creatures is "a very focused, specific fetish"
among 2,000 men at most, and they're
uninterested in seeing babies killed, Vilencia
says. Vilencia blames the accessibility of the
Internet for putting the spotlight on a
decades-old underground practice.
Nobody should profit from the killing of
"hamsters or any domestic pet," Vilencia
says. But "mice and rats might be a gray
area. We have a love-hate relationship with
mice and rats. If you're an apartment owner
in Los Angeles and you don't kill rats,
you'll get fined."
Gallegly sees no allowable distinctions.
"Even if you are killing vermin, there's still
a humane way to do it," he says.
In most states, animal cruelty laws
criminalize the conduct often shown on the
videos. But Gallegly says federal legislation
is needed because local authorities
essentially must catch someone in the midst
of videotaping to prove that the cruelty took
place within the criminal statute of
limitations period.
"It's difficult to get to the actual
perpetrators," he says. "The most effective
way of stopping this trade is by getting to
the people who are distributing this product
and making a profit."
312
"They're Perverted, but Are They Protected?"
Time
October 1, 1999
Jessica Reaves
Members of Congress have a pretty
extensive exposure to all things sordid, but
most of them were probably not prepared for
what they heard and saw this week.
On Thursday, the House Judiciary
Committee's crime panel heard testimony
from animal-rights activists pushing for
criminal penalties for traffickers of animal
"squish" or "crush" movies.
According to the Associated Press, the films,
which feature the graphic torture and death
of animals, are part of what one witness
called a multimillion-dollar, worldwide
industry.
"It's time to stop this windfall," said Rep.
Elton Gallegly (R-Ca.), the sponsor of the
bill that would make it illegal to create, sell
or possess any depiction of cruelty to
animals.
The laws would be enforced, one California
deputy district attorney explained, in much
the same way as those criminalizing the
traffic of child pornography.
With all the well-funded causes filling up
their hearing rooms, will Congress take the
proliferation of animal crush films
seriously?
Time senior writer Frederic Golden thinks
so.
"It's not surprising to me at all that these
movies are making it into Congressional
hearings," he says.
"The animal-rights movement is gaining a
lot of momentum in the U.S., and they've
got enormous support in Congress."
But there is one obstacle the backers of the
bill may not be able to jump over.
"This is a classic First Amendment
situation," says Time senior reporter Alain
Sanders.
"The problem with the law the animal-rights
advocates are proposing is that it's almost
impossible to target only the evil you want
to suppress."
You run the risk, says Sanders, of
eliminating other forms of expression: for
example, documentaries about bullfights or
cockfights, or movies in which cruelty to
animals is simulated for legitimate purposes
but not actually carried out.
Sanders doubts this case is Supreme Court
material, but even if it did end up on the
Justices' docket, there's little chance of a
ruling against free speech.
"The First Amendment," he says, "is the
most closely guarded Amendment in the
Supreme Court."
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Salazar v. Buono
08-472
Ruling Below: Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008)
Frank Buono, a former National Park Service employee and Roman Catholic, sued to have a
Latin cross removed from a prominent outcropping of rock in the Mojave National Preserve. The
district court found that the cross violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and
ordered an injunction prohibiting the display of the cross.
In response to litigation of this matter, Congress passed several pieces of legislation to protect
the cross and prevent its removal. Once the district court issued the injunction barring display of
the cross, Congress effected a transfer of the land upon which the cross sits to a private party.
The district court found that the federal government's transfer to a veterans' group, via statute, of
that small parcel of land violated the prior injunction against the display of the cross.
Questions Presented: (1) Does respondent have standing to maintain this action when he has
no objection to the public display of a cross, but instead is offended that public land on which the
cross is located is not also a forum on which other persons might display other symbols? (2)
Even assuming respondent has standing, did the court of appeals err in refusing to give effect to
the act of Congress providing for the transfer of the land to private hands?
Frank BUONO, Plaintiff-Appellee,
V.
Dirk KEMPTHORNE, Secretary of the Interior, in his official capacity; Jonathan B.
Jarvis, Regional Director, Pacific West Region, National Park Service, Department of the
Interior, in his official capacity; Dennis Schramm, Superintendent, Mojave National
Preserve, National Park Service, Department of the Interior, in his official capacity,
Defendants-Appellants.
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Decided May 14, 2008
[Excerpt: some footnotes and citations omitted]
McKEOWN, Circuit Judge: including the land where the cross is
situated-violates the Establishment Clause
A Latin cross sits atop a prominent rock of the United States Constitution. We
outcropping known as "Sunrise Rock" in the affirmed the district court's judgment
Mojave National Preserve ("Preserve"). Our permanently enjoining the government
court previously held that the presence of "from permitting the display of the Latin
the cross in the Preserve-which consists of cross in the area of Sunrise Rock in the
more than 90 percent federally-owned land, Mojave National Preserve."
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During the pendency of the first appeal,
Congress enacted a statute directing that the
land on which the cross is situated be
transferred to a priv ate organization in
exchange for a parcel of privately-owned
land located elsewhere in the Preserve. That
land exchange is already in progress and
would leave a little donut hole of land with a
cross in the midst of a vast federal preserve.
The issue we address today is whether the
land exchange violates the district court's
permanent injunction. We conclude that it
does, and affirm the district court's order
permanently enjoining the government from
effectuating the land exchange and ordering
the government to comply with the original
injunction.
BACKGROUND
I. THE MOJAVE
PRESERVE
NATIONAL
The Preserve encompasses approximately
1.6 million acres, or 2,500 square miles, of
primarily federally-owned land in the
Mojave Desert, located in Southeastern
California. In 1994, the Bureau of Land
Management ("BLM") transferred the land
to the National Park Service ("NPS"); both
the BLM and the NPS are federal agencies
under the Department of the Interior
("DOI"). Within the Preserve,
approximately 86,000 acres of land are
privately owned and 43,000 acres belong to
the State of California. Thus, slightly more
than 90 percent of the land in the Preserve is
federally owned. The Preserve is a "unit of
the National Park System" and is given
"statutory protection as a national preserve."
The Preserve is under NPS jurisdiction and
authority.
II. THE CROSS
The current incarnation of the cross atop
Sunrise Rock is between five and eight feet
tall and is constructed out of four-inch
diameter metal pipes painted white. It is a
Latin cross, meaning that it has two arms,
one horizontal and one vertical, at right
angles to one another. It is undisputed that
"[t]he Latin cross is the preeminent symbol
of Christianity. It is exclusively a Christian
symbol, and not a symbol of any other
religion." Buono 1, 212 F Supp. 2d at 1205.
Historic records reflect that a wooden cross
was built on that location as early as 1934
by the Veterans of Foreign Wars ("VFW")
as a memorial to veterans who died in World
War I. Photographs depict the wooden cross
and signs near it stating: "The Cross,
Erected in Memory of the Dead of All
Wars," and "Erected 1934 by Members of
Veterans of Foreign [sic] Wars, Death
Valley post 2884." The wooden signs are no
longer present, and the original wooden
cross, which is no longer standing, has been
replaced by private parties several times
since 1934. The cross has been an
intermittent gathering place for Easter
religious services since as early as 1935, and
regularly since 1984.
The current version of the cross was built by
Henry Sandoz, a local resident, sometime in
1998. When NPS investigated the history of
the cross, Sandoz explained that he drilled
holes into Sunrise Rock to bolt the cross in
place, making it difficult to remove. Sandoz
did not receive a permit from NPS to
construct the cross.
Following Buono I's injunction against
display of the cross, the cross has been
covered by a plywood box. When
uncovered, the cross is visible from vehicles
traveling on Cima Road, which passes
through the Preserve, from a distance of
approximately 100 yards away. No sign
indicates that the cross was or is intended to
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act as a memorial for war veterans.
Ill. LITIGATION OVER THE CROSS
AND THE CONGRESSIONAL
RESPONSE
The current controversy surrounding the
cross surfaced in 1999, when NPS received
a request from an individual seeking to build
a "stupa" (a dome-shaped Buddhist shrine)
on a rock outcropping at a trailhead located
near the cross. NPS denied that request,
citing 36 C.F.R § 2.62(a) as prohibiting the
installation of a memorial without
authorization. A handwritten note on the
denial letter warns that "[a]ny attempt to
erect a stupa will be in violation of Federal
Law and subject you to citation and/or
arrest." The letter also indicates that
"[c]urrently there is a cross on [a] rock
outcrop located on National Park Service
lands... . It is our intention to have the cross
removed."
In 1999, NPS undertook a study of the
history of the cross. NPS determined that
neither the cross nor the property on which it
is situated qualifies for inclusion in the
National Register of Historic Places.
Specifically, NPS recognized that the cross
itself "has been replaced many times and the
plaque that once accompanied it (even
though it is not known if it is original) has
been removed." Also, the property does not
qualify as an historical site because, among
other things, "the site is used for religious
purposes as well as commemoration."
Following the announcement by NPS of its
intention to remove the cross, the United
States Congress passed a series of laws,
described below, to preserve the Sunrise
Rock cross. The first piece of legislation,
enacted in December 2000, provided that no
government funds could be used to remove
the cross.
Frank Buono filed suit in March 2001
against the Secretary of the DOI, the
Regional Director of NPS, and the
Superintendent of the Preserve (collectively,
"NPS" or "Defendants"). The district court
concluded that the presence of the cross in
the Preserve violates the Establishment
Clause. In July 2002, the court entered a
permanent injunction ordering that the
"Defendants, their employees, agents, and
those in active concert with Defendants, are
hereby permanently restrained and enjoined
from permitting display of the Latin cross in
the area of Sunrise Rock in the Mojave
National Preserve."
B. DESIGNATION OF THE CROSS AS
A NATIONAL MEMORIAL
In January 2002, while this matter was
pending in district court, Congress passed a
defense appropriations bill, which included a
section designating the Sunrise Rock cross
as a "national memorial."
The cross is designated the "White Cross
World War I Memorial."
NPS is statutorily charged with "the
supervision, management, and control of the
several national parks and national
monuments." National "memorials" fall
within the broader category of national
''monuments."
In October 2002, less than three months
after the district court's injunction, in
legislation aimed at the Sunrise Rock cross,
Congress passed a defense appropriations
bill that included a provision barring the use
of federal funds "to dismantle national
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A. BUONO I
memorials commemorating United States
participation in World War I."
C. BUONO II AND PASSAGE OF § 8121
The government appealed the district court's
order and injunction. In September 2003,
one month after oral argument before a
panel of our court but before a decision
issued, Congress enacted another defense
appropriations bill that included a land
exchange agreement regarding the Sunrise
Rock cross.
In June 2004, in affirming the district court's
permanent injunction, we held that the
presence of the cross in the Preserve violates
the Establishment Clause, agreeing with the
district court that this case is "squarely
controlled" by Separation of Church and
State Committee v. City of Eugene,
("SCSC"). In SCSC, we reasoned that the
presence of a cross on city land, even where
it bore a plaque dedicating the cross as a war
memorial to veterans, violated the
Establishment Clause because "the presence
of the cross may reasonably be perceived as
governmental endorsement of Christianity."
The government's several attempts to
distinguish SCSC were not persuasive. For
example, we held that it was "of no
moment" that the cross in SCSC was
significantly taller, located in an urban area,
or illuminated during certain holidays:
Though not illuminated, the cross
here is bolted to a rock outcropping
rising fifteen to twenty feet above
grade and is visible to vehicles on
the adjacent road from a hundred
yards away. Even if the shorter
height of the Sunrise Rock cross
means that it is visible to fewer
people than was the SCSC cross, this
makes it no less likely that the
Sunrise Rock cross will project a
message of government
endorsement. . . . Nor does the
remote location of Sunrise Rock
make a difference. That the Sunrise
Rock cross is not near a government
building is insignificant-neither
was the SCSC cross. What is
significant is that the Sunrise Rock
cross, like the SCSC cross, sits on
public park land. National parklands
and preserves embody the notion of
government oinership as much as
urban parkland, and the remote
location of Sunrise Rock does
nothing to detract from that notion.
We also held that a reasonable observer,
even wx ithout knowing whether Sunrise
Rock is federally owned, would believe-or
at least suspect-that the cross rests on
public land because of the vast size of the
Preserve, more than 90 percent of which is
federally owned. A reasonably informed
observer aware of the history of the Sunrise
Rock cross would know not only that the
cross was erected by private individuals
(which the government argued favored its
view), but also that Congress has taken
various measures to preserve the cross, i.e.,
designating it a war memorial, prohibiting
use of federal funds to remove it, and
denying similar access for a Buddhist shrine.
Acknowledging the passage of § 8121 while
the appeal was pending, we addressed the
government's challenge that § 8121
rendered the appeal moot or would soon do
so. We rejected the government's mootness
challenge for two reasons: First, we held that
the case was not moot because the land
transfer had not yet taken effect. Second,
because "[m]ere voluntary cessation of
allegedly illegal conduct does not moot a
case," we held that even if the land transfer
had taken effect, the government still had
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not carried its heavy burden to show
mootness. Even if the land were transferred
under § 8121 (a), it mai revert to the
government under § 8121(e), or as provided
in other statutes. In particular, we noted that
16 U.S.C. § 431 authorizes relinquishment
of lands containing "national monuments" to
the federal government, and 16 U.S.C.
§ 410aaa-56 authorizes the Department of
the Interior to "acquire all lands and interest
in lands within the boundary of the [Mojave]
preserve by donation, purchase, or
exchange."
D. BUONO III
Despite the injunction against display of the
cross in the Preserve, the government began
moving forward with the mechanics of the
land exchange under § 8121. Buono then
moved to enforce the district court's prior
injunction, or modify it to prohibit the land
exchange as a violation of the Establishment
Clause. In April 2005, the district court
granted Buono's motion to enforce the
injunction, and denied as moot the request to
amend the permanent injunction. According
to the district court, "the transfer of the
Preserve land containing the Latin Cross
which as [a] sectarian war memorial carries
an inherently religious message and creates
an appearance of honoring only those
servicemen of that particular religion is an
attempt by the government to evade the
permanent injunction enjoining the display
of the Latin Cross atop Sunrise Rock." The
district court deemed the exchange "invalid"
and permanently enjoined the government
"from implementing the provisions of
Section 8121 of Public Law 108-87" and
ordered the government "to comply
forthwith with the judgment and permanent
injunction entered by th[e] court on July 24,
2002." It is that decision that the
government now appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review for abuse of discretion the
district court's order enforcing its prior
injunction. A district court abuses its
discretion in this regard if "it bases its
decision on an erroneous legal standard or
on clearly erroneous findings of fact."
ANALYSIS
In the district court, Buono advanced two
alternative arguments challenging the land
exchange under § 8121. First, Buono argued
that the land exchange is an attempt to evade
the permanent injunction. Alternatively, he
argued that the land exchange itself violates
the Establishment Clause because it is an
improper governmental endorsement of
religion. The district court's holding is
grounded only on the first basis, i.e., that the
land exchange is a sham transaction with the
purpose of permitting continued display of
the cross in violation of the permanent
injunction. On appeal, the government
contends that § 8121 was a bona fide
attempt by Congress to comply with the
injunction. The government also argues that
because it was not given the opportunity to
fully effectuate the transfer, there are
unknown facts that render this controversy
"unripe" for judicial review.
[The Court concludes that the issue is ripe
for judicial review.]
II. VIOLATION OF THE PERMANENT
INJUNCTION
We next address whether the district court
abused its discretion in concluding that
"transfer of the Preserve land containing the
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Latin Cross, which 'as [a] sectarian war
memorial carries an inherently religious
message and creates an appearance of
honoring only those servicemen of that
particular religion' . is an attempt by the
government to evade the permanent
injunction enjoining the display of the Latin
Cross atop Sunset Rock."
A. GOVERNMENT ACTION
1. CONTINUING GOVERNMENT
OVERSIGHT AND CONTROL OVER
THE CROSS AND PRESERVE
PROPERTY
Although Congress sought to transfer the
property to the VFW, a private entity, the
various statutes, when read as a package,
evince continuing government control. The
following summary highlights that control:
NPS retains overall management and
supervision of the Preserve.
NPS is responsible for
supervision, management,
control" of national memorials.
"the
and
The "five-foot-tall white cross" in
the Mojave National Preserve is
designated as a "national memorial."
The transfer of land to the VFW is
conditioned on the VFW's
maintenance of the conveyed
property as a memorial to World
War I veterans.
The Secretary must carry out its
duties under § 8137, which provides
$10,000 for NPS to acquire and
install replicas of the original cross
and plaque.
The property "shall revert- to
government ownership if "it is no
longer being maintained as a war
memorial."
The government retains various rights of
control over the cross and the property. NPS
is granted statutory powers of "supervision,
management, and control" of national
memorials. Thus, NPS's general supervisory
and managerial responsibilities with respect
to the cross remain, despite a land transfer.
In addition, § 8121(a) expressly reserves
NPS's management responsibilities under
§ 8137. Section 8137 not only designates the
cross a national memorial, but provides for
$10,000 in funds for NPS to acquire and
install replicas of the original plaque and
cross located at the site. The district court
found that these provisions gave the
government an easement or license over the
subject property for this particular purpose.
Such an easement or license reflects ongoing
control over the property requiring
compliance with constitutional requirements
on that land.
The district court also focused on the
significance of the government's retention
of a reversionary interest in the property
under § 8121(e). As in Hampton and Eaton,
the reversionary clause in § 8121(e) results
in ongoing government control over the
subject property, even after the transfer.
Although the government argues that
reversionary interests are run-of-the mill
clauses in contracts with the government,
the commonality of such clauses does not
diminish their power or effect. The fact
remains that the government has an
automatic reversionary interest in the
property if it determines that the property is
no longer being used as a "war memorial,"
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which, at this juncture, is the cross itself.
As it did with respect to ripeness, the
government argues that the court must await
exercise of the rev ersionary interest before
determining whether it is a real factor in
government control over the property. We
reiterate the import of the reversionary
interest; it shows the government's ongoing
control over the property and that the parties
will conduct themselves in the shadow of
that control. The courts in Hampton and
Eaton found dispositive the ongoing control
resulting from the reversionary interest; their
analysis is persuasive here.
Based on the government's ongoing
supervisory, maintenance and oversight
responsibilities with respect to the cross and
the property, coupled with the reversionary
interest, the district court found that the
government retains important property rights
in, and "will continue to exercise substantial
control over," the property on which Sunrise
Rock is located, even after the land
exchange. The government has failed to
show that this determination is either clearly
erroneous or an abuse of discretion.
2. METHOD FOR EFFECTUATING
THE LAND EXCHANGE
Next, we examine the method of sale by
which § 8121 transfers the property to a
private buyer outside the normal NPS
procedures for transfer of parklands. The
Secretary of DOI is authorized to exchange
federal land for non-federal land under its
jurisdiction. In this case, however, the
decision to exchange the land was made by
Congress and authorized by a provision
buried in an appropriations bill. The
government did not hold a hearing before
enacting such exchange. Nor did the
government open bidding to the general
public. Rather, § 8121 directs that the land
be transferred to the VFW, the organization
that originally installed a cross on Sunrise
Rock some years ago and desires the
continued presence of the current cross in
the Preserve. The private land being
exchanged for the federal property is owned
by the Sandozes, who constructed the
present cross and who have actively sought
to keep the cross on Sunrise Rock.
The government argues that, of all parties,
the VFW is the "logical purchaser" because
it originally erected the cross at the site more
than seventy years ago. The government
cites Marshfield and another Seventh Circuit
case, Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles.
In both cases, the respective courts upheld
the sale of property to a private party
without an open market bidding process for
the land.
Although neither the exclusion of other
purchasers, nor the fact that Congress acted
outside the scope of normal agency
procedures for disposing of federal park land
is dispositive, both acts demonstrate the
government's unusual involvement in this
transaction. These facts, coupled with the
government's selection of beneficiaries of
the land exchange who have a significant
interest and personal investment in
preserving the cross that has been ordered
removed, provide additional evidence that
the government is seeking to circumvent the
injunction in this case. We see no basis to
upset the district court's conclusion that the
VFW was a straw purchaser.
3. HISTORY
GOVERNMENT'S
EFFORTS
OF THE
PRESERVATION
Finally, the government's long-standing
efforts to preserve and maintain the cross
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atop Sunrise Rock lead us to the undeniable
conclusion that the government's purpose in
this case is to evade the injunction and keep
the cross in place. In brief, wvhen litigation
was first threatened against NPS, Congress
banned the use of government funds to
remove the cross (§ 133). the first step in
forestalling inevitable enforcement of a
federal injunction. After litigation
commenced, Congress designated the cross
and adjoining Preserve property as a
national memorial commemorating World
War I. Congress also appropriated up to
$10,000 for NPS to acquire replicas of the
original cross and plaque at the site, once
more trying to bolster the presence of the
cross. Once the district court enjoined
display of the cross in Buono I, Congress
again prohibited the use of federal funds to
remove any World War I memorials (which,
obviously, includes the cross); and, while
the appeal was pending in Buono II,
Congress enacted § 8121, directing the
transfer of the subject property to a private
organization. but maintaining effective
government control over the memorial and
the use of that property.
The government does not contest these
legislative responses to various stages of the
litigation in this case, or their purpose aimed
at preserving the cross. Rather, the
government attempts to diminish their
importance. For example, the government
argues that § 8137(c), which earmarks funds
for the replica plaque and cross, was passed
before the district court's injunction and that
after the injunction, DOI has taken no action
to acquire the replicas. While this may be
true, when Congress enacted § 8121, it
specifically incorporated the Secretary's
duty to carry out the responsibilities set out
in § 8137; Congress did not repeal the
funding provisions, or any other provision
permitting ongoing government control. The
funding provisions offer historical evidence
of the governmental responses aimed at
preserving the cross, as well as ongoing
legislative authorizations. In that context, it
does not matter whether DOI has exercised
its powers to obtain such replicas; the
important fact is that Congress directed that
it do so- further showing its intent to
preserve and maintain the cross.
We agree with the district court that the
government engaged in "herculean efforts"
to preserve the cross atop Sunrise Rock. We
also agree that "the proposed transfer of the
subject property can only be viewed as an
attempt to keep the Latin Cross atop Sunrise
Rock without actually curing the continuing
Establishment Clause violation."
B. CONTINUING GOVERNMENTAL
ENDORSEMENT OF RELIGION
Our inquiry into a purported cure of an
Establishment Clause violation must also
analyze whether the improper governmental
endorsement of religion has ceased. Because
of the procedural posture of this case, we
have necessarily already considered that
question. We previously held that the
presence of the cross in the Preserve violates
the Establishment Clause.
We also concluded that a reasonable
observer aware of the history of the cross
would know of the government's attempts to
preserve it and the denial of access to other
religious symbols. Even a less informed
reasonable observer would perceive
governmental endorsement of the message,
given that "[n]ational parklands and
preserves embody the notion of government
ownership," that the Sunrise Rock area is
used as a public campground, and finally.
because of "the ratio of publicly-owned to
privately-owned land in the Preserve."
Nothing in the present posture of the case
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alters those earlier conclusions. Under the
statutory dictates and terms that presently
stand, carving out a tiny parcel of property
in the midst of this vast Preserve-like a
donut hole with the cross atop it-will do
nothing to minimize the impermissible
governmental endorsement. Nor does the
proposed land exchange under § 8121 end
the improper government action. Such a
transfer cannot be validly executed without
running afoul of the injunction.
In sum, the government has not shown the
district court's factual findings to be clearly
erroneous. Nor has the government shown
that the district court applied erroneous legal
standards. Finally, the district court's
decision does not reflect any clear error of
judgment.
The district court did not abuse its discretion
in enjoining the government from
proceeding with the land exchange under 16
U.S.C. § 8121 and ordering the government
to otherwise comply with its prior injunction
that it not permit the display of the Sunrise
Rock cross in the Preserve.
AFFIRMED.
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"Cross Display Draws U.S. Supreme Court Review in Test for Obama"
Blooniburg
February 23, 2009
Greg Stohr
The U.S. Supreme Court will consider the
fate of a cross erected as a war memorial on
federal land in a case that calls upon the
Obama administration to take a stance on
the role of religion in public life.
The justices today said they will review a
federal appeals court decision that would
force removal of the cross, located in the
Mojave National Preserve in California, as a
violation of the constitutional ban on
government establishment of religion. Bush
administration lawyers appealed the ruling
in October.
The dispute, which the justices will consider
during the nine-month term starting in
October, will be the first Supreme Court
religion fight to confront the new
administration. Solicitor general nominee
Elena Kagan must decide whether to adopt
the Bush administration's defense of the
cross or to shift positions and perhaps even
withdraw the government's appeal.
"There's no question the Obama
administration will change the perspective,"
said Marci Hamilton, a professor at Yeshiva
University's Cardozo School of Law in New
York. She said that, even if the new
administration presses ahead with the
appeal, "they don't have to put everything
into it."
The Bush appeal contends that Frank
Buono, the Oregon resident objecting to the
cross, lacks legal "standing" to sue. The
appeal also argues that Congress resolved
any constitutional problems by authorizing
the transfer of the land on which the cross
sits to a private citizen. The cross, currently
covered by a plywood box because of the
litigation, is perched on a rock outcropping
about 100 yards away from a road in the
southern California park.
A cross has been on the site since 1934,
when the private Veterans of Foreign Wars
erected a wooden version and a plaque as a
memorial to fallen troops.
Cross Replaced
The cross has been replaced several times.
The current version, which isn't
accompanied by a plaque, is made of white
pipes and is between five and eight feet
high.
A federal judge ruled that the cross, as a
Christian symbol, unconstitutionally
promoted religion. Congress responded in
2004 by enacting a law that directed the
Interior Department to transfer about an acre
of land to the Veterans of Foreign Wars in
exchange for a privately owned plot nearby.
The San Francisco-based 9th U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals ultimately agreed that the
cross display was unconstitutional. The
court also said the 2004 law was an
improper effort to circumvent the order to
remove the cross.
The Bush administration appeal called the
2004 law "an eminently sensible and
constitutionally permissible way of
resolving any establishment clause
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problem."
Ongoing Role
Buono, represented by the American Civil
Liberties Union, said in court papers that the
transfer wouldn't eliminate the
government's involvement with the cross.
He points to provisions that would keep the
cross's designation as a national monument
and would require the return of the land to
the government if the war memorial isn't
maintained.
Buono, a Roman Catholic, also argued in his
court filing that the government had a
'history of favoritism" toward Christianity
at the site. The National Park Service in
1999 refused a request from a person who
wanted to erect a Buddhist memorial near
the cross.
The Supreme Court in 2007 limited the
power of taxpayers to challenge government
actions as unconstitutionally promoting
religion, throwing out a suit aimed at
President George W. Bush's faith-based
initiatives office. That case divided the court
along ideological grounds, with Chief
Justice John Roberts and Justices Antonin
Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito and
Anthony Kennedy forming the majority.
The case is Salazar v. Buono, 08-472.
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"Intriguing Issues About Religion"
SCOTUSblog
February 23, 2009
Lyle Denniston
The Supreme Court has given itself two
choices to resolve a decade-old controversy
over a Christian cross that stands on an
isolated acre in the desert, amid the vast 1.6
million acres of the Mojave National
Preserve in San Bernardino County in
southeastern California. Either one is likely
to be of considerable importance, in the
ongoing national dispute over placing
religious symbols on public property-a
dispute that regularly returns to the Court.
The Court can end the controversy by ruling
that the only challenger to the cross had no
right to file his case. That seems, on the
surface, to be a somewhat mundane issue of
court procedure. It is, however, a question of
deep consequence for those who oppose
religious symbols. That's because the
underlying question is: What kind of harm
must such an opponent show before being
allowed to seek a remedy in court?
Or, the Court can decide whether Congress,
stubbornly defending such a religious
symbol's place on public property, can get
around the constitutional question by simply
transferring the site to a private buyer, thus
leaving the symbol intact where it is. That
outcome of the case likely will have wide
impact on a variety of statutes and other
monuments with religious themes that stand
on government property, in cemeteries,
parks and elsewhere. Many tributes to war
veterans, for example, use religious imagery.
Several veterans' groups, in fact, told the
Court in this case that "without action by
this Court, countless veterans memorials
will perish."
Both of those fundamental questions are at
issue in the case of Salazar (Interior
Secretary) v. Buono (08-372). The case
involves a 74-year-old war memorial in the
form of a Christian cross (several times
replaced). It is made of white metal pipes,
and stands at about five feet on Sunrise
Rock, a granite outcropping rising from the
desert floor. It is in a remote part of the huge
Preserve, but it is clearly visible to those
who approach it on a nearby road. There is
nothing near it except rock, weeds and some
cactus.
The controversy
been an active
times, Congress
cross.
over its presence there has
issue since 1999; several
has stepped in to save the
Ten years ago, a Utah man, a National Park
Service retiree, asked permission to put up a
Buddhist shrine near the cross. The Park
Service said no, and indicated it would take
down the cross. The American Civil
Liberties Union pressed the Service to do so,
but then Congress stepped in amid protests
from one of its members and local officials.
Ultimately, after several other measures did
not succeed, Congress in 2004 ordered a
one-acre site including the cross swapped
for a five-acre parcel of privately owned
land, elsewhere in the Preserve.
That action was taken while the Ninth
Circuit Court was considering a case filed
by another former Park Service official,
Frank Buono, who lives in Oregon but once
worked at the Preserve and returns from
time to time for visits. He is a Roman
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Catholic, and does not object to a cross
being on public land. But he does say he is
offended if a cross is allowed on
government property, when the site is not
open to other displays, including, perhaps,
emblems of other religions.
The Interior Secretary-now Ken Salazar. in
the new Obama Cabinet-is pursuing the
government appeal, continuing the case
originally taken to the Court by his
predecessor, Secretary Dirk Kempthorne.
The government petition seeks to have
Buono's challenge dismissed, first on the
argument that he had no right to sue (no
"standing," in Article III terms). Buono's
claim of injury, it contends, is not a religious
problem at all. Rather, it says, it is an
"ideological objection that public lands on
which crosses are displayed should also be
public fora on which other persons may
display other symbols."
Salazar's lawyers argue that Buono has only
a "policy disagreement," and the Court has
never allowed a lawsuit based on the
Constitution's religious clauses for such a
complaint. Since Buono has no "spiritual
stake" in the placement of the cross on
national lands, it asserts, he is suffering no
injury the courts can remedy.
Buono's lawyers contend that the Court's
precedents only require evidence of "direct
and unwelcome contact with a government-
sponsored religious display or practice."
That, they say, is Buono's objection, and his
resulting injury. It is not an "abstract,
generalized objection," the response
contends.
If the Court were to accept the government
contention that Buono had no injury, and
thus no right to sue, that would be the end of
the case. But, in reaching that conclusion,
the Court presumably will make some new
law, clarifying the injury component of
"standing" to challenge religion in the public
square.
If, however, the Court finds Buono was
properly allowed into court, it would then
decide whether the tactic chosen by
Congress-a giveaway, or trade, of a site
containing a religious display-cures any
constitutional problem. The Court, in this
particular case, however, is not confronted
with a simple disposal of the property into
private hands. Even while ordering the
transfer, Congress officially designated the
one acre plot with the cross as "a national
memorial commemorating United States
participation in World War I and honoring
the American veterans of that war."
This, according to Buono's lawyers, brings
into play a federal law requiring the
National Park Service to regulate national
parks, monuments, and reservations,
whether on federal or private land. That is
enough to make the cross a continuing
object of the government's care and
concern, making its presence still a
constitutional problem, his lawyers assert.
"If Congress had wanted to limit the NPS's
jurisdiction to national monuments or
memorials on federal lands, it could have
done so, as it has done in other statutes,"
they say.
The case will come up for argument some
time in the Court's next Term, starting
Oct. 5.
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"High Noon at Sunrise Rock"
W1'all Street Journal
May 27, 2005
Christopher Levenick
Just west of the California-Nevada border,
II miles south of the freeway that connects
San Diego with Las Vegas, a small hill rises
above the sunbaked floor of the Mojave
Desert. Atop that hill stands a six-foot cross,
fashioned out of four-inch-diameter steel
pipe. That dusty hilltop and its lonely
marker just might become the scene of the
most significant church-state controversy
since last year's fight over the Pledge of
Allegiance.
In 1934, a gritty prospector named J. Riley
Bembry gathered a couple of his fellow
World War I veterans at Sunrise Rock.
Together they erected the cross, in honor of
their fallen comrades. The memorial has
been privately maintained ever since, with
small groups still occasionally meeting to
remember the nation's veterans.
A wrinkle developed in 1994, when the
federal government declared the surrounding
area a national preserve. With the cross now
located on newly public land, the memorial
soon caught the attention of the American
Civil Liberties Union. Working with Frank
Buono, a retired park ranger turned
professional activist, the ACLU demanded
that the National Park Service tear down the
cross.
Mr. Buono insists that his seeing the
monument ("two to four times a year")
violates his civil rights. A federal district
court found in his favor, and the decision
was subsequently upheld by the Ninth
Circuit. Last-ditch attempts to deed Sunrise
Rock over to the local Veterans of Foreign
Wars were struck down in April. Defenders
of the memorial hope to appeal, but their
options are narrowing.
The ACLU, however, has made out quite
nicely. Not only has it prevailed in the
courts to date, but it has managed to pocket
$63,000. Owing to a quirk in civil-rights
law, the taxpayer once again ended up
paying the ACLU for pressing a highly
controversial church-state lawsuit.
The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act
of 1976 specifies that anyone bringing an
even partly successful civil-rights suit may
have the defendant pay all legal fees for both
parties, a discretionary award that is
routinely granted. Such fee-reversals are not
permitted to successful defendants.
Congress meant for the law to help citizens
with little or no money, but since then
wealthy and powerful organizations have
perverted that intention. They use the
specter of massive attorney fees to force
their secularist agenda on small school
districts, cash-strapped municipalities and,
now, veterans' memorials. According to
Rees Lloyd, a former ACLU staff lawyer,
such litigation is "manifestly in terrorem,"
intended to terrify defendants into settling
out of court.
And what if the defendants don't knuckle
under? For advocacy groups that use staff or
volunteer lawyers as plaintiffs' counsel, the
result is pure gravy. If they lose their cases,
they have lost no money. If they win,
defendants pay attorney's fees at the private
sector's market rate, which the advocacy
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groups can keep for themselves.
Working to amend the Attorney's Fees
Award Act is Rep. John Hostettler, a
Republican from Indiana. Yesterday, he
reintroduced the Public Expression of
Religion Act, under which plaintiffs could
still ask the courts to prevent governmental
endorsement of religion-but could no
longer soak the public for the privilege of
being sued.
By eliminating the financial incentives for
advocacy groups to take on trivial church-
state cases, the measure would actually help
restore the civil-rights law to its intended
purpose. Equally important, it would signal
that Congress is exercising its duty to
correct the judicial branch when it goes
astray of the Constitution. Such is clearly the
case here.
If Buono v. Norton stands, the distance
between the cross at Sunrise Rock and the
headstones at Arlington National Cemetery
will have effectively disappeared. It is only a
matter of time until someone visits that field
of heroes and takes offense at all the
religious symbols inscribed in marble. Then
the courts vill have a hard time devising a
principle by which those thousands of
crosses on federal land are not as
unconstitutional as the one in the desert.
Undoing the unholy mess the courts have
made of the Establishment Clause will be
the work of many years. In the meantime,
Congress should at least deter those who
would rather destroy veterans' memorials
than allow them any religious symbols
whatsoever. As Memorial Day approaches,
swatting their hand from the taxpayer's
pocket is a good place to start.
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"Veterans Fight to Be Remembered"
Reuters: Liberty Legal Institute
May 21, 2009
Jennifer Grisham
WASHINGTON-Today, days before
Memorial Day-Liberty Legal Institute
joins five veterans groups, representing over
four million veterans, to ask the U.S.
Supreme Court to save the Mojave Desert
Veterans Memorial from being torn down by
the ACLU, the subject of Salazar v. Buono
to be heard in The High Court's 2009-2010
term. The coalition is launching a major
campaign to draw attention to the case:
www.Dont'l'earMeDown.com.
"Our nation is only as secure as we
remember those who have given their lives
for the freedom that we now have," said
Kelly Shackelford, chief counsel of Liberty
Legal Institute and attorney for the veterans
groups. "The issue of saving this veterans
memorial is something nearly every
American will be interested in."
The seven-foot-tall memorial cross, erected
in 1934 by World War I veterans as a war
memorial to honor all fallen soldiers, stands
in the midst of the 1.6 million-acre Mojave
Preserve. The legal case arose when a
former National Park Service (NPS)
employee living in Oregon sued for the
memorial's removal.
Following attempts by Congress to
designate the memorial as a national
memorial and to transfer the land to the
VFW, the District Court and Ninth Circuit
Court both ruled that the memorial is
unconstitutional and must be removed. The
court also ordered the memorial covered
with a plywood box until the U.S. Supreme
Court ruling.
"A story untold is a story forgotten," said
Joe Davis, public affairs director for the
VFW. "We must tell the story of our
veterans and fallen heroes, and we must
keep this veterans memorial."
Henry and Wanda Sandoz, current and
longtime caretakers of the memorial agree:
"If they were to tear down the memorial
which has been there for 75 years, I would
lose faith in our government," said Wanda
Sandoz. Henry agreed, "It would be sad. It
would be so sad." The Sandoz's have been
caring for the memorial since 1984 when
they promised their friend Rily Bembrey, a
WWI veteran, on his death bed, that they
would look after the monument. Bembrey
was one of many veterans who erected the
memorial after relocating to the desert after
the war to find physical and emotional
healing.
"If the plaintiff is so offended by the
possibility of seeing this memorial cross in
the desert, will he be offended when he
drives by Arlington National Cemetery?"
asked Jim Sims, National Senior Vice
Commander of the Military Order of the
Purple Heart. "It's our opinion that this case
is not about a single memorial cross, it is a
larger issue of honoring veterans who served
and sacrificed for our country."
The American Legion is also concerned
about the fate of the memorial. "If you don't
think this is not the first domino in a series,
you're not paying attention," said Mark
Seavey, Assistant National Legislative
Director for The Legion. "The cross is
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emblematic of sacrifice, not religion."
This case is part of a larger trend of assaults
on war memorials with religious imagery
and all displays with religious symbolism on
public property. In addition to the lawsuit
against the Mojave Desert War Memorial,
the ACLU is suing for the removal of the
Mount Soledad Memorial (Paulson v.
Abdelnour, et al.). A related case in which
the veterans were involved, Pleasant Grove
City v. Summuni, which dealt with donated
monuments on public property, was resolved
in the Supreme Court earlier this year.
Liberty Legal Institute is a legal
organization committed to the defense of
religious freedoms and First Amendment
rights and is often before the U.S. Supreme
Court.
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"Supreme Court Agrees to Hear Mojave Cross Case"
L.A. Times
February 24, 2009
David G. Savage
In a case that could reshape the doctrine of
separation of church and state, the Supreme
Court agreed Monday to decide whether a
cross to honor fallen soldiers can stand in a
national preserve in California.
The case will give the Roberts court its first
chance to rule directly on the 1st
Amendment's ban on "an establishment of
religion."
In the last two decades, the justices have
been closely divided on whether religious
symbols, such as the Ten Commandments or
a depiction of Christ's birth, can be
displayed on public property.
Four years ago, then-Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor cast a fifth and deciding vote
against the display of the Ten
Commandments in a Kentucky courthouse.
She said such a public display of a religious
message violated the 1st Amendment
because it amounted to a government
endorsement of religion.
In dissent, the court's conservatives said
religious displays on public land generally
do not violate the 1 st Amendment, since no
one is forced to listen to a religious message
or participate in a religious event.
A year later, O'Connor retired and was
replaced by Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr.,
President Bush's second appointee, who
could form a new majority on religion.
At issue is an eight-foot-tall cross in the
Mojave National Preserve in San Bernardino
County. A smaller wooden cross was first
erected by the Veterans of Foreign Wars in
1934 and was originally maintained as a war
memorial by the National Park Service.
The American Civil Liberties Union
objected to the cross and filed a suit on
behalf of Frank Buono, a Catholic and
former Park Service employee. The suit
noted that the government had denied a
request to have a Buddhist shrine erected
near the cross.
Two years ago, the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of
Appeals ruled for the ACLU and declared
the cross an "impermissible governmental
endorsement of religion."
Congress had intervened to save the cross. It
ordered the Interior Department to transfer
to the VFW one acre of land where the cross
stood. The 9th Circuit judges were
unswayed, however.
Bush administration lawyers appealed to the
Supreme Court last fall and said the
" seriously misguided decision" would
require the government "to tear down a
cross that has stood without incident for 70
years as a memorial to fallen service
members."
The government also questioned Buono's
standing to challenge the cross, since he
lives in Oregon and suffers no obvious harm
because of the Mojave cross.
In a friend-of-the-court brief, the VFW,
American Legion and other veterans groups
said the 9th Circuit's ruling, if allowed to
stand, could trigger legal challenges to the
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display of crosses at Arlington National
Cemetery and elsewhere.
The court said it had voted to hear the case,
now relabeled Salazar vs. Buono.
Arguments will be heard in October, and
Obama administration lawyers will be in
charge of defending the presence of the
cross. Monday saw the return of Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg. She had surgery for
pancreatic cancer on Feb. 5, but as
promised, she was back on the bench when
the court resumed hearing oral arguments.
Lab tests said her cancer was in a very early
stage and had not spread.
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"Desert Cross May Lead to Landmark Church-State Ruling"
The Los Angeles Times
October 22, 2008
David G. Savage
A long-running dispute over a cross in the
Mojave National Preserve in Southern
California may give the Supreme Court a
chance to shift the law on church-state
separation. Bush administration lawyers
urged the justices last week to take up the
case and to reverse a series of rulings that
would "require the government to tear down
a cross that has stood without incident for 70
years as a memorial to fallen service
members."
The appeal may be well timed. For two
decades, the court has been closely divided
over the presence of religious displays-
such as a Christmas tree, the Ten
Commandments or a cross-on public
property.
Three years ago, the justices were evenly
split in a pair of cases involving the Ten
Commandments. They upheld, 5 to 4, a
granite monument on the grounds of the
Texas state capitol, but struck down a
similar display inside a courthouse in
Kentucky in another 5-4 ruling.
Soon afterward, Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor, who said both displays were
unconstitutional, retired. She was replaced
by Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr.
"I think the court is poised for a major
change as to the Establishment Clause," said
UC Irvine Law Dean Erwin Chemerinsky,
referring to the 1st Amendment's ban on "an
establishment of religion."
"Under Chief Justice [William H.]
Rehnquist, there were four votes to say the
Establishment Clause is violated only if the
government literally establishes a church or
coerces religious participation," said
Chemerinsky, who argued one of the Ten
Commandments cases before the high court.
"Now, I think there are five."
The Mojave cross is in a remote location on
federal land in San Bernardino County, near
the border with Nevada. It dates to 1934,
when the Veterans of Foreign Wars erected
a wooden cross atop an outcropping known
as Sunrise Rock.
Since then, the cross has been replaced
several times. The current cross-two white
metal pipes welded together-stands less
than 8 feet high, but can be seen from Cima
Road, about 11 miles south of Interstate 15.
The dispute over the cross arose in 1999,
when the National Park Service considered
and rejected a request to put a dome-shaped
Buddhist shrine at a nearby trail head.
Afterward, the park service said it planned
to remove the cross.
But Congress intervened, blocking the
agency from taking down the cross. In 2001,
Frank Buono, a retired park service
employee, sued the park service with the
help of the American Civil Liberties Union
chapter in Southern California. Buono, a
Roman Catholic, alleged that the cross was
an unconstitutional religious display on
public land.
A federal judge and the U.S. 9th Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled for Buono, saying
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the cross must be removed. But Congress
intervened again and told the Interior
Department to give the VFW the acre of
land under the cross.
Undaunted, the 9th Circuit struck that down
too, saying it "would leave a little doughnut
hole of land with a cross in the midst of a
vast federal preserve." A "reasonable
observer would perceive" this as a
"government endorsement of religion," the
ruling said.
U.S. Solicitor General Gregory G. Garre
urged the high court to review the 9th
Circuit's decision, saying it was wrong for at
least two reasons: First, Buono, the park
service employee, did not have standing to
sue over the display of the cross, and
second, Congress had solved the problem by
giving the land to a private group.
Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. has been
skeptical of according standing to litigants
who cannot show that they have suffered an
"actual injury" of some sort. A ruling in
favor of the government on the standing
issue could have a broad impact, as it would
be hard for any objectors to prove that a
religious symbol on government property
had caused them a true injury.
The two sides also disagree over who is
violating the essence of the Ist Amendment.
The ACLU and the 9th Circuit said the park
service should not show a "preference" for
Christianity over Buddhism by allowing a
symbol of one while forbidding the other.
But the Bush administration's lawyer
countered by saying the court's order to tear
down the cross could be seen as
"demonstrating hostility toward religion."
Next month, ACLU lawyers will file a brief
urging the court to turn away the
government's appeal. A decision on whether
to take up the issue may come in December
or January.
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"9th Circuit Topples Mojave Desert Cross"
The Associated Press
June 8, 2004
A federal appeals court ruled yesterday that
an 8-foot cross in the Mojave National
Preserve is an unconstitutional government
endorsement of religion.
Ruling 3-0 in Biono v. Norton, the 9th U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a lower
court that had ruled against the cross, which
has become both a war memorial and a place
of worship at a Southern California desert
site known as Sunrise Rock.
The case was brought by the American Civil
Liberties Union on behalf of a retired
National Park Service employee who
objected to the religious symbolism of the
steel-pipe structure, which sits about 10
miles south of Interstate 15 between Las
Vegas and Barstow.
The cross, the subject of constant attack by
vandals, was constructed in 1934 by a group
of World War I veterans. According to a
plaque they placed nearby, the cross was
intended as a memorial, but has since
attracted Christian worshipers.
The cross has been covered by a heavy tarp
after a federal judge in Riverside sided with
the ACLU in 2002, ruling that the "primary
effect of the presence of the cross" was to
"advance religion."
The San Francisco-based appeals court,
however, did not indicate whether the cross
must be immediately removed or whether it
can remain covered pending new appeals.
"We think this opinion makes it clear that
the government has an obligation to take
down the cross as soon as possible," said
Peter Eliasberg, an ACLU attorney.
The park service did not return calls seeking
comment yesterday on whether it would ask
the 9th Circuit to reconsider, appeal to the
Supreme Court or drop its appeals and
remove the cross.
Sixty years after the cross was constructed,
Congress in 1994 declared the 1.6 million-
acre area, which is covered with Joshua
trees, a national preserve under the National
Park Service's jurisdiction.
The park service, however, defended the
cross in court, saying the outcropping it rests
on was being transferred to a local Veterans
of Foreign Wars post in exchange for five
acres of privately held land near the
preserve, which is in San Bernardino
County.
Congress has also declared the site a war
memorial.
The government told the court that the
pending land transfer made the case moot.
But the appeals court said the transfer could
take years, meaning that the cross was still
on public land. Judge Alex Kozinski, a
Reagan appointee, said that, even if the land
was transferred, the cross may still be a
government endorsement of religion.
In ruling against the government, Kozinski
noted that the park service has not opened
the cross site to other permanent displays,
religious or not. In 1999, the park service
rejected an application for a monument to
Buddha near the cross.
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"Judge Orders Cross Removed from Mojave National Preserve"
National Parks Traveller
September 8, 2007
Kurt Repanshek
A federal judge has ruled that this cross atop Sunri
removed NPS Photo.
Brace yourself, I'm about to delve into one
of those public conversation taboos. You
know, you don't talk sex, politics, or
religion in public.
But at times I find the debates spurred by
symbols fascinating. And. of course.
religious symbols seem to spur the most
debates. The one I want to focus on involves
Mojave National Preserve, where a federal
judge has ruled that a cross can no longer
stand atop Sunrise Rock.
The cross, a simple unadorned one, dates to
1934, when a wooden one was raised in
honor of Americans who died during World
War I. It later was replaced by a more
enduring metal cross. As you look at it, it
seems like a simple tribute. And yet in 2001
se Rock in Mojave National Preserve must be
Frank Buono, a former National Park
Service assistant superintendent at the
preserve, filed a lawsuit, supported by the
American Civil Liberties Union, to have the
cross removed.
Court papers from an earlier stage in the
case noted that Buono was "deeply offended
by the display of a Latin Cross on
government-owned property," reads a story
from the San Bernardino Sun.
Look at the picture.
offended" by the cross?
Are you "deeply
In her ruling, Judge M. Margaret McKeown
held that the cross's location within the
national preserve is an unconstitutional
federal endorsement of Christianity.
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This case has me wondering if there's a
point when a symbol, religious or otherwise,
becomes more a part of our country's
history, of our social fabric, our culture, than
it does a symbol of what it wx as initially
viewed as?
Beyond that, will this ruling lead the Park
Service to remove any and all symbols or
structures located within its properties that
can be construed as religious? Should it
prohibit any and all religious services?
Why did the judge in this case rule against
the federal government, and yet back in
2000 a court dismissed a lawsuit claiming
the federal government was endorsing a
Native American religion by restricting
access to Rainbow Bridge at Rainbow
Bridge National Monument?
Of course, in the Rainbow Bridge case the
court held that the couple that brought the
lawsuit had suffered no personal injury and
so had no standing. But what personal injury
did Mr. Buono suffer in the Mojave Preserve
matter?
Look elsewhere in the park system. The
Park Service earlier this year designated a
synagogue designed by Frank Lloyd Wright
as a National Historic Landmark. Could
someone argue that means the government
endorses Judaism?
At Devil's Tower National Monument in
Wyoming, conflicts arise when Native
Americans want to hold ceremonies at the
tower and ask that climbing be restricted.
And then there's the Christian Ministry In
the National Parks, which holds non-
denominational services every Sunday
during the summer in more than 35 national
parks. By permitting these services, does the
Park Service tacitly endorse religion in
general?
As these cases reflect, there are no quick,
clearcut answers to these questions. Judges
seemingly have different standards when
weighing the merits of the cases before
them. Across the country, different segments
of our population hold different values.
Where do you draw the line? How do you
decide what should be allowed, and what
should not? Should the parks be so aseptic
of some segments of America's culture?
How do you decide which symbols are
offensive and which are not? If the cross in
question were taken down and replaced by a
monument, would that be OK?
Religion long has played a role in this
country's evolution. The Founding Fathers
were pious men, the explorers who opened
up the West often talked of the majesty "He"
created. Even John Muir referred to God in
his writings about nature:
In God's wildness lies the hope of
the world-the great fresh
unblighted, unredeemed wilderness.
The galling harness of civilization
drops off, and wounds heal ere we
are aware. John of the Mountains,
(1938) page 317.
I've long viewed myself as a secularist, and
certainly don't want to see crosses and other
symbols, religious or otherwise, sprouting
on hills and mountaintops across the park
system. And yet, are there times when you
wonder whether we go too far in striving to
be politically correct?
Frankly, perhaps it would have been best if
the judge in the Mojave case simply ruled
that the cross did not belong in the preserve,
regardless of whether it had any religious
connotations.
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"Critics Say the Park Service Is Letting Religion and Politics
Affect Its Policies"
The Neii York Times
January
Michael
18, 2004
Janofsky
To halt the removal of a cross placed in the
Mojave National Preserve almost 70 years
ago to commemorate World War I veterans,
a Republican lawmaker from California has
proposed swapping the land it sits on with a
private group.
The National Park Service recently ordered
the return of plaques bearing biblical verses
that had hung in Grand Canyon National
Park for more than 30 years before they
were taken down last summer. The Park
Service also approved selling a book at the
Grand Canyon that suggests the canyon was
created in six days several thousand years
ago.
And here at the Lincoln Memorial, an eight-
minute film that shows historical events at
the memorial, including demonstrations for
civil rights, abortion rights and gay rights, is
being revised by the Park Service to add
four minutes of more politically neutral
events.
While the Park Service says these are
unrelated incidents, reflecting no
overarching political policy, a national
alliance of public environmental workers
says the efforts are evidence of a new
program of "faith-based parks" promoted by
the Bush administration with the strong
support of conservative groups.
The apparent trend, the alliance says, has
resulted in a willingness by Republican
appointees now in senior positions in the
Park Service to resolve disputes by
protecting religious or conservative content,
even in the
establishment
Amendment,
separation of
violated.
face of arguments that the
clause of the First
which safeguards the
church and state, is being
"What this shows," said Jeff Ruch,
executive director of the alliance, Public
Employees for Environmental
Responsibility, "is that Christian
fundamentalists and morally conservative
groups have a special entree with the
decision makers at the Park Service and the
White House."
A spokesman for the Park Service, Dave
Barna, denied that decisions made in these
recent cases reflected political motives,
insisting that political appointees have
sought advice from career employees in
resolving problems. "These are a few
unrelated issues that have been put together
just to criticize this administration," said Mr.
Barna, who has worked for the Park Service
for eight years.
Even so, in all but the case involving the
cross, a senior political appointee at the Park
Service has influenced the resolution of the
dispute, fueling at least the impression that
political considerations could have played a
part in the decision.
At the Grand Canyon, three plaques quoting
psalms had been hanging on buildings at the
South Rim since the plaques were given to
the park in the late 1960s by the Evangelical
Sisterhood of Mary, a Christian group
founded in Germany during World
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War II.
Maureen Oltrogge, a Grand Canyon
spokeswoman, said that a handful of visitors
each year complain about them, but that it
was not until the American Civil Liberties
Union inquired last February that officials at
the canyon sought counsel from regional
Park Service officials in Denver and a Park
Service lawyer in Santa Fe, N.M. Those
discussions led to a decision last July by the
Grand Canyon superintendent, Joe Alston,
to take the plaques down.
Within a few weeks, however, complaints
over his ruling had reached Washington,
prompting the Park Service's deputy
director, Donald W. Murphy, to ask the
Sisterhood to return the plaques so they
could be displayed again.
In a letter to the Sisterhood last July, Mr.
Murphy said he regretted that "further legal
analysis and policy review did not take
place" before the plaques were removed and
apologized for any inconvenience. He said
he would like to "return to the historical
situation that had been in place" while the
department conducted a more
comprehensive examination of the issue.
Mr. Barna said the issue was still under
review.
The other matter, involving a coffee-table
book that promotes a creationist view of the
Grand Canyon, has been resolved-at least
for now. After the book, "Grand Canyon: A
Different View" (2003, Master Books), by
Tom Vail, a river guide and evangelical
Christian who leads religious-oriented
excursions, first appeared on shelves at the
park's six bookstores last summer, a park
employee raised objections. That led to a
review by several members of the Grand
Canyon staff, who recommended that the
book remain on the same shelves with books
that offer evolutionary explanations of how
the park formed. About 300 copies have
been sold, Ms. Oltrogge said, and more have
been ordered.
But the book's presence clearly troubles
some Park Service employees. As Mr. Barna
said, "We're still struggling with it."
When the controversy arose at the Grand
Canyon, a copy of the book was sent to Park
Service officials in Washington for review.
This month, the Alliance Defense Fund, a
conservative law firm that specializes in
First Amendment issues and is representing
Mr. Vail, threatened to sue the Interior
Department if the book did not receive "the
same treatment as books on the same topic
from differing viewpoints." Mr. Barna said
that Mr. Vail's book had not led senior
officials to ask for a change in policy. They
have determined, he said, that the book can
remain on sale as an alternative theory to
Grand Canyon history-but one that the
Park Service does not necessarily support.
The film at the Lincoln Memorial has been
shown for nearly a decade. But because so
many of the events held there have been
large protests sponsored by liberal groups,
they tend to dominate the presentation. Last
year, Mr. Barna said, several conservative
groups complained that the film reflected "a
leftist political agenda," leading to a
decision by Fran P. Mainella, the Park
Service's director, to order the film
lengthened to include events like the gulf
war victory parade in 1991 and tape of every
president since the memorial opened in
1922.
A dispute over the Mojave Desert cross
arose when a former Park Service employee,
Frank Buono, objected to the presence of a
religious symbol on federal land. After Mr.
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Buono and the American Civil Liberties
Union tried repeatedly to have it taken
down, Congress passed a measure in
December 2000, sponsored by
Representative Jerry Lewis, a 13-term
Republican from California, that prohibited
spending money on its removal. A year
later, the cross was designated a National
Memorial, giving it federal protection.
Mr. Buono then sued the Park Service and
won, with a federal judge in Riverside,
Calif., ordering the government to remove
the cross. Rather than comply, the Park
Service appealed.
With the case now before the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, Mr. Lewis succeeded in
getting a provision into the 2004 defense
appropriations bill that could resolve the
dispute by trading the acre around the cross
for land owned by a private veterans group
in Barstow, Calif.
The government now claims that the land
transfer, which could take several years,
makes the litigation moot. Not so, say Mr.
Buono's lawyers, who argue that the
designation of the cross as a memorial keeps
it in federal hands-and should keep the
court case alive.
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"Lawmaker Seeks Land Swap to Let Mojave Cross Stand"
The Los Angeles Times
October 18, 2002
Julie Cart
A 5-foot cross that has been a fixture in the
Mojave National Preserve for 68 years and
the subject of intensive removal efforts is
now included in a proposed legislative land
exchange that would redraw the park
boundary to place the cross in private hands.
The white cross stands on a rocky slope
called Sunrise Rock, about 11 miles south of
Interstate 15 near the Nevada border.
The Bush administration is backing the
efforts of Rep. Jerry Lewis (R-Redlands) to
preserve the cross, which is fashioned out of
metal pipe and was erected in 1934 to honor
World War I veterans. The issue of a
permanent religious symbol on the remote
desert site has been simmering for three
years. The American Civil Liberties Union
has sued to have the cross taken down.
Lewis has successfully interceded twice
before. First, he presented a bill to prohibit
the Park Service from using federal money
to remove the cross.
Then he inserted language in the 2002
defense appropriations bill that declared the
site a national memorial.
The latest attempt is part of a massive
federal lands bill introduced last week in the
House of Representatives.
Lewis' provision calls for one acre around
the cross to be given to the Barstow
Veterans of Foreign Wars post in exchange
for five acres of land that would be donated
by a private landowner who owns property
within the preserve.
The exchange would allow local residents to
continue to gather for Easter sunrise services
or other religious worship because the
ceremonies would take place on private land
and satisfy the constitutional requirement for
separation of church and state.
Critics say the land swap is an effort to
circumvent the July ruling of a federal judge
who ordered the cross to be taken down. The
Park Service has not complied.
"It's truly amazing that what is a clear-cut
constitutional issue could engender the
depth of legislative enactment and amount
of effort that has gone into saving this
cross," said Frank Buono, a former deputy
superintendent at the Mojave National
Preserve now retired from the Park Service.
It was Buono who notified the Southern
California ACLU after determining that the
cross was on public land.
Buono said he defends citizens' rights to
worship and he supports the idea of a
veterans' memorial, as long as it is
nonsectarian.
"The issue, as a federal judge has ruled, is
the permanent placement of the cross-a
religious symbol-on public land," Buono
said.
Lewis' spokesman, Jim Specht, said
congressman had acted on behalf
constituents who oppose changes to
cross site. Lewis regards the cross as a
the
of
the
war
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memorial, rather than a religious symbol,
Specht said.
Park officials have tried to be sensitive to
residents who love the site even though,
officials say, the remote area is seldom
visited.
"People out here feel very strongly about it,
and we wanted to work with them to find a
resolution," said Mojave's chief ranger,
Sean McGuiness. "Taking it down wasn't a
high priority for us."
Religious symbols are not unknown on
national parkland. The Chapel of
Transfiguration is a major draw at Grand
Tetons National Park in Wyoming. But, to
be allowed, the structure or site must be
found to have historical significance.
In the case of the Mojave cross, a Park
Service study found no historical merit in
the site, which has changed significantly
since the cross was first erected.
Henry Sandoz has been taking care of the
cross since 1983, fulfilling a promise he
made to a dying veteran. Sandoz, a retired
mine employee who lives nearby, said he
has re-erected the cross more than 18 times
in 20 years, as the elements and vandals
have had their way with the isolated site.
The cross began life as two wooden planks
and is now made of sturdy iron pipes welded
together and sunk into concrete.
According to Joe McGuire, quartermaster of
the Barstow VFW post, the Barstow area-
with its cluster of military bases-is a mecca
for military retirees. McGuire said he could
envision a tradition of decorating the site on
Memorial Day.
"We look forward to having it," he said.
The ACLU's case is still pending. The Park
Service has not appealed the judge's ruling
but has asked for a clarification. The judge
has not yet responded.
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"Context is Key to Sorting out Commandments Rulings"
First Amiendment Center
June 28, 2005
Tony Mauro
There are only 10 commandments, but it
took the Supreme Court 138 pages of
opinion to decide whether displays of those
commandments belong on public property.
And in spite of the verbiage, it all boiled
down to the views of one justice: Stephen
Breyer.
The Supreme Court splintered yesterday on
the issue in Van Orden v. Perry and
McCreary County v. ACLU, virtually
guaranteeing further litigation. The justices
said a Ten Commandments monument on
the Capitol grounds in Austin, Texas, could
stay where it has been since 1961. But the
Ten Commandments displays in two county
courthouses in Kentucky, put up in 1999
with unabashed pro-Christian intent, had to
come down.
How to reconcile the two decisions? At the
strictly numerical level, the answer is
Breyer. He was the only justice in the
majority in both 5-4 cases.
But beyond that, Duke University law
professor Erwin Chemerinsky put it best
yesterday: "Context is everything."
Chemerinsky argued before the high court
against the Texas monument, and lost.
Chemerinsky was pleased to have won the
vote of O'Connor, who has voted on both
sides of the church-state divide, but sorry to
have lost Breyer, the deciding vote.
Indeed, context was the driving force in the
Court's decisions, and nothing made that
clearer than the color photographs that were
included in the Court's opinions in the
Texas case. Breyer's concurring opinion,
upholding the Texas display, includes a
panoramic photo of the Capitol grounds that
shows the Ten Commandments monument
as a sliver of granite that can barely be
picked out among an assortment of other
memorials and lampposts. But dissenting
Justice John Paul Stevens, who said flatly
that the message of the memorial is that
"this state endorses the divine code of the
Judeo-Christian code," included a very
different photo in which the face of the
memorial, etched with the words of the Ten
Commandments, almost fills the frame, with
none of its surroundings visible.
For Breyer, the wide-range photo
demonstrated one part of the crucial context.
"The physical setting of the monument," he
wrote, "suggests little or nothing of the
sacred... . The setting does not readily lend
itself to meditation or any other religious
activity. But it does provide a context of
history and moral ideals."
Breyer was also swayed by the fact that the
monument had stood unchallenged since it
was placed there in 1961. It took a homeless
lawyer named Thomas Van Orden, who
often passed the monument on his way to
the state law library, to take offense and take
the state to court. "Those 40 years suggest
more strongly than can any set of formulaic
tests that few individuals, whatever their
system of beliefs, are likely to have
understood the monument as amounting, in
any significantly detrimental way, to a
government effort to favor a particular
religious sect," wrote Breyer.
In dissent, Justice David Souter said the 40-
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year quiescence had no importance in
deciding this establishment-clause case. Past
potential challengers might have been
deterred by financial and social
considerations, he said. "Suing a state over
religion puts nothing in a plaintiffs pocket
and can take a great deal out, and even with
volunteer litigators to supply time and
energy, the risk of social ostracism can be
powerfully deterrent."
But Breyer's view held sway. And, just as
he was willing to let the monument stand, so
too Breyer was content to let other sleeping
dogs lie: the Court's own precedents,
contradictory as they may be at times.
Reviewing those precedents, Breyer said,
"The Court has found no single mechanical
formula that can accurately draw the
constitutional line in every case.
The so-called Lemon test, which appeared to
survive yesterday's decisions, can explain
some of the Court's judgments but not
others, Breyer said, because it is so hard to
draw the line. Legislatures may open their
sessions with prayers, the Court has said, but
public school football players may not.
The Texas monument, like other cases the
Court has faced, was "borderline," Breyer
said. "And in such cases, I see no test-
related substitute for the exercise of legal
judgment. . . . That judgment is not a
personal judgment. Rather, as in all
constitutional cases, it must reflect and
remain faithful to the underlying purposes of
the Clauses, and it must take account of
context and consequences measured in light
of those purposes."
Breyer's celebration of nuance and seeming
contradiction was unacceptable to Justice
Antonin Scalia, who wants clear principles
to be applied without exception. In his angry
dissent in the Kentucky case, some of which
he read from the bench, Scalia wrote, "What
distinguishes the rule of law from the
dictatorship of a shifting Supreme Court
majority is the absolutely indispensable
requirement that judicial opinions be
grounded in consistently applied principle.
That is what prevents judges from ruling
now this way, now that-thumbs up or
thumbs down-as their personal preferences
dictate."
So why does the Court sometimes embrace
government neutrality toward religion and
sometimes not? A lack of courage, Scalia
said. "I suggest it is the instinct for self-
preservation, and the recognition that the
Court ... cannot go too far down the road of
an enforced neutrality that contradicts both
historical fact and current practice without
losing all that sustains it: the willingness of
the people to accept its interpretation of the
Constitution as definitive, in preference to
the contrary interpretation of the
democratically elected branches."
But Justice Sandra Day O'Connor had a
more principled explanation that seemed to
drive her own surprisingly strong stance
against the Ten Commandment displays in
Texas as well as Kentucky. Maintaining a
sometimes wandering boundary between
church and state, she seemed to say, is the
key to avoiding the religious strife that
besets many parts of the world.
"At a time when we see around the world
the violent consequences of the assumption
of religious authority by government,
Americans may count themselves fortunate:
Our regard for constitutional boundaries has
protected us from similar travails, while
allowing private religious exercise to
flourish," O'Connor wrote. "Those who
would renegotiate the boundaries between
church and state must therefore answer a
difficult question: Why would we trade a
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system that has served us so well for one
that has served others so poorly?"
And in a seeming response to Scalia's
repeated reference to the widespread public
acceptance of the Ten Commandments and
other acknowledgements of God, O'Connor
added, -It is true that many Americans find
the Commandments in accord with their
personal beliefs. But we do not count heads
before enforcing the First Amendment."
So at the end of the day, what is the Court's
verdict on the Ten Commandments?
Displays with long and benign histories
seem OK; the thousands of Ten
Commandments memorials like Austin's
that were placed across the country will not
be uprooted. But those displays that are new
and sectarian-driven are vulnerable to legal
attack.
In short, the justices needed only to look up
and to the left of their own chamber to see
the paradigm example of what passes muster
as of yesterday: the sculpted frieze of Moses
holding the tablets, standing for the last 70
years in a row of other lawgivers.
"We do not forget, and in this litigation have
frequently been reminded, that our own
courtroom frieze was deliberately designed
in the exercise of governmental authority so
as to include the figure of Moses holding
tablets exhibiting a portion of the Hebrew
text of the later, secularly phrased
Commandments," wrote Justice David
Souter for the majority in the Kentucky case.
"In the company of 17 other lawgivers, most
of them secular figures, there is no risk that
Moses would strike an observer as evidence
that the National Government was violating
neutrality in religion."
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Reed Elsevier Inc. v. Muchnick
08-103
Ruling Below: In re Literary Works in Electronic Databases Copyright Litig., 509 F.3d 116
(2nd Cir. 2007)
In the 2001 Supreme Court case of New York Times Co. v. Tasini, freelance authors brought suit
against publishers, alleging that their copyrights were infringed when versions of their works
were published in electronic form. While §201(c) of the Copyright Act extends privileges to
reproductions of the copyrighted works, the authors argued that the provision did not include
electronic versions. The Supreme Court agreed. This case was part of the litigation that followed
the Tasini decision. In In re: Literary Works in Electronic Databases Copyright Litigation, the
parties were seeking District Court approval for a settlement reached between freelance authors
and electronic database publishers. However, the Plaintiff class includes a large population of
freelance authors whose copyrights are unregistered, leading the court to question their
jurisdiction. The 2nd Circuit found that the District Court did not have jurisdiction to approve the
settlement, and the parties appealed.
Question Presented: Does 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) restrict subject matter jurisdiction of federal
courts over copyright infringement actions?
IN RE: LITERARY WORKS IN ELECTRONIC DATABASES COPYRIGHT
LITIGATION. Irvin Muchnick, Abraham Zale Znik, Charles Schwartz, Jack Sands, Todd
Pitock, Judith Stacey, Judith Trotsky, Christopher Goodrich, Kathy Glicken and Anita
Bartholomew, Objectors-Appellants,
V.
Thomson Corporation, Dialog Corporation, Gale Group, Inc., West Publishing Company,
Inc., Dow Jones & Company, Inc., Dow Jones Reuters Business Interactive, LLC, Knight
Ridder Inc., Knight Ridder Digital, Mediastream, Inc., Newsbank, Inc., Proquest
Company, Reed Elsevier Inc., Union-Tribune Publishing Company, New York Times
Company, Copley Press, Inc., Ebsco Industries, Inc. and Participating Publisher Tribune
Company, Defendants-Appellees, Michael Castleman Inc., E.L. Doctorow, Tom Dunkel,
Andrea Dworkin, Jay Feldman, James Gleick, Ronald Hayman, Robert Lacey, Ruth
Laney, Paula McDonald, P/K Associates, Inc., Letty Cottin Pogrebin, Gerald Posner,
Miriam Raftery, Ronald M. Schwartz, Mary Sherman, Donald Spoto, Robert E. Treuhaft
and Jessica L. Treuhaft Trust, Robin Vaughan, Robley Wilson, Marie Winn, National
Writers Union, The Authors Guild, Inc. and American Society of Journalists and Authors,
Plaintiffs-Appellees, Edward Roeder, Appellant.
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Ixcerpt: some footnotes and citations omitted]
STRAUB, Circuit Judge:
This class action copyright litigation arises
from the unauthorized electronic
reproduction of various written works.
Named plaintiffs and class members consist
mainly of freelance writers who contracted
with publishers to author the works for
publication in print media, and retained the
copyrights in those works. The contracts did
not grant the publishers the right to
electronically reproduce those works or
license them for electronic reproduction by
others. But the publishers did so anyway.
Plaintiffs then brought this class action on
the theory that such electronic reproduction
infringed their copyrights. After years of
negotiations, class and defense counsel
finally agreed on a settlement. Following
lengthy motion practice, the District Court
for the Southern District of New York
certified a class and approved the settlement.
We review that order and judgment on this
appeal.
The overwhelming majority of claims within
the certified class arise from the
infringement of unregistered copyrights. We
have held, albeit outside the class action
context, that district courts lack statutory
subject matter jurisdiction over infringement
claims arising from unregistered copyrights.
The District Court never specifically
addressed this potential jurisdictional flaw.
The precise issue on appeal is whether the
District Court had jurisdiction to certify a
class consisting of claims arising from the
infringement of unregistered copyrights and
to approve a settlement with respect to those
claims. We hold that it did not. We therefore
vacate its order and judgment and remand
the case for proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
BACKGROUND
In Nei York Times Co. v. Tasini, the
Supreme Court held that §201(c) of the
Copyright Act does not permit publishers to
reproduce freelance works electronically
when they lack specific authorization to do
so. Tasini effectively requires publishers
wishing to electronically reproduce written
works to obtain a separate license to do so.
Shortly after the Court decided Tasini, three
preexisting class action infringement suits,
which had been suspended pending the
decision, were activated and consolidated in
the Southern District of New York. A
fourth, nearly identical action was
coordinated with that consolidated action.
Together, these claims comprise the instant
litigation.
In this case there are basically two kinds of
plaintiffs: individual authors and trade
groups representing authors. Defendants
also fall into two classes: companies that
publish original electronic content, such as
the New York Times Co., and companies
that operate databases that license content
from publishers, such as Thomson
Corporation, the owner of Westlaw.
The named plaintiffs, and the class members
they purport to represent, produced written
works for certain defendants on a freelance
basis. Based on their copyrights in those
freelance works, plaintiffs assert claims for
two types of infringement. They first claim
that publishers, such as the New York Times
Co., infringed their copyrights. This
infringement allegedly occurred when the
publishers licensed the articles for print
publication only but also reproduced the
articles in their electronic databases. Since
the publishers needed but never received a
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license for this second, electronic
reproduction, plaintiffs allege that it
constitutes infringement.
Plaintiffs next claim that the electronic
database services infringed their copyrights.
This infringement allegedly occurred when
those companies licensed the articles from
the publishers and then reproduced the
articles in their own electronic databases.
Because the publishers never possessed the
right to electronically reproduce the articles,
plaintiffs urge, the publishers could not
grant any license for electronic reproduction.
Thus, any such license that the publishers
sold to the aggregators and databases was
legally ineffective. Consequently, according
to plaintiffs, the electronic reproduction by
the databases is unauthorized and infringing.
Since Tasini established the basic soundness
of plaintiffs' liability theory, the District
Court swiftly referred the parties to
mediation. Before the mediator, defendants
contended that this litigation possessed scant
settlement value because the District Court
could never certify the vast majority of the
claims for inclusion in any proposed class.
Defendants noted that section 411(a) of the
Copyright Act provides that "no action for
infringement of the copyright in any United
States work shall be instituted until
preregistration or registration of the
copyright claim has been made in
accordance with this title." 17 US.C. §
411(a) (emphases in defendants' mediation
submission). "That rule," defendants wrote,
"whose language could hardly be clearer,
precludes the certification of any class
respecting works in which a copyright has
not been registered." Defendants then cited
authority for the proposition that the District
Court "lacks jurisdiction . . . to certify a
class covering any unregistered works."
Citing survey evidence showing that
freelancers register less than one percent of
their works, defendants noted that this
jurisdictional failure likely affected more
than 99 percent of the claims at issue.
Having reached an agreement, plaintiffs and
defendants moved the District Court for
class certification and settlement approval.
Objectors opposed the motion on the
ground, inter alia, that the settlement was
inadequate and unfair to Category C
claimants because they were paid little and
singled out for reduction if the total claims
exceeded $18 million. Objectors also
maintained that the disparate treatment of
Category C claimants illustrates that named
plaintiffs, who each possess at least some
registered copyrights, did not adequately
represent those absent class members who
possess only unregistered copyrights.
Defendants responded that Category C
claimants were adequately represented and
treated fairly because their claims were
essentially worthless. In justifying the C-
reduction, defendants renewed their
jurisdictional argument, urging that
Category C claims mainly concerned "works
in which [the] copyright had never been
registered, and which were not, therefore,
within the court's subject matter
jurisdiction." Somewhat similarly, plaintiffs
maintained that "freelance authors typically
did not register their works and thus lacked
standing to bring an infringement action."
After prolonged proceedings, the District
Court granted final class certification and
final settlement approval in September of
2005. The District Court never considered
whether it had jurisdiction to certify a class
consisting mostly of claims arising from
unregistered copyrights, or to approve a
settlement resolving those claims.
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Objectors appealed, again challenging the
settlement's fairness and the adequacy of
named plaintiffs- representation. Prior to
oral argument, we became concerned that
the District Court and the parties had passed
over a nettlesome jurisdictional question.
We ordered the parties to submit letter briefs
"addressing the issue of whether the District
Court had subject matter jurisdiction over
claims concerning the infringement of
unregistered copyrights." In re Literary
Works in Elec. Databases Copyright Litig.,
No. 05-5943-cv (2d Cir. Jan. 31, 2007).
Those submissions were timely filed and we
further questioned the parties at oral
argument.
DISCUSSION
We review de novo whether the District
Court had subject matter jurisdiction. In the
following sections, we first ask whether the
Copyright Act's registration requirement is
jurisdictional and then ask whether each
claim within the class must satisfy that
requirement. We answer both questions
affirmatively. Since most of the claims
within this purported class do not satisfy the
registration requirement, we also analyze
whether the supplemental jurisdiction
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, remedies that
jurisdictional defect. We conclude that it
does not. Based on those determinations, we
ultimately hold that the District Court lacked
jurisdiction to certify the instant class or
approve the settlement.
I. The Copyright Act's Registration
Requirement Is Jurisdictional
Federal district courts possess only limited
jurisdiction, which Congress regulates by
statute. In a copyright action, a district court
initially derives its jurisdiction from two
sources: 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1338.
Section 1331 provides district courts with a
general grant of original jurisdiction over
..all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States." Section 1338 more specifically
grants district courts original jurisdiction
over "any civil action arising under any Act
of Congress relating to . . copyrights."
But these provisions are not necessarily the
end of the matter. Congress may supplement
or limit these basic provisions with
additional requirements "expressed in a
separate statutory section from jurisdictional
grants." Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537
U.S. 149, 159-60 n.6, (2003). Section 411(a)
of the Copyright Act, which regulates a
district court's authority to adjudicate a
copyright claim, is one such additional
provision. It provides that "no action for
infringement of the copyright in any United
States work shall be instituted until
preregistration or registration of the
copyright claim has been made in
accordance with this title." 17 US.C. §
411(a).
Whether this requirement is jurisdictional is
not up for debate in this Circuit. On two
recent occasions, we have squarely held that
it is.
We are far from alone in this regard; there is
widespread agreement among the circuits
that section 411(a) is jurisdictional.
Given our own binding precedent, not to
mention the persuasive authority of our
sister circuits, we again conclude that
section 411(a)'s registration requirement
limits a district court's subject matter
jurisdiction to claims arising from registered
copyrights only.
The parties advance several arguments that
effectively ask us to overrule our holdings in
Morris and Well-Made. The short answer to
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these arguments is that this panel simply
cannot overrule a prior panel's holding.
Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness
we explain why these arguments fail.
The parties first urge that section 411(a) is
jurisdictional in a very minimal sense. They
claim that if a plaintiff brings a single claim
based on a registered copyright, the district
court acquires jurisdiction over any and all
related copyright claims, even if those other
claims arise from unregistered copyrights.
Defendants contend that "§ 411(a) is merely
the plaintiffs ticket to court," that once
stamped, allows him to raise all sorts of
claims arising from unregistered copyrights.
Although defendants are not necessarily
bound by earlier arguments, their current
tack cuts against their position before the
mediator and the District Court, where they
broadly maintained that "works in which
[the] copyright had never been registered . . .
were not . . . within the court's subject
matter jurisdiction."
Anyway, our holding in Well-Made shuts
the door on this line of argument. There, the
plaintiff brought two infringement claims:
one based on the infringement of its
registered copyright in a 20-inch doll, the
other based on the infringement of its
unregistered copyright in a derivative 48-
inch doll. The district court decided the first
claim on the merits but dismissed the second
claim for lack of jurisdiction. We affirmed
on both scores. We specifically upheld the
dismissal, for lack of jurisdiction, of the
claim based on the unregistered copyright
even though the plaintiff had paired that
claim with a related claim stemming from
the registered copyright in the 20-inch doll.
Thus, the existence of a claim based on a
registered copyright does not bring within a
district court's jurisdiction all related claims
stemming from unregistered copyrights.
In similar vein, defendants also point out
that other courts have enjoined the
infringement of unregistered copyrights
when at least one of the plaintiff's
copyrights-in-suit was registered. This is
another, although more limited, variation on
the theme that where one of the plaintiffs
claims arises from a registered copyright,
section 411(a) vests jurisdiction over any
related infringement claim. There are several
problems with this argument.
First, we have never held that a district court
may enjoin the infringement of unregistered
copyrights so long as the underlying action
arises from a registered copyright held by
the same party. Second, even if injunctive
relief against infringement of an
unregistered copyright is available, that
relief is properly limited to situations, as
were found to exist in Olan Mills and
Pacific and Southern Co., where a defendant
has engaged in a pattern of infringement of a
plaintiffs registered copyrights and can be
expected to continue to infringe new
copyrighted material emanating in the future
from the plaintiff. That sort of prophylactic
relief furthers the purposes of the Copyright
Act generally and does not undermine the
intended effect of section 411(a). To the
extent that Perfect 10, Inc. suggests a
broader exception, we decline to follow it.
In any event, defendants' position calls for
an exception vastly broader than is found in
any case by asking us to rule that
registration of one party's copyright would
somehow provide jurisdiction over claims
stemming from the unregistered copyrights
of many other parties. We decline to do so.
In addition to the parties' arguments, we
have considered whether the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Eberhart v.
United States, 546 U.S. 12, (2005) (per
curiam), "casts doubt" on Morris and Well-
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Made; if so, we may reconsider our holdings
in those cases. We conclude that Eberhart
does not undermine our holdings in Morris
and Well-Made.
In Eberhart, the Supreme Court held that the
seven-day time limit for moving under
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 was
not jurisdictional. The Court underscored the
"critical difference between a rule governing
subject-matter jurisdiction and an inflexible
claim-processing rule," and slotted Rule
33's time limit within the latter category.
546 U.S. at 13.
A key difference between section 411(a) and
Rule 33 renders Eberhart inapplicable. Rule
33 merely sets forth a time limit for moving
in a case that undoubtedly already falls
within the district courts subject matter
jurisdiction. The rule is nothing more than
an "'emphatic time prescription[] in [a]
rule[] of court"' that regulates motion
practice within a jurisdictionally-sound
cause of action-namely, a prosecution for a
violation of federal law. Id. at 18. By
contrast, section 411(a) creates a statutory
condition precedent to the suit itself. In so
doing, it "delineat[es] the classes of cases
. . . falling within a court's adjudicatory
authority."' Id. at 19. Given that
fundamental difference between Rule 33 and
section 411(a), Eberhart's holding does not
cast doubt on Morris and Well-Made.
For these reasons, we conclude that section
411 (a)'s registration requirement is a
jurisdictional prerequisite to a copyright
infringement suit.
II. Each Claim within the Certified Class
Must Satisfy Section 411(a)'s Registration
Requirement
Having established that section 411(a)
imposes a jurisdictional requirement, we
must decide whether each claim within the
certified class must satisfy that requirement.
The parties urge that jurisdiction is proper so
long as the named plaintiffs' works were
registered. Based upon the named plaintiffs'
registrations, the parties maintain, the
District Court had jurisdiction to certify a
class containing thousands of claims arising
from unregistered copyrights. We disagree.
Initially, we note that the class action
certification device, Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23, does not offer any alternative
source of jurisdiction in the class action
context. We therefore must look to the
language of section 411(a), as well as any
applicable case law, to determine how the
registration requirement applies in the class
action context.
Again, section 411(a) provides, in relevant
part, that "no action for infringement of the
copyright in any United States work shall be
instituted until preregistration or registration
of the copyright claim has been made in
accordance with this title." 17 U.S.C. §
411(a) (emphasis added). The question, as
we see it, is whether the phrase "the
copyright claim" refers to all the claims
within the class or only those claims of the
named plaintiffs.
On the literal level, the language is not
dispositive. The phrase "the copyright
claim" does not require, or even tend
toward, one reading. But case law does
provide some useful guidance as to how we
should interpret that phrase. To begin with,
we have applied Article III's jurisdictional
requirements to each member of a class.
Since statutory and constitutional
jurisdictional requirements are equally
binding, the same approach should hold
here.
And case law indicates that it does. In Zahn,
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the Supreme Court considered whether the
diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, requires
each class member to satisfy the amount-in-
controversy requirement. The Court held
that the phrase "matter in controversy- in
§ 1332(a) refers to each class member's
claim and therefore requires each claim to
satisfy the statute's amount-in-controversy
requirement. In so holding, the Court
reasoned that Rule 23 does not authorize one
plaintiff to "ride on another's coattails." 414
US.. at 301 (internal quotation marks
omitted). In order to alter this result,
Congress needed to pass, and did pass, a
new statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, which we
analyze in the next section.
Two years later, in Weinberger v. Salfi, the
Court addressed whether a district court
properly certified a class of Social Security
claimants who asserted that they had been
denied benefits wrongfully. Like the
Copyright Act, the Social Security Act
contains a provision limiting jurisdiction
over social security claims: section 205(g) of
the Social Security Act, which grants subject
matter jurisdiction over only "final"
decisions of the Secretary. In determining
whether the district court had jurisdiction to
certify the class in Weinberger, the Supreme
Court applied this finality requirement to all
the claims within the class. It concluded that
the named plaintiffs' claims satisfied the
finality requirement but that claims of absent
class members did not. Given this statutory
jurisdictional defect, "the District Court was
without jurisdiction over so much of the
complaint as concerns the class, and it
should have entered an appropriate order of
dismissal." 422 US. at 763. Weinberger
thus supports the proposition that when a
statute imposes a jurisdictional requirement,
each member of a putative class must satisfy
that requirement.
Four years later, the Court reaffirmed this
approach in Califano v. Yamasaki., There,
the Court held that section 205(g) of the
Social Security Act permits social security
claimants to seek relief via the class action
device. But the Court carefully reiterated
that each class member must meet the
jurisdictional requirements of section
205(g). Stating the proposition more
generally, the Court wrote, "Where the
district court has jurisdiction over the claim
of each individual member of the class, Rule
23 provides a procedure by which the court
may exercise that jurisdiction over the
various individual claims in a single
proceeding." 442 US. at 701.
We see no reason to interpret or apply the
jurisdictional requirement of section 411(a)
any differently. In light of these precedents,
we hold that the phrase "the copyright
claim" in section 411(a) refers to each claim
within a purported class, and thus requires
that each class member's claim arise from a
registered copyright. Only when each claim
satisfies that jurisdictional prerequisite may
the district court utilize Rule 23 to "exercise
[its] jurisdiction over the various individual
claims in a single proceeding." Id.
III. The Supplemental Jurisdiction
Statute Does Not Apply Here
[The Court addresses the possibility that the
supplemental jurisdiction statute might
provide an alternate source of jurisdiction.
They conclude that it does not, holding that
the text of the statute would not apply to
jurisdictionally-deficient federal claims
asserted together with another,
jurisdictionally-proper claim.]
CONCLUSION
Because the District Court lacked
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jurisdiction to certify the class and approve
the settlement agreement, we VACATE and
REMAND for proceedings consistent with
this opinion
VACATED, REMANDED.
DISSENT
JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
dissenting:
Circuit Judge,
The majority insists that the copyright-
registration requirement, 17 U.S.C. § 411(a),
presents a "jurisdictional" bar to this class-
action settlement. To be sure, in the past we
have labeled the copyright-registration
requirement as "jurisdictional," at least with
respect to an action for damages. The
Supreme Court, however, in Eberhart v.
United States, urged us to more carefully
distinguish between true jurisdictional bars
and claim-processing rules that may be
waived and to revisit our use of the
"jurisdiction" label in that light. Following
that instruction and bearing in mind the
underlying purpose of 17 U.S.C. § 411(a), as
well as our recent holding that not all
members of a settlement-only class need to
possess a valid cause of action under the
applicable law, leads me to conclude that the
fact that some of the otherwise presumably
valid copyrights have not been registered is
an insufficient basis for undoing this class-
action settlement.
In Kontrick v. Ryan, and Eberhart, the
Supreme Court held that even "emphatic"
time prescriptions in the rules of court are
not necessarily "jurisdictional," Kontrick,
540 US at 454. It explained, "[c]larity
would be facilitated . . . if courts and
litigants use the label 'jurisdictional' not for
claim-processing rules, but only for
prescriptions delineating the classes of cases
(subject matter jurisdiction) and the persons
(personal jurisdiction) falling within a
court's adjudicatory authority." Eberhart,
5-16 US at 16 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Then, in Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp.,
the Court applied Eberhart and Kontrick to a
statute, concluding that the employee-
numerosity requirement of Title VII, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(b), is not jurisdictional,
noting that "the 15-employee threshold
appears in a separate provision that 'does
not speak in jurisdictional terms or refer in
any way to the jurisdiction of the district
courts,'" 546 US. at 515. Finally, and most
recently, in Bowles v. Russell, the Supreme
Court determined that 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a),
which explicitly provides that in a civil
action "no appeal shall bring any judgment
. . . before a court of appeals for review
unless notice of appeal is filed[] within
thirty days" of entry of judgment, is
jurisdictional. The Court emphasized the
jurisdictional significance "of the fact that a
time limitation is set forth in a statute," 127
S. Ct. at 2364, and noted that § 2107(a)
admits of no exception.
As will be explained, I think that § 411(a) is
more like the employee-numerosity
requirement in Arbaugh than it is like
§ 2107(a) in Bowles. Moreover, because
Congress passed § 411(a) to facilitate the
enforcement of copyrights, I conclude that
compliance with § 411(a) is a mandatory
prerequisite to the accrual of a cause of
action for damages, but not a prerequisite to
the possession of constitutional standing.
Thus this suit falls within the ambit of our
holding in Denney v. Deutsche Bank A.G.,
that not all members of a settlement-only
class must possess a valid cause of action
under the applicable law at the time of
settlement.
Plaintiffs are a class of mostly freelance
authors whose work has been reproduced
without their consent in defendants'
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electronic databases. An individual
infringement suit for damages requires that
the plaintiffs copyright be registered; yet
few members of the class hold registered
copyrights in their work. Of course, should
any wish to sue individually, the formality
of prior registration could be met. After
several years of intense negotiation, and
prior to trial (and hence without registration
of many of the copyrights held by class
members), plaintiffs and defendants reached
the comprehensive settlement that is the
subject of this appeal. The majority vacates
that settlement on the basis that the district
court lacked jurisdiction over the class
because most of its members have not
registered their copyrights. For the reasons
that follow, I respectfully dissent.
1. Jurisdiction and Section 411(a)
Section 411(a) of Title 17 provides that "no
action for infringement of the copyright in
any United States work shall be instituted
until preregistration or registration of the
copyright claim has been made in
accordance with this title." I turn first to the
text of § 411(a) and ask whether it speaks in
"jurisdictional" terms. It does not.
Section 411(a) does not, by its terms,
provide the copyright holder with any of the
sticks in his bundle of rights.
Indeed, it is addressed to the copyright
holder, not the courts, and it simply sets
forth a prerequisite to suit-namely,
registration. Furthermore, as 17 U.S.C.
§ 501(b) makes clear, § 411(a) speaks not to
rights but to the means of their vindication.
It stipulates, "[tihe legal or beneficial owner
of an exclusive right under a copyright is
entitled, subject to the requirements of
section 411, to institute an action for any
infringement of that particular right
committed while he or she is the owner of
it." 17 US.C. § 501(b) (emphasis added).
As we have emphasized, the distinction
between a rights-creating statute and an
enforcement mechanism is an important
one: we typically consider the latter a claim-
processing rule within the meaning of
Eberhart. For instance, in Richardson v.
Goord, 347 F.3d 431 (2d Cir. 2003) (per
curiam), we concluded that the exhaustion
requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform
Act ("PLRA") is a claim-processing rule
because exhaustion is not "essential to the
existence of the claim . . . and therefore to
the presence of an Article III case or
controversy," id at 434 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). Similarly,
registration is not essential to the existence
of a copyright claim or, as is discussed
below in Part II, to the presence of an
Article III case or controversy. Section
411(a) provides that even if registration has
been refused by the Copyright Office, "the
applicant is entitled to institute an action for
infringement if notice thereof, with a copy
of the complaint, is served on the Register of
Copyrights. . . . [T]he Register's failure to
become a party shall not deprive the court of
jurisdiction to determine that issue." 17
US.C. § 411(a). Thus, the registration
requirement appears simply to be a
procedural or "administrative
prerequisite[]," Boos, 201 F.3d at 183, to
ensure that the "deposit, application, and fee
. . . have been delivered to the Copyright
Office in proper form," 17 U.S.C. § 411(a).
And failure to comply with an
administrative prerequisite "would not
deprive district courts of jurisdiction." Boos,
201 F.3d at 183. Indeed, under § 411(a),
district courts' jurisdiction is not disturbed
by the denial of registration or by the
Register's failure, in that event, to become a
party to the litigation.
Second, the legislative history of Title 17
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confirms that § 411(a) does not create rights
but is rather like the enforcement
mechanisms or claim-processing rules in
Kontrick, Eberhart, and Arbaugh.
Congress passed § 411(a) to implement a
policy preference that courts, before they
process a copyright claim, should consider
the views of the Copyright Office, whose
duty is to determine whether "'the material
deposited constitutes copyrightable subject
matter and the other legal and formal
requirements of [Title 17] have been met."'
H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 156. Indeed,
"[tihe Copyright Office certificate of
registration is prima facie evidence of the
facts stated therein. This has generally been
held to mean prima facie proof of ownership
and validity." Novelty Textile Mills, Inc. v.
Joan Fabrics Corp., 558 F2d 1090, 1092
n.1 (2d Cir. 1977) (citation omitted). In this
respect, § 411(a) is like other statutory
exhaustion requirements, which are
designed to permit agencies to pass first on
contested questions, the resolution of which
requires a certain quantum of expertise, and
most such exhaustion requirements are not
jurisdictional. Furthermore, because this suit
was settled before trial, the views of the
Copyright Office are unhelpful; the
copyright registration requirement only
serves its statutory purpose when a cause is
litigated, not settled.
The legislative history of the Copyright Act
also suggests that registration, rather than
being a prerequisite to federal jurisdiction, is
a prerequisite to certain remedies-namely
statutory damages and attorney's fees.
Registration furthers the important policy
behind copyright of disclosing works and
making them part of the public domain. But
because registration is not required for
copyright protection, the Copyright Act
provides the additional remedies of statutory
damages and attorney s fees as incentives to
register.
Third, § 411(a) is riddled with
jurisdictionally recognized exceptions. For
instance, courts routinely permit plaintiffs to
file suit before applying for a copyright or
while the Copyright Office is considering
their application. The general exception that
allows post-suit registration is particularly
telling because "[iut has long been the case
that 'the jurisdiction of the court depends
upon the state of things at the time of the
action brought."' Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas
Global Group, 541 U.S. 567, 571, (2004).
Moreover, as the majority notes, several
circuits have seen fit to enjoin the
infringement of an unregistered copyright.
These circuits have reasoned that, by the
very language of 17 U.S.C. § 502(a), "[t]he
power to grant injunctive relief is not limited
to registered copyrights, or even to those
copyrights which give rise to an
infringement action." Olan Mills, 23 F.3d at
134. Permitting district courts to enjoin the
infringement of unregistered copyrights is
not only consistent with § 502(a), but also
gives meaning to § 408(a)'s provision that
"registration is not a condition of copyright
protection," and to the congressional policy
of making available the additional remedies
of statutory damages and attorney's fees to
those who register.
Finally, it is evident that § 411(a) is not a
definitive limitation on the court's power,
characteristic of a jurisdictional provision,
from § 411(a)'s explicit exception of foreign
works from its reach. The history of this
exception further counsels concluding that
§ 411(a), unlike jurisdictional provisions, is
not meant to be inflexible. In discussing
possible ways to amend the Copyright Act
to bring it into compliance with the Berne
Convention, the Senate Judiciary Committee
argued that because:
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[r]egistration . . . [while] not,
technically speaking, a condition for
the existence of copyright . . is,
however, a precondition for the
exercise of any of the . . . rights
conferred by copyright, . . . [the]
metaphysical distinction between the
existence of a right to prevent
unauthorized use of a copyrighted
work, and the exercise of that right,
[should not be] maintain[ed].
Although the House did not endorse the
Senate's view, Congress as a whole was able
to reach consensus on an amendment to the
Act only because it deemed § 411(a) a
"formality," and the Berne Convention did
not forbid signatories from "'impos[ing]
[formalities] ... on works first published in
its own territory."' La Resolana Architects,
PA v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d
1195, 1206 & n.11 (10th Cir. 2005).
Taken together, § 411(a)'s language,
legislative history, jurisdictional exceptions,
and exception for foreign works strongly
indicate that the registration requirement is
more akin to a claim-processing rule than a
jurisdictional prerequisite.
II. Constitutional Standing in the Class-
Action Context and Section 411(a)
This appeal concerns the pre-trial settlement
of a class action. Whether or not § 411(a) is
a claim-processing rule, compliance with its
requirements is not necessary for a copyright
plaintiff to have constitutional standing.
Indeed, as the Seventh Circuit has aptly
explained, it is hard to see how the filing of
an administrative claim could ever be the
prerequisite to asserting constitutional
injury.
And, in the class-action context, there is a
distinction between constitutional standing,
which is always required, and statutory
standing, which is not required of all
members of a settlement-only class. Uor
instance, in Lerner v. Fleet Bank, N.A., a
RICO class action, we held that RICO
standing was not "jurisdictional," at least in
the class-action context. We explained that
"plaintiffs' lack of statutory standing does
not divest the district court of original
jurisdiction over the . . . action." 318 F.3d
at 130. And we went on to conclude that the
district court could exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over plaintiffs' state-law claims
despite the fact that certain members of the
plaintiff class lacked RICO standing. We
emphasized that RICO standing was
"sufficiently intertwined with the merits,"
Lerner, 318 F.3d at 128, and thus not
jurisdictional.
Drawing such a distinction between
constitutional standing, the absence of which
deprives the court of authority to redress
harm to that plaintiff, and statutory standing,
the absence of which may be waived, makes
particular sense in the settlement context.
We have, for example, approved the
settlement of mass-tort lawsuits involving
plaintiffs who have been exposed to toxic
substances and therefore run the risk of
incurring actionable injuries at some point in
the future-but who, while they may have
constitutional standing, surely could not
survive a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim were they to bring their case to
trial. And I am not disposed to undo such
settlements because certain class members
may not, at the moment of settlement,
possess the statutory cause of action that
they could have in the future and could then
litigate.
A plaintiff alleging copyright infringement
must show ownership of a valid copyright
and copying by the defendant, the
registration requirement, and resulting
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opinion of the Copyright Office., bear upon
the validity of the copyright and its
ownership and thus "go[] to the merits of the
action," cf. Lerner, 318 F3d at 129. But a
plaintiff alleging copyright infringement has
suffered an injury-in-fact whether or not he
has registered his copyright. As the Eighth
Circuit has explained, "infringement itself is
not conditioned upon registration of the
copyright." Olan Mills, 23 F.3d at 1349.
Thus, all members of the plaintiff class-
whether or not they have registered their
copyrights-have been injured by
defendants if we assume the truth of
plaintiffs' allegations.
The other two requirements of Article III
standing-an injury that is traceable to the
challenged action and redressable by a
favorable decision-are also satisfied in this
case. Plaintiffs' injuries are a direct result of
defendants' infringement and would be
redressed by an award of damages for their
economic losses. Plaintiffs therefore have
standing in the constitutional sense.
Finally, as I noted in Part I, claim-
processing rules are not essential to the
presence of an Article III case or
controversy, Richardson, 347 F3d at 434.
That plaintiffs have established an Article III
case or controversy regardless of whether
they have registered is further support for
the conclusion that § 411(a)'s registration
requirement is a claim-processing rule rather
than a jurisdictional prerequisite, and that
plaintiffs' settlement should not be
disturbed.
III. Well-Made Toy, Morris,
Weinberger Are Distinguishable
and
In concluding that § 411(a) is
"'jurisdictional," the majority relies on two
decisions of our court-Well-Made Toy
Manufacturing Corp. v. Goffa International
Corp., and Morris v. Business Concepts,
Inc.,-that attach the "jurisdictional" label
to § 411(a). I have already sought to explain
why we should reconsider our too-facile use
of the jurisdictional label in the wake of
Eberhart. I now explain why those cases, in
any event, offer only equivocal support.
The plaintiff in Well-Made Toy, for instance,
manufactured two similar rag dolls, differing
principally in their size. Although it
registered a copyright in only the smaller of
the two dolls, Well-Made Toy sought
damages from the defendant based on the
defendant's alleged reproduction of the
larger of the two dolls. In concluding that
Well-Made Toy could not maintain such a
suit, we distinguished Streetwise Maps, Inc.
v. VanDam, Inc. In Streetwise Maps, while
the plaintiff had registered a copyright in
only the second of two maps it published (as
in Well-Made Toy), the second map
incorporated the substance of the first map
(unlike the dolls in Well-Made Toy); and
thus, we concluded, the "registration
certificate [for the second map]... suffice[d]
to permit [the plaintiff] to maintain an action
for infringement based on defendants'
infringement [of its unregistered copyright
in the first map]." 159 F.3d at 747. The
difference between Well-Made Toy and
Streetwise Maps was a matter of logic, not
locution: "Because a derivative work is
cumulative of the earlier work, it is logical
that the registration of the derivative work
would relate back to include the original
work, while registration of the original
material would not carry forward to new,
derivative material." Murray Hill Publ'ns v.
ABC Commc'ns, Inc., 264 F.3d 622, 632
(6th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added).
Morris v. Business Concepts, Inc. is equally
unhelpful to the majority. In that case, while
we did say that "subject matter jurisdiction
was lacking because the registration
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requirement of § 411(a) was not satisfied,"
259 F3d at 72. we also asserted, without
mentioning -jurisdiction," that "proper
registration is a prerequisite to an action for
infringement," id. at 68. Thus, Morris is
hardly a beacon of clarity.
The majority likewise relies upon
Weinberger i. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975), to
support its contention that each member of a
settlement-only class must satisfy the
'jurisdictional" requisites to a suit under the
Copyright Act-including as it so happens,§ 411(a). But the majority misses the point:
Weinberger supports the conclusion that the
essential question is whether compliance
with a statutory exhaustion requirement is
necessary for plaintiffs to have
constitutional standing. And, indeed, in
Weinberger it was. Weinberger involved 42
U.S.C. § 405(g), a provision of the Social
Security Act that channels social security
and medicare claims through an
administrative process and precludes federal
courts from exercising general federal
question jurisdiction over such claims. The
Court explained, "it is the Social Security
Act which provides both the standing and
the substantive basis for the presentation of
th[e] constitutional contentions."
WJ1einberger, 422 U.S. at 760-61 (emphasis
added); But, as I have already explained, in
this case, constitutional injury does not
depend upon compliance with § 411(a):
whether or not they have registered their
copyrights, all members of the class in this
case have suffered sufficient injury to satisfy
Article III.
For the foregoing reasons,
dismiss the settlement on
grounds. I respectfully dissent.
I would not
jurisdictional
DISSENTING
358
"Court to Rule on Copyright Settlement"
SCOTUSblog
March 2, 2009
Lyle Denniston
After examining the case multiple times, the
Supreme Court agreed on Monday to rule on
the scope of federal court authority to decide
cases involving copyright infringement,
when the claims have been settled. The
Court limited its review to a question it had
composed: "Does 17 USC 411 (a) restrict
the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal
courts over copyright infringement actions?"
The case is Reed Elsevier, et al., v.
Muchnick, et al. (08-103). It was the only
case granted Monday.
As stated, the question appears to be a
variation on the first question raised by the
petition: "Whether the usual power of lower
courts to approve a comprehensive
settlement releasing claims that would be
outside the courts' subject matter
jurisdiction to adjudicate, confirmed in
Matushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516
U.S. 367 (1996), was eliminated in
copyright infringement actions by 17 USC
411 (a)."
As a practical matter, the case involves
whether the courts had authority to scuttle
an $18 million, nationwide settlement of
copyright infringement claims that authors
made when their free-lance articles or
photos in major publications were made
freely available in those publishers'
electronic databases. This was a class-action
lawsuit.
A District Court had approved the
settlement, but the Second Circuit Court
ruled that the federal law limiting copyright
lawsuits to those who have registered their
works meant that the District Court had no
jurisdiction over the lawsuit, and thus had no
authority to approve the settlement. Some
99 percent of the claims covered by the
settlement were by creators of unregistered
works. A group of publishing companies
then took the issue on to the Supreme Court,
arguing that the nullification of the
settlement contradicted the Supreme Court's
decision in 2001 in New York Times, et al.,
v. Tasini, et al.
The copyright case the Court added to its
docket for decision at its next Term had
been pending at the Court since before the
Term opened. It was listed ten times for
consideration at the Justices' private
Conferences, leading finally to Monday's
order.
The provision at issue in the case, part of the
Copyright Act of 1976, says that "No action
for infringement of the copyright in any
United States work shall be instituted until
. . . registration of the copyright claim has
been made in accordance with this title."
Congress adopted that clause to assure that
courts, in dealing with infringement claims,
would have a chance to consider the views
of the U.S. Copyright Office, which decides
whether a work may qualify for copyright
protection.
The Second Circuit, in its decision in the
Elsevier case, ruled that when a class action
involving copyright infringement claims is
before the court, every member of the class
must have registered the work before suing.
Since many of the authors involved in this
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case had not done so, the class had no right
to sue, the Circuit Court said, so the District
Court had no authority to approve the
settlement.
The Court's grant was limited to the
jurisdictional question. It thus did not accept
for review a second question, testing
whether the Second Circuit had ignored the
Supreme Court's Tasini opinion seeming to
encourage settlement of the copyright claims
at issue.
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"Supreme Court to Revisit a Case on Breach of Copyright"
The New York Times
March 3, 2009
Adam Liptak
WASHINGTON-The Supreme Court
agreed on Monday to revisit a case it
decided eight years ago in favor of freelance
writers who said that newspapers and
magazines had committed copyright
infringement by making their contributions
available on electronic databases.
In that 2001 decision, Nei' York Times
Company v. Tasini, the Supreme Court
seemed to contemplate and even encourage
a settlement of the case, saying that the
parties "may enter into an agreement
allowing continued electronic reproduction
of the authors' works."
After the Tasini decision, many freelance
works were removed from online databases.
Most publishers these days require freelance
writers to sign contracts granting both print
and online rights.
In an effort to settle the original copyright
infringement claims, authors, publishers and
database companies undertook four years of
what they said were intensive, complex and
costly negotiations. In the end, the
defendants agreed to pay $18 million for a
global settlement of all claims in four class
actions to two groups of authors-those who
had registered copyrights in their works and
those who had not.
The second group was by far the more
numerous. But the federal copyright law
allows suits claiming copyright infringement
only after works are registered.
In November 2007, a divided three-judge
panel of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, in New York,
declined to approve the settlement, saying it
did not have jurisdiction over the claims of
the second group of authors.
The question for the Supreme Court this
time is whether courts may approve global
class action settlements that include claims
they would not have had jurisdiction to
decide.
Many authors supported the settlement, but
some objected. The objectors said that
authors who had not registered their works
were treated unfairly because their share
would be reduced if there was not enough
money to go around.
But all concerned urged the court to hear the
case, Reed Elsevier v. Muchnick, No. 08-
103.
A brief for one group of authors said that
most freelance writers "will not spend $35
or $45 to register a year's worth of works"
to bring a lawsuit over "articles they sold
years ago for $50 or $100."
"With no comprehensive settlement in
place," the brief added, "the publishers and
databases will have no choice but to search
for and delete whole swaths of freelance
works from their digital archives, or risk
repetitive litigation over the same dispute
the parties sought to settle in this case."
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"Tasini Parties Ask Supreme Court to Overturn Settlement Rejection"
Librar' Journal Academic Newswire
July 8, 2008
Andrew R. Albanese, Contributing Editor
Parties to the Tasini v. Aew York Tines case
recently filed a petition for certiorari,
meaning they will ask the U.S. Supreme
Court to reverse a November 2007 decision
by the Second Circuit that rejected a
proposed settlement. In a surprise decision,
the Second Circuit rejected the settlement
proposal last year, ruling that the federal
courts could not approve payments of claims
to those holding unregistered copyrights. If
the Supreme Court agrees to hear the appeal,
the Justices will see a rare sight: both parties
to the case will argue to reverse the lower
court ruling. The deadline for the parties to
file their petitions is August 13, 2008.
Although a group of "objectors" still
opposes the settlement terms put forth, and
would like to see the settlement fail, all
parties agree that the Second Circuit ruling
rejecting the case, which essentially leaves
freelancers with unregistered copyrights
with no standing to resolve their
complaints-was wrong. "Neither the
appellants (objectors) nor the appellees
(defendants plus plaintiffs) raised the issue
the [Second Circuit] addressed in its ruling,"
objector Irv Muchnick told the LJ Academic
Newswire in an interview last year. "In fact,
we all argued against it when the Second
Circuit asked for a briefing on it."
If left to stand, the current ruling would
leave both parties in legal limbo, Muchnick
explained, with publishers unable to get the
"complete peace" they seek, and with
unregistered claimants unable to settle
through a class-action. "I think the current
ruling is terribly inconvenient and inefficient
for all concerned, as well as for information
consumers and for society," Muchnick
added. "A failure to reverse would mean not
only that this settlement is rejected but also
that no other settlement could include
unregistered claims."
That would mean that some publishers
would likely remove articles by unregistered
writers from their databases rather than
"face a potential wave of lawsuits even
greater than they might have budgeted to
handle earlier," Muchnick noted.
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"Second Circuit Holds Copyright Class Action Claims Must Be Based on
Registered Copyright"
JOLT digest
December 4, 2007
Andre\w Ungberg-
On November 29, the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit vacated and remanded a
decision of the District Court for the
Southern District of New York to certify a
class of freelance authors and accept a
settlement of their copyright infringement
claims. The claims arose from unauthorized
reproduction of the authors' works on
Internet sites and web databases.
The Second Circuit vacated the district
court's ruling on jurisdictional grounds.
Citing Section 411(a) of the Copyright Act,
which provides that claims will not be
instituted until preregistration or registration
of the copyright claim has been made, the
court held that the district court lacked
jurisdiction over the claims raised by the
majority of the class members, who had not
registered their works. The court held that
because § 411(a) requires each class
member's claims to be based on a registered
copyright, the district court lacked the
authority to both certify the class and accept
any settlement.
Judge Walker dissented, arguing that the
majority fundamentally misunderstood the
-Edited by Wen Bu
nature of § 411(a), treating it as a
jurisdictional bar when in reality it is a
claim-processing rule. Relying on Eberhart
v. United States,, 546 U.S. 12 (2005) and a
series of other Supreme Court decisions to
define the distinction, he argued that
§ 411(a) is more like claim-processing rules
than a jurisdictional bar because the rule
primarily allows consideration of the
Copyright Office's views on the validity of a
copyright (which is not at issue in a
settlement), is a prerequisite only to
particular remedies, and is limited through a
number of recognized exceptions.
He stated that as Congress passed the Act to
facilitate the enforcement of copyrights, the
statute makes registration a prerequisite to
recover damages, but not all members of a
settlement-only class need to hold registered
copyrights for the court to have jurisdiction
over their claims.
Interestingly, Judge Walker and Judge
Winter are possible members of the plaintiff
class but declined to recuse themselves,
issuing a separate opinion explaining their
non-recusal.
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"Appeals Court Voids Agreement to Pay Freelancers for
Work Published on the Web"
Neiw York Times
November 30, 2007
Richard Perez-Pefia
A federal appeals court yesterday threw out
a hard-fought agreement between publishers
and freelance writers to pay the writers for
electronic reproduction of their work.
In a 2-to-i decision, an appellate panel ruled
that the courts had no jurisdiction over the
copyright dispute and that a lower court
erred in accepting the writers' lawsuit and
approving the settlement.
People on both sides of the dispute said it
was unclear what would happen next-
whether the decision would be appealed, a
new suit filed, or a new agreement
negotiated.
"The decision is an outrage, and I hope it's
appealable to the Supreme Court," said
Gerard Colby, president of the National
Writers Union, and a plaintiff.
In 2001, the United States Supreme Court
ruled that digital reproduction of newspaper,
magazine and other articles without the
writers' permission violated their
copyrights. Publishers removed such articles
from their digital archives and began
requiring freelancers to explicitly cede
electronic rights to their work.
But that did not resolve claims for monetary
damages for the earlier violations. In Federal
District Court in Manhattan, Judge George
B. Daniels allowed a class-action suit by
writers and their organizations; without that
crucial step, each writer determined to win
payment would have had to sue individually.
The suit named major publishers and archive
services, including the Thomson
Corporation, The New York Times
Company, Dow Jones & Company, the
LexisNexis unit of the Reed Elsevier Group
and the Tribune Company.
After years of negotiation, the companies
and the writers reached a settlement in
March 2005, which the judge approved. It
provided for mostly modest payments to
freelancers, and capped the publishers'
payout at $18 million.
But yesterday, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in Manhattan
voided the settlement.
In his decision, Judge Chester J. Straub
wrote that federal copyright law allows
claims for damages only by writers who
have registered their work with the United
States Copyright Office. The vast majority
of freelancers did not register, so he said the
courts had no jurisdiction over their
disputes, and the case should not have been
approved as a class-action suit.
He noted that the defendants had themselves
made similar arguments before settling and
stated that they settled the case out of "the
desire to achieve global peace in the
publishing industry."
The settlement had recognized the gap in
standing, providing higher payments for
writers who had registered their work with
the copyright office.
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Judge Ralph K. Winter joined in the
majority. In a dissenting opinion, Chief
Judge John M. Walker argued that the
registration requirement was a malleable
procedural rule for processing a legal claim,
not a strict limit on the court's jurisdiction.
365
"Righting a Wrong Against Writers"
The Legal Intelligencer
April 4, 2005
Shannon P. Duffy
A federal judge has granted preliminary
approval of an $18 million settlement in a
class-action suit on behalf of thousands of
freelance writers who sold literary works to
newspapers and magazines and whose
works later appeared in electronic databases
without their consent.
Lead plaintiffs' lawyer Michael J. Boni of
Kohn Swift & Graf in Philadelphia said the
settlement is believed to be the largest
copyright class-action settlement in history.
"This is a terrific result for the freelancers,"
said Boni. "This settlement will finally
provide payment to thousands of freelance
authors who woke up one day and found
their works being sold on electronic
databases without their permission."
Under the terms of the proposed settlement,
publishers including the New York Times,
Time Inc., and the Wall Street Journal, and
database companies including Dow Jones
Interactive, Knight-Ridder, Lexis-Nexis,
Proquest and West Group agreed to pay
writers up to $1,500 for stories in which the
writers had registered a copyright.
Writers who failed to register their
copyrights will receive up to $60 per article.
The amount paid will depend on a number
of factors, including whether the writer
registered the copyright, the original fee
paid for the article, the year it was published
and whether the writer permits the future use
of the article in the databases.
U.S. District Judge George M. Daniels of
the Southern District of New York granted
preliminary approval of the settlement,
clearing the way for the lawyers to spend $1
million from the settlement fund to notify
the class.
The settlement also provides that the
plaintiffs' lawyers-Boni, along with co-
lead counsel Diane Rice of Ilosie Frost
Large & McArthur and A.J. De Bartolomeo
of Girard Gibbs & De Bartolomeo, both in
San Francisco-may petition for up to $4.4
million in attorney fees.
Several prominent authors served as named
plaintiffs in the suit, including E.L.
Doctorow, Lettie Cotton Pogrebin, James
Gleick and Derrick Bell. The Authors Guild,
the National Writers Union, and the
American Society of Journalists and Authors
also joined as co-plaintiffs.
According to court papers, it was industry
practice for years for freelance authors to
sell their works to publications without a
written contract. Customarily, for a fee paid
to the author, the author granted to the
publisher the first right to publish the work
in a specified edition of the newspaper or
magazine, but in all other respects the author
retained copyright ownership to the work.
In the 1980s and early 1990s, when
electronic databases such as LEXIS/NEXIS
came into existence, print publishers entered
into license agreements authorizing the
databases to copy and sell the first text (or
portions) of the publications, including
articles written by freelance contributors.
But the print publications typically did not
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obtain the freelance authors written
permission for this subsequent publication
of their works on the electronic databases.
In the suit, captioned In re Literary Works
in Electronic Databases Copyright
Litigation, a group of freelance writers
alleged that the databases and print
publications violated their copyrights in the
electronically reproduced works.
In the settlement, the defendants denied any
wrongdoing or liability, and denied that any
member of the class would be entitled to
damages if the case proceeded to trial.
According to court papers, the settlement
was struck after extensive negotiations
mediated by attorney Kenneth R. Feinberg
of The Feinberg Group in Washington, D.C.
Feinberg, a former federal prosecutor in
New York who served as the special master
of the federal Sept. 11th Victim
Compensation Fund, now focuses his
practice on negotiated resolutions of
complex legal disputes.
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"Copyright Developments You Should Know About"
Interface, IV'olwne 5, Issue 6
October 2005
Leonard D. DuBoff
In 2001, the United States Supreme Court
handed down one of the most significant
copyright cases it had decided in decades.
In that case, New York Times Co. v. Tasini,
the Supreme Court confirmed what many of
the lower courts had earlier stated, namely,
that the copyright laws of the United States
do apply in cyberspace. It also attempted to
clarify some of the rules with respect to this
form of new technology and to establish
guidelines for the future. The Supreme
Court then remanded the case to the original
trial court for adjudication based on the new
rules.
Shortly before the Supreme Court's
pronouncement, a number of prominent
authors (including Derrick Bell, E. L.
Doctorow, Lettie Cotton Pogrebin, and
James Gleick), as well as the American
Society of Journalists and Authors, the
Authors Guild, and the National Writers
Union, filed a class action against numerous
publishers and database companies,
including the New York Times, Time, Inc.,
the Wall Street Journal, Dow Jones
Interactive, Knight-Ridder, Lexis-Nexis,
Proquest, and West Group for copyright
infringement, based on facts similar to those
in the Tasini case. In both this case, In re
Literary Works in Electronic Databases
Copyright Litigation, and the Tasini case, it
was noted that it was typical for independent
writers to sell their articles to publishers
without a written agreement. Customarily, it
was argued, the arrangement was for the
publisher to have only first publication
rights for the article, whereas all other rights
were retained by the author.
In the 1980s and 1990s, when electronic
communication emerged, many publishers,
such as those involved in the Tasini and
Literary Works cases, either created
electronic databases themselves or entered
into arrangements with electronic publishers
to have articles included in electronic
databases. When the authors whose works
were involved learned that their materials
were being made available online without
their consent, the litigation began. In the
Tasini case, several freelance authors sued
the New York Times Co., Newsday. Inc.,
and Time, Inc., for those publishers'
licensing of electronic rights to Lexis-Nexis
and University Microfilms International.
It was the authors' position that the
publishers had acquired only the right to
first publication for their articles in a
tangible newspaper or periodical, and, since
all other rights were retained by the author,
publication online without the authors'
permission was unauthorized. The
publishers argued that the electronic
publication of the articles was simply a
"revision" of the original collective works,
expressly permitted by the U.S. Copyright
Act.
The Supreme Court agreed with the authors'
position. The Court made it clear that
publishing online is not merely a "revision"
since the articles were not published in the
same context and noted that the databases
offered individual articles rather than intact
periodicals.
The Supreme Court's approval of
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republication of an article when the
republication is in the same context was
recently relied on by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit in another
landmark case, Faulkner v. National
Geographic Enterprises, Inc. In this case,
many authors and photographers whose
works appeared in National Geographic
magazines over the years filed suit against
the publisher alleging that it infringed their
copyrights when it distributed a collection of
CDs containing the entire collection of
National Geographic magazines from 1888
to 1996. It was the position of the
complainants that republication of their
copyrighted works in electronic form
without permission was an infringement.
This position had, in fact, previously been
upheld by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in
Greenberg v. National Geographic Society,
in which the magazine was held liable for
copyright infringement.
The Second Circuit distinguished the earlier
Eleventh Circuit case, however, because it
predated the Supreme Court's
pronouncement in Tasini and was apparently
inconsistent with the Supreme Court's
position on electronic publishing. It is now
clear that at least in the area covered by the
Second Circuit (which includes New York,
Connecticut, and Vermont), republication of
the works in a different medium is
permissible so long as that republication is
in context (i.e., the entire newspaper or
periodical). In this case, the court noted that
the National Geographic reproduction of the
articles preserved the context and was, in
fact, similar to reproduction on microfiche,
which the Supreme Court had expressly
approved as a simple legal conversion from
one medium to another. The National
Geographic articles appeared exactly as they
had within each issue; the entire magazine
was scanned, showing the page numbers,
photographs, and advertisements exactly as
they had appeared in the original magazine.
Presumably based on the holding in Tasini,
the District Court for the Southern District
of New York recently gave preliminary
approval for a settlement of between $10
and $18 million to be paid to the authors
involved in the Literary Works case, which
involved articles that were not reproduced
exactly as they had originally appeared. The
actual amount to be paid depends on a
number of factors, including copyright
registration, the original fee paid, the year
published, and whether the writer permits
future electronic publication.
There is a host of lessons to be learned from
these cases by writers and photographers, as
well as publishers. The first-and perhaps
most important-is that the publishing
landscape is in flux. Arrangements with
publishers are subject to interpretation by
the courts, but the rules in effect today may
very well change tomorrow. It is for this
reason that authors, photographers, and
publishers should reduce their agreements to
writing. It is also important to have those
agreements reviewed by attorneys who have
experience with intellectual property so that
ambiguities can be avoided, since an
ambiguous written contract may be even
more problematic than an oral contract.
It is also important for those involved in
communication arts to recognize the fact
that the World Wide Web and electronic
publishing are established in today's
publishing world, but it is difficult to predict
what will come next. Unlike its
predecessors, the 1976 Congress recognized
that the world was in technological
expansion and that new media were
inevitable when it revised the copyright law
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to include language that would deal with
media which was "now known or later
dev eloped."
Publishers are generally sensitive to this
fact., and it is quite common for ther to use
the broad language of the statute in their
publishing agreements. Writers and
photographers are also beginning to
recognize the importance of having written
agreements for their works that anticipate
future uses.
Another issue that was significant in the
Literary Works settlement was copyright
registration. The settlement approved by the
Court in Literary Works distinguished the
amounts available for the settling author by,
among other things, whether the works were
registered. Those writers whose works were
registered before the infringing acts
occurred were entitled to a greater amount
of the $18 million settlement than were the
authors whose works had not been
registered. In fact, the amount available for
registered works was up to 25 times more
than that for unregistered works.
Many writers and photographers do not
timely register their works. It seems to be
their position that the cost of registration
need not be incurred since the statute
provides copyright protection without
registration. While this is true, it is
somewhat shortsighted because any
infringer of a work that is not registered will
not be liable for statutory damages or
attorneys' fees. The law provides that those
infringers will be liable only for the
copyright owner's actual damages, that is,
the copyright owner's losses resulting from
the copyright or the infringer's profits,
whichever is greater.
Unfortunately, most infringements are
discovered when the infringer has not earned
much profit, and it is rarely possible to
prove with particularity that the copyright
owner was deprived of profit because of the
infringement. As a result, recovery of actual
damages is often far less than the cost the
copyright owner incurs in litigating the case.
If, therefore, costs and attorneys' fees are
not recoverable, then copyright owners will
find it economically impractical to redress
an infringement. Even the other remedies
available, namely, an order to prevent future
infringement and an order to have the
infringing works destroyed, will likely not
provide the copyright owner with the
financial incentive to redress the wrong.
Copyright registration is by no means
difficult. The forms are available online
from the Copyright Office at
www.copyright.gov. By downloading a
form, filling it out. depositing two of the
best copies of the work when published
(only one copy is required if unpublished),
and paying a $30 registration fee, the work
will be registered in due course. As of the
date of this writing, the turnaround time for
copyright registration is approximately eight
months, though an expedited registration can
be obtained by paying an additional $580.
For this additional $580, a registration will
be accomplished within two weeks. Given
the significant additional cost for expediting
the registration, copyright owners generally
expedite registrations only when it is
important to do so for purposes of litigation.
The Copyright Office has been sensitive to
the financial stress that registration imposes
on many creative people. It was for this
reason that in the year 2001, a regulation
was adopted that permitted photographers
the ability, in some circumstances, to
register groups of photographs with a single
application, single filing fee, and a single
deposit. If photographs in a group are all by
the same photographer, the copyright
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claimant is the same for all photographs and
the photographs are published in the same
calendar year, then a photographer can
register that group of photographs with one
application. The savings could be enormous
for a prolific photographer.
At the same time, rules for deposits for
unpublished collections of photographs were
liberalized. The following variety of deposit
options were made available for those
registering either published or unpublished
groups of photographs: CD-ROMS, DVD-
ROMS, unmounted prints measuring at least
three inches by three inches but not
exceeding 20 inches by 24 inches, contact
sheets, slides with single or multiple (up to
36) images, the format in which the
photographs were published (e.g.,
newspaper and magazine clippings),
photocopies clearing depicting the
photographs or videos clearly depicting the
photographs.
Unfortunately, the Copyright Office has
recently announced a retreat from this liberal
program with regard to the number of
images that can be registered with one
application. Under the new rule, if the
photographer identifies the date of
publication for each photograph in the group
on a continuation sheet, the application may
include no more than 50 continuation sheets
and no more than 750 photographs. This is
likely to work a hardship on many
photographers. Concerned individuals
should write their representatives in
Congress to express their displeasure with
the Copyright Office's recent change.
Creative people are continuously stretching
and exploring new dimensions of their
creativity. This is important for professional
growth and is beneficial for cultural growth
as well. Despite the fact that all benefit from
expanded creativity, it is essential not to lose
sight of the necessity of written agreements
that spell out the rights, obligations, and
limitations of the arrangements between the
parties.
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"Did Second Circuit Eviscerate Copyright Class Actions?"
New York Law .Journal
January 15, 2008
Peter L. Simmons and Mitchell Epner
Six years after the U.S. Supreme Court held
in New York Times v. Tasini, 533 U.S.483
(2001), that freelance writers do not
implicitly convey rights to electronic
reproduction of their works when they
license their materials to newspapers and
other publishers for print media, a group of
copyright holders seeking to vindicate those
Tasini rights was poised finally to recover
some money in a negotiated class action
settlement that was approved by the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of
New York.
But the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit threw out the entire
settlement and held that the district court
lacked jurisdiction even to entertain the
claims of most of the class members, even
though the rights being asserted were the
very ones that the Supreme Court had ruled
were, in fact, protectible.
The Second Circuit, in a split decision,
concluded that most of the class had a right
without a remedy. Even though the
copyright interests were, on the face of
things, valid and infringed, because the
majority of the works for which damages
were claimed were never registered with the
Copyright Office, the class was not entitled
to sue for-and the district court was
powerless to approve a settlement requiring
payment of-damages with respect to those
unregistered works.
Yet copyright infringement class actions are
quite common, and ownership, validity and
valid recordation of the asserted copyrights
is frequently a disputed issue. If, as the
Second Circuit said, the district courts
cannot adjudicate claims involving
copyrights not properly registered, does
Literary Works represent a turning point in
the viability of copyright class actions?
Under an extreme reading of the case,
defendants might now be able to cut off
class claims early merely by raising a
jurisdictional challenge predicated on the
failure to prove registrations for each work
in the class. In all likelihood, the decision
probably does not represent such a break
with precedent. But it does highlight some
of the hazards of pleading and settlement
structuring that could become land mines, as
they did here, if not properly navigated.
Disconnect Between Rights and Remedies
At the core of the Copyright Act, there is a
tension between when a copyright is created
and when a copyright holder may bring an
action to enforce that copyright.
Section 102 of the Copyright Act provides
that "[c]opyright protection subsists . . . in
original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression. .
However, s411(a) of the Copyright Act
provides that "no action for infringement of
the copyright in any United States work
shall be instituted until preregistration or
registration of the copyright claim has been
made in accordance with this title." In other
words, although s102 provides that the
copyright exists, and can be infringed, from
the moment an author places an original
work on paper (or any other tangible
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medium), s41 1(a) disables the copyright
holder from suing to enforce that copyright
until it has been registered.
Following that interdiction, the Second
Circuit seems to hold that district courts
cannot approve class-action settlements that
adjudicate claims involving unregistered
copyrights. Yet in reality, writers and
publishers routinely litigate in class actions
the alleged infringement of their works,
particularly when electronic mass
distribution (including online file-sharing
services) is involved.
And whether those works have been
properly registered is frequently an issue in
dispute. For example, the defendants in the
Napster, Grokster and Streamcast class-
action litigations each raised as an
affirmative defense the claimed lack of valid
copyright registrations for the copyrighted
works allegedly unlawfully disseminated
over those services. Nevertheless, classes
were certified in each of those cases; and, in
each case, membership in the class is
predicated on ownership or control of a
copyrighted musical that had been made
available without permission through the
challenged service, and not on whether the
infringed work was the subject of a valid
registration. Moreover, settlement
agreements were reached and approved by
the courts in those cases that resulted in
payments being made to the plaintiffs
despite the challenge to whether the works
were properly registered, or registered at all.
When the Second Circuit's decision is
properly understood, there is no need to
assume that Literary Works would subject
those settlements, or others like them, to
collateral challenge for lack of jurisdiction,
or that the decision would preclude such
settlements from being reached and enforced
in other cases going forward.
Literary Works Settlement
Following years of litigation, the parties
reached a settlement that provided for the
payment of between $10 million and $18
million by the defendants. The parties
sought and obtained certification of a
settlement class which, like so many others,
was predicated on copyright ownership, and
which did not explicitly state whether class
members had registered their copyrights.
Where the parties appear to have outsmarted
themselves was in dividing the so-called
"subject works," the works for which claims
were being settled, into three groups based
upon whether and when each work had been
registered with the Copyright Office.
"Category A" works were defined as subject
works "properly registered as an individual
work with the U.S. Copyright Office in time
to be eligible for statutory damages under 17
U.S.C. s412(2)." "Category B" works were
defined as subject works "properly
registered before Dec. 31, 2002, but not in
time to be eligible for statutory damages
under 17 U.S.C. s412(2)." "Category C"
works were defined as "all other Subject
Works."
The settlement agreement provided varying
amounts of damages to the three categories
of subject works, with Category A (timely
registered) works obtaining the greatest
recovery, Category B works (those not
registered in time to claim statutory damages
but still entitled to pursue claims for actual
damages) receiving a reduced amount, and
Category C works (those not registered at
all) receiving a sliding scale payment of a
much more modest amount. Moreover, in
the event that total allowed claims would
lead to damages of more than the $18
million maximum payment by the settling
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defendants, the settlement agreement
provided that the damages available to
Category C works would be ratably reduced
or eliminated before any reduction would be
made in the damages available to Category
A or Category B works.
The settlement thus highlighted quite
starkly, in a way the class definition did not,
the substantial merit of the defense
predicated on a failure to register the works.
Compounding the problem, some of the
Category C plaintiffs, those with the
weakest claims, objected to the settlement
on the theory that they should actually have
gotten more out of the deal. And the settling
parties (both plaintiffs and defendants)
responded by shooting themselves in the
foot and contending that the settlement was
fair and should be approved precisely
because those Category C claims concerned
unregistered copyrights that were outside of
the district court's subject matter jurisdiction
and thus entitled to very little compensation.
The district court approved the settlement
without addressing the jurisdictional
question.
The objectors continued their attack on the
fairness of the settlement on appeal, and the
Second Circuit sua sponte required the
parties to submit additional briefs
"addressing the issue of whether the District
Court had subject matter jurisdiction over
claims concerning the infringement of
unregistered copyrights."
Second Circuit Decision
The Second Circuit's majority opinion in
Literary Works held that "the District Court
lacked jurisdiction to certify the instant class
or approve the settlement," reasoning that
although Congress granted (in 28 U.S.C.
s1338) the district courts jurisdiction over
..any civil action arising under any Act of
Congress relating to . . . copyrights," that
jurisdiction was limited by s411(a) of the
Copyright Act. Slip op. at 8-9. Relying upon
Well-Male Toy Mfg. Corp. v. Goffa Int'l
Corp, and Morris v. Business Concepts, Inc.,
the majority held that "Section 411(a)'s
registration requirement limits a district
court's subject matter jurisdiction to claims
arising from registered copyrights only."
Slip op. at 10. "[S]ection 411(a) creates a
statutory condition precedent to the suit
itself. In so doing, it 'delineates the classes
of cases . . . falling within a court's
adjudicatory authority."' Id. at 14. "In other
words, a copyright claim does not exist
absent registration or preregistration-and
the law is clear that courts lack subject
matter jurisdiction over claims that Congress
has specified do not yet exist." Id at 14 n.5.
Judge John M. Walker Jr. dissented from the
finding that s41 1(a) presented a
jurisdictional bar, writing that "in the class
action context, there is a distinction between
constitutional standing, which is always
required, and statutory standing, which is
not required of all members of a settlement-
only class." Dissent at 14. The dissent
contended that holders of infringed
unregistered copyrights satisfied the three
requirements for Article III standing: (a)
injury-in-fact, (b) traceable to the challenged
action and (c) redressable by a favorable
decision. Dissent at 16-17.
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